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Abstract
This thesis undertakes a sustained engagement with theoretical debates within 
and between the fields of human rights and environmental sustainability, which, it is 
argued here, inevitably come together in the context of globalisation. At issue in this 
thesis are questions about the nature of and rationale for human rights, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of environmental sustainability, the impact of globalisation 
on human rights and environmental sustainability, and the interaction between them. 
The aim of the thesis is to interrogate a variety of arguments about human rights and 
environmental sustainability in order to assess their coherence and consistency, and to 
evaluate competing perspectives. The central questions animating this inquiry are, to 
what  extent  can  environmental  threats  to  human  security  be  conceptualised  as  a 
human  rights  issue,  and  do  human  rights  provide  an  adequate  and  appropriate 
framework  in  terms  of  which  to  respond  to  the  environmental  impacts  of 
globalisation? 
The thesis begins by examining the impact of globalisation on human rights 
and environmental sustainability. There follows, in chapter 3, a detailed analysis of 
possible justifications of support for universal human rights, looking at philosophical 
foundations, the idea that there might be an overlapping consensus on human rights, 
and  the  idea  of  human  rights  as  a  sentimental  education.  Chapter  4  focuses  on 
criticisms  that  have  been  levelled  at  the  contemporary  human  rights  regime  and 
evaluates a proposed alternative, Thomas Pogge’s idea of an institutional model of 
human rights. Thereafter the focus of the thesis shifts to environmental sustainability. 
Firstly, chapter 5 investigates definitions of environmental sustainability and proposes 
an evaluative  framework for assessing different  models of economic organisation. 
Secondly, chapter 6 looks at the political  changes that might be appropriate to an 
environmentally  sustainable  society  by examining  green (re-)interpretations  of  the 
concepts of citizenship, democracy, and justice. In chapter 7 the two fields of inquiry 
are reintegrated, firstly by addressing the question of whether rights or sustainability 
can or should be prioritised at the expense of the other, and secondly by considering 
the plausibility and merit of the idea of claiming that there are environmental human 
rights. 
The conclusion advanced in the thesis is that human rights do not provide a 
sufficient framework in terms of which to respond to the environmental impacts of 
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globalisation,  however,  a  renewed understanding  of  human rights,  informed by  a 
sense of the social  and ecological  embeddedness of human life, may be a fruitful 
feature of an environmentally sustainable society. Moreover, it  is argued here that 
human rights and environmental  sustainability share some illuminating features, in 
that support for each is most coherently justified in terms of a sentimental concern for 
the  fate  of  others,  though  informed  by  a  sense  of  the  social  and  ecological 
embeddedness of human life. This informed sentimentalism is ultimately held to be a 
stronger motivation to act in defence of human rights or environmental sustainability 
than rational self-interest in the context of globalisation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
It is now widely accepted within policy circles and academic discourse that the 
environment cannot long sustain the stresses currently placed upon it by the volume 
and  character  of  human  activity,  specifically  the  production  of  wastes  and 
consumption of natural resources. There is also widespread recognition that, despite 
more  than fifty  years  of  campaigning,  legislating,  and official  affirmation,  human 
rights remain systematically underfulfilled in many parts of the world. Human rights 
theorists and green political theorists alike have argued that globalisation exacerbates, 
and  indeed  causes,  serious  problems  in  the  fields  of  human  rights  and  the 
environment. However, few scholars in any field have paid detailed attention to the 
interaction between human rights and environmental sustainability in the context of 
globalisation. The focus of those who have has mostly been on empirical analyses, 
studying, for example, the extent to which economic globalisation prompts changes in 
industrial and agricultural priorities that simultaneously undermine human rights and 
environmental  sustainability  in  a  particular  geographical  area,  or  on  the  overlap 
between legal issues in human rights and environmental protection (see, for example, 
Agyeman et al 2003; Anderson and Boyle (eds) 1996; Bosselmann 2001; Johnston 
1995; Lowi and Shaw (eds) 2000; Picolotti and Tailant (eds) 2003; Zarsky (ed) 2002). 
In  contrast,  the  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  undertake  a  sustained  engagement  with 
theoretical debates within and between the fields of human rights and environmental 
politics, which, I argue, inevitably come together in the context of globalisation.  
The thesis has its genesis in a paradox, or what might be called a ‘trilemma’: it 
is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  individuals  are  more  likely  to  care  about  the 
environment if their human rights are secure, because, for most people, environmental 
issues are long-term rather than immediate  problems,  whereas human rights  often 
refer to our immediate security. People rationally seek to secure their well-being in 
the short-term before they worry about long-term concerns. Therefore, it  might be 
suggested that a useful step in working towards environmental sustainability would be 
to secure human rights for all. But human rights are widely perceived to be embedded 
in a liberal democratic framework that is itself frequently held to be inimical to, or at 
least  problematic  for,  the  project  of  realising  environmental  sustainability. 
Globalisation further complicates matters in that the globalisation of political norms, 
such as democracy and human rights, has been accompanied by, and some argue has 
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been dependent upon, the advancement of economic globalisation, which, to date, has 
had  an  adverse  impact  on  the  global  environment.  If  this  is  the  case,  then,  as 
globalisation  increasingly  undermines  global  ecological  integrity,  environmental 
issues  will  come to  be  an  element  of  the  immediate  concerns  relating  to  human 
security, rather than an issue that can be deferred. Indeed, this is already the case for a 
substantial number of the global poor who live on land that is polluted, desalinated, or 
on  flood plains.  For  such people,  environmental  problems are  already a  threat  to 
human security.
At issue in this thesis, then, are questions about the nature of and rationale for 
human rights, the necessary and sufficient conditions of environmental sustainability, 
and  the  impact  of  globalisation.  A  further  important  focus  of  the  thesis  is  the 
plausibility of the idea of environmental human rights. Environmental human rights 
have been proposed both by green theorists and human rights theorists in the past 
decade, but neither group of scholars has produced a persuasive synthesis of human 
rights theory and environmental theory. Instead, the tendency among green theorists 
has been to take human rights as they are and add environmental rights to the existing 
portfolio (see, for example, Eckersley 1996; Hancock 2003; Hayward 2005a), whilst 
human  rights  theorists  proposing  environmental  rights  have  typically  been  those 
seeking to reconceptualise existing human rights without devoting detailed attention 
to what environmental sustainability would entail (see, for example, Langlois 2001; 
Stammers 1999). 
1.1 Why human rights, environmental sustainability and globalisation?
Throughout the thesis, I take the core issue of environmental politics to be the 
question  of  how  to  achieve  environmental  sustainability.  There  are  many  other 
questions within environmental politics that legitimately command the attention of 
green theorists – for example, what constitutes a just relationship between human and 
non-human  nature?  Do  non-human  beings  have  rights?  What  would  be  a  just 
distribution of environmental goods and harms? Do states have rights to interfere in 
the domestic affairs of neighbours if shared environmental resources are threatened? 
Can future generations have rights? Some of these questions I touch upon in chapters 
5, 6, and 7. But I take environmental sustainability, rather than, say, environmental 
justice or environmental ethics, to be the central issue, because questions about a just 
distribution of clean water, or the ethical treatment of whales, cannot be resolved over 
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the long-term unless the question of how to live sustainably is addressed. Finding a 
sustainable way (or ways) to live is a precondition for all other pursuits, including 
protecting human rights.
Given that one of the aims of the thesis is to investigate the tensions between 
environmental sustainability and human rights, it is appropriate to focus narrowly on 
environmental  sustainability,  rather  than  more  expansive  notions  of  sustainable 
development, which might reasonably be understood to incorporate a commitment to 
human rights. The focus here is on the mutual compatibility between human rights 
and environmental sustainability as normative values. Therefore, it is essential to the 
clarity  of  the  project  to  identify  key  features  of  environmental  sustainability 
independently of any conceptual interconnection with human rights as a starting point 
for analysis.
The  choice  of  examining  the  interaction  between  human  rights  and 
environmental  sustainability,  rather  than,  say,  democracy  and  environmental 
sustainability, or justice and environmental sustainability, is motivated by the fact that 
human  rights  encapsulate  a  notion  of  human  well-being  that  is  claimed  to  be 
universal, and because of the prevalence of human rights language in contemporary 
moral and political discourse, though, in chapter 6 I look at some of the different ways 
in which green theorists have interpreted the concepts of citizenship, democracy, and 
justice. Human rights represent a minimum conception of what is required for a life 
befitting a human being. Insofar as sacrifices are often called for in order to achieve 
environmental  sustainability,  within  the  framework  of  currently  dominant  norms, 
those  sacrifices  must  not,  in  principle,  impinge  upon  human  rights,  if  an 
environmentally  sustainable  life  is  to  be  a  life  befitting  a  human.  If  that  is  not 
possible, then two choices present themselves: either the goal of sustainability or our 
understanding of human rights is in need of re-evaluation. In the course of the thesis, I 
argue  that  neither  environmental  sustainability  nor  human  rights  have  fixed, 
universally agreed upon definitions. One aim of the thesis is therefore to explicate 
some of the various conceptions of each. The point to note here is that human rights 
are a valid and relevant starting point for discussion because they represent a more 
comprehensive notion of the minimum conditions for a fully human life, which is 
claimed to be universal, than the alternatives, such as democracy and justice. Rights to 
democracy and justice are parts of our human rights, they are thus facets of what any 
human should have, but they are not the whole package. This is not to say, however, 
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that the notion of human rights is necessarily valid or even coherent, as I will discuss 
in chapter 3. It is, nevertheless, a point of entry into the debate. 
Processes of globalisation, particularly economic globalisation, are taken here 
to frame the dynamic between human rights and environmental sustainability because 
I argue, in chapter 2, that economic globalisation has contributed to, and sometimes 
caused,  environmental  problems  that  have  human  rights  consequences.  The  latter 
stage  in  this  causal  chain  –  environmental  problems  having  human  rights 
consequences  –  is  fairly  self-evident:  if,  for  instance,  global  warming  causes  sea 
levels to rise,  people living on low-lying land are likely to become environmental 
refugees.  Environmental  refugees typically  face a  number  of  human rights-related 
problems, regarding both socio-economic rights and political  and civil  rights.  The 
former  part  of  the  causal  chain  –  economic  globalisation  causing  environmental 
problems  –  is  an  argument  that  continues  to  generate  controversy,  and  will  be 
explored in some detail in chapters 2 and 5. Globalisation is not, however, exclusively 
economic.  Almost  every state government  in the world has made some degree of 
commitment to the norm of human rights. The globalisation of norms is therefore a 
further part of the picture. Indeed, it is argued that environmental sustainability,  or 
more often the idea of ‘sustainable development’,  is also coming to be a globally 
accepted norm. As will be discussed in chapter 5, much depends upon the ways in 
which sustainability is interpreted, that is, what, precisely, is being sustained. 
At  this  point,  a  further  caveat  should  be  noted.  Economic  globalisation  is 
argued here to be at present set on an environmentally unsustainable trajectory, and 
for that reason raises problems for human rights. However, that is not to say that it is 
the only model of economic organisation that is problematic. Indeed, environmental 
conditions  in  many  former  Soviet  countries  suggest  that  Soviet-style  planned 
economies were also environmentally unsustainable. The selection of globalisation as 
a relevant field of study is a reflection of the dominance of the global economy. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to interrogate a variety of arguments about human 
rights  and  environmental  sustainability,  in  order  to  assess  their  coherence  and 
consistency,  and to evaluate competing perspectives. The lack of consensus within 
each  field  means  that  no  position  argued  for  here  would  satisfy  all  advocates  of 
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human rights, nor all proponents of environmental sustainability. Given the variety of 
positions and approaches within each of the fields that this project brings together, the 
approach taken here in drawing out debates within and between them is necessarily 
somewhat  eclectic,  a  consequence  of  engaging  with  the  multiplicity  of  positions 
within the literature. Though sympathetic to the green agenda, I recognise that green 
thought  comes in  many hues,  and do,  on  occasions,  where  pertinent,  make some 
distinctions, but the focus of this thesis is not an engagement with or assessment of 
green argumentation per se, but, broadly construed, of its  bearing on the relations 
between human rights and environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation. 
As  the  thesis  unfolds  it  will  become apparent  that  I  judge  some  facets  of  green 
thought to be more telling than that of others, but, for the most part, that judgment is 
incidental  to  my  assessment  of  their  contribution  to  the  questions  raised  by  my 
analysis.
The discussion is  organised as  follows:  chapter 2 investigates the dynamic 
between  economic  globalisation,  human  rights,  and  the  environment.  I  begin  the 
chapter by looking at the ways in which human security is affected by environmental 
issues, then the dynamic between globalisation and human rights. Thereafter, I argue 
the case for the claim that economic globalisation has a destructive impact on the 
environment,  and finally  I  suggest  that  current  strategies  of  global  environmental 
governance are inadequate to the task of limiting and redressing the ecological harm 
caused  by  economic  globalisation.  The  question  is  therefore  raised  as  to  whether 
environmental threats to human security should be considered a human rights issue, 
and whether human rights provides an appropriate framework for dealing with the 
challenge of environmental harms associated with globalisation.
The next task of the thesis is therefore to evaluate that framework; specifically, 
whether human rights can constitute a universal norm. In chapter 3 I explore what is 
meant by the term ‘human rights’ and appraise competing justifications advanced in 
defence of human rights. I first consider arguments grounded in rationality, but find 
these unsatisfactory,  in part because they depend upon an assumption that there is 
something  morally  significant  about  being  human,  a  claim  that  is  argued  to  be 
difficult  to  sustain unless  underwritten  by the idea of  a  higher  being that  created 
humans and therefore gives value to them. The universal appeal of such beliefs being 
questionable, I then consider the plausibility of a purported ‘overlapping consensus’ 
on human rights, but again find this problematic. Finally, I look at Richard Rorty’s 
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post-modern account of human rights that seeks to circumvent what he calls ‘appeals 
to  foundationalism’,  by  means  of  a  ‘sentimental  education’,  but  this,  too,  proves 
flawed,  because (as  widely acknowledged) it  provides only a  weak grounding for 
human rights. 
In chapter 4, I look at the contemporary international human rights regime, 
considering some criticisms and evaluating an alternative. The criticisms hinge on the 
purported universalism of human rights, which is found to be problematic in several 
respects. Firstly, the so-called ‘Asian values’ debate highlights tensions that exist over 
the content of human rights. Secondly, the ambivalence of human rights with respect 
to power is discussed, both in terms of the state-centrism of human rights and the idea 
of using human rights as a ‘standard of civilisation’, that is, a means powerful states 
might use to judge the legitimacy of other governments, a practice which could be 
said  to  undermine  the  norm  of  self-determination.  Finally,  I  consider  Pogge’s 
proposed ‘institutional’ model of human rights, and conclude that, although Pogge at 
times seems to adopt a ‘standard of civilisation’ perspective, his strategy of taking as 
a  benchmark the ‘underfulfilment’  rather  than the ‘violation’ of human rights has 
merit,  and  is  particularly  appealing  when  trying  to  theorise  the  link  between 
environmental sustainability and human rights. 
Following this analysis of what human rights are, and what they might be, 
chapter 5 attempts to define environmental sustainability, focusing first on whether an 
ecocentric  or  an  anthropocentric  framework  is  appropriate  for  theorising 
sustainability, and then considering alternative ways of explicating the conditions for 
sustainability. A typical response to the challenge of environmental sustainability is to 
juxtapose future generations’ needs with present generation wants, as, for example, in 
the  influential  Brundtland  report  of  1987.  However,  I  argue  that  such  a  strategy 
obscures more than it clarifies, and instead propose taking ecosystem integrity as a 
starting point for conceptualising environmental sustainability. In the latter half of the 
chapter I  develop a framework for analysis  of competing models  of a sustainable 
economy.  The  conclusion  advanced  is  that  the  ecological  economics  approach 
provides the most robust and appealing model of environmental sustainability. 
Chapter 6 then turns attention to the political conditions for sustainability. The 
argument presented does not offer  a utopian vision of the sustainable society,  but 
instead  considers  possible  green  interpretations  of  three  foundational  norms  – 
citizenship,  democracy,  and  justice  –  which  are  necessarily  interlinked.  One 
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conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that the methods greens might adopt 
for instituting citizenship, democracy, and justice may well require the recognition of 
fundamental rights on the part of individuals if they are to avoid being vulnerable to 
oppression or injustice, even in an environmentally sustainable society. 
In  response  to  this,  chapter  7  first  rebuts  the  argument  that  rights  and 
sustainability  are mutually  exclusive,  and then looks at  the idea of  environmental 
human rights. While green theorists have engaged critically with almost every other 
aspect of liberal democratic politics, human rights have often been endorsed by green 
theorists with a view to promoting environmental human rights. However these are 
built upon the foundation of existing human rights which, in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis,  is  found to be flawed.  I  conclude that  a  critical  engagement  with existing 
models of human rights is a necessary condition of any attempt to foster the idea of 
environmental human rights. 
Finally,  chapter  8  summarises  the  argument  presented  and  assesses  what 
conclusions can be reached on the extent to which human rights offer an appropriate 
framework for addressing the challenge of environmental sustainability in the context 
of  globalisation.  I  argue  that  human rights  may  not  be  a  sufficient  condition  for 
environmental  sustainability,  but  that  a  sentimental  concern for the fate of others, 
informed by knowledge of both the social and ecological embeddedness of human 
life, provides a coherent link between environmental sustainability and human rights 
in the context of globalisation.  
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Chapter 2: Globalisation
It is the contention of this thesis that issues in human rights and environmental 
sustainability inevitably come together and impact on one another in the context of a 
globalised or globalising world. The purpose of this chapter is to ask how and why 
this happens, or, what difference globalisation makes with respect to issues in human 
rights and environmental sustainability. Globalisation has been defined in a number of 
ways. For some it is purely economic, for others predominantly so, for others still it is 
a set of intrinsically linked and equally important processes of economic, political and 
cultural phenomena. One straightforward definition is:
Fundamentally,  [globalisation is]  the closer  integration of the countries 
and peoples of the world which has been made possible by the enormous 
reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking 
down  of  artificial  barriers  to  the  flows  of  goods,  services,  capital, 
knowledge,  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  people  across  borders.  (Stiglitz 
2002:9)
I  am  concerned  here  primarily  with  economic  globalisation  and  the 
implications that this has for the environment, and thus for human rights. Defining 
globalisation principally in economic terms allows me to focus in this chapter on the 
relationship  between the  globalisation of  the  world’s  economy and environmental 
problems related to unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, and the 
consequent relationship between environmental problems and issues in human rights.1 
Economic  globalisation  is  generally  recognised  as  being  driven  or  promoted  by 
neoliberal economic policies. In some writing on globalisation these are responsible 
for all the evils of the world. For instance, in a polemical article, human rights theorist 
Adamantia Pollis asserts that, ‘globalization […] is underpinned by the ideology of 
neoliberalism, which is devoid of any normative principle of justice and humanity; it 
is market driven’ (Pollis 2004:343). Though Pollis is justified in some of her concerns 
about the neoliberal model of economic globalisation, it is misleading to suggest that 
neoliberalism has no normative principles of justice.  To be clear,  neoliberalism is 
1 It should be noted that focusing on the interaction between environmental sustainability and human 
rights does not presuppose an anthropocentric ethic with respect to the environment. Rather, identifying 
the problem of environmental unsustainability as a consequence of patterns in the human economy 
affirms that humans are at the centre of the problem, but not the centre of the universe. An ecocentric 
approach is not thereby excluded. Nevertheless, I argue in chapter 5 that a weak anthropocentrism is 
the most tenable ethical basis from which to approach the question of how to achieve environmental 
sustainability.
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understood here as an economic theory which can be most simply characterised in 
terms of  promoting the  idea that  the  economy should  be freed from government. 
Adherents of neoliberalism hold that government regulation or other interference in 
the market place (such as state ownership or provision of goods) should be minimised, 
so as to maximise efficiency. Success is measured in terms of overall increases in 
economic activity. Neither justice nor humanity are absent from this theory – agents 
should receive the fruits of their own labour, and should not be arbitrarily deprived of 
them by government (by way of taxation), and wealth is expected to ‘trickle down’ 
through  society,  and  improve  thereby  the  general  welfare.  At  the  global  level, 
neoliberal economic policies seek to facilitate world-wide ‘free trade in goods and 
services, freer circulation of capital, and freer ability to invest’ (Martinez and Garcia 
1997). Insofar as economic globalisation impacts on political issues I will  address 
them.  Thus  I  consider  human  rights  and  globalisation,  global  environmental 
governance,  and  the  human  rights  and  environmental  impacts  of  the  purported 
weakening of state sovereignty in the context of globalisation. 
Assertions of undeniable links between human rights and the environment are 
easy  to  find  in  academic  discussion,  NGO  campaigns,  and  intergovernmental 
initiatives  concerning the  environment,  sustainable  development,  and development 
projects  more  generally.  A crude  explanation  of  this  interconnection  might  make 
reference to the global nature of environmental problems – the global environment is 
everyone’s  home, and while there are highly localised instances of environmental 
degradation, there are also global problems, such as climate change, ozone depletion, 
loss of biodiversity, and so on, which would seem to demand global cooperation to be 
solved. Human rights are held to represent a global standard – almost all states have, 
at least formally, signalled their endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) – and so one might expect a global problem to be met with a global 
solution. Starting from the environment side of the equation, greens often argue that a 
‘clean’  or  ‘decent’  environment  is  an  essential  precondition  for  the  realisation  of 
human rights (see, for example, Sachs 1995; Picolotti 2003; Hancock 2003). Starting 
from  the  human  rights  side,  however,  there  is  less  evidence  of  an  unfailing 
commitment  to  environmental  issues  on  the  part  of  human  rights  activists  and 
scholars.  Amnesty  International,  for  example,  explicitly  reject  the  idea  of  an 
‘environmental human right’ (Hancock 2003:56). Prominent human rights theorists 
such as Jack Donnelly (2003) and Michael Freeman (2002) mention environmental 
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issues as a contemporary concern relevant perhaps to human rights theorising, but the 
purported ‘indivisibility of human rights and the environment’ (Picolotti 2003:49) is 
undermined  somewhat,  or  at  the  very  least  requires  explication,  in  view  of  the 
substantive exclusion of environmental issues from most human rights theory. 
One way of approaching such an explication is to consider the importance of 
environmental  sustainability  for  human  security.2 If  human  rights  are  claimed  in 
defence  of  human  security,  and  that  security  is  threatened  by  environmental 
degradation resulting from unsustainable economic practices, then there would seem 
to be a prima facie case for considering the environment to be a human rights issue. 
There is a great deal to be unpacked in this proposition; here I deal with only part of 
it. In section 1 I seek to show a link between human security and the environment. In 
section 2 of this chapter I discuss globalisation and human rights, but postpone until 
chapters 3 and 4 a detailed inquiry as to what exactly human rights are, and why 
people may be said to have such rights. In section 3 of this chapter I illustrate some of 
the ways in which the globalisation of the economy has contributed to environmental 
degradation, but I postpone until chapter 5 a substantive demonstration of the ways in 
which  contemporary  economic  practices  are  unsustainable  from an  environmental 
point  of  view.  In  section  4  I  offer  a  brief  discussion  of  global  environmental 
governance. 
2.1 Human security and the environment
As noted above, almost every state has formally endorsed the UDHR. Article 
3 of the UDHR asserts that all persons have the right to ‘life, liberty and security of 
person’.  Steve Lonergan  notes  that  ‘[i]nitially,  human security  was  interpreted as 
meaning  threats  to  the  physical  security  of  the  person’  (Lonergan  2000:69).  But 
security  of  person  can  also  be  threatened  by  a  number  of  environmental  factors. 
Firstly, environmental degradation and resource depletion are a potential cause of, or 
contributory  factor  in,  violent  conflict  (Lonergan  2000:68;  Neefjes  1999;  Page 
2000:34-36 Redclift  2003).  Secondly,  access  to  clean  air  and water  is  crucial  for 
human life, and it has been argued that the right to water can be regarded as a human 
right (Alvarez 2003). Similarly,  access to food is dependent on the environment in 
important ways and can clearly be regarded as crucial to human security and to the 
2 What I have in mind here is security of person, which, though not insulated from national security, is 
nonetheless a distinct field of inquiry.
18
fulfilment  of  human rights.  As Vandana Shiva (1999)  argues,  the  human right  to 
freedom of speech can be undermined by hunger as well as by political repression. 
Thirdly,  human  security  is  threatened  when  people  are  removed  from  their  land 
because of environmental threats, whether these threats be pollution, such as oil spills, 
other chemical spills, or radioactive contamination, or from flooding and rising sea 
levels  or  landslides  and  soil  erosion.  Another  relevant  consideration  here  is  the 
removal of people from their lands to make way for development projects, such as 
mining and dams. 
There  is  a  vast  literature  on  the  ways  in  which  human  security  has  been 
threatened and compromised in the context of activities associated with globalisation 
and  the  degradation  of  the  environment.  Joan  Martinez-Alier’s  work  on  ‘the 
environmentalism of the poor’ is often cited in this regard. In the face of development 
strategies  to  exploit  minerals,  oil  and  timber  resources,  ‘the  poor  often  find 
themselves fighting for resource conservation and a clean environment even when 
they  do  not  claim  to  be  environmentalists’  (Martinez-Alier  2003:201).  The 
environmental  justice  movement,  most  often  associated  with  the  USA and  South 
Africa,  emerged largely  in  response  to  localised threats  to  environmental  security 
arising from corporate externalities, that is, the ecological costs that are not included 
in the market price of a given commodity (because the producer does not have to pay 
for the costs). For instance, the effects of oil production in the Niger Delta and the 
struggle  of  the Movement  for  the Survival  of  the Ogoni  People  have been much 
publicised since the death of environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 (Sachs 
1995; Robson 1999). Similar examples have been documented in relation to gold-
mining  in  Peru  (Martinez-Alier  2003:210-11)  where  indigenous  and  tribal  people 
have suffered pollution and deforestation of their (claimed) lands, and in Suriname 
(MacKay 2002), where forced relocation of communities was avoided only by a drop 
in the world market price of gold, making mines in the interior of richly biodiverse 
tropical rainforest commercially unviable. The reprieve may be temporary, depending 
on the market price of gold. Many more such stories could be told. 
These  particular  stories,  I  hope,  point  towards  a  general  conclusion;  that 
humans cannot be said to enjoy security of person when preponderant patterns of 
production and consumption, both in local communities and globally, are ecologically 
unsustainable. While it is clear from these cases that there are localised problems, my 
primary concern is with the global picture. Indeed, these local stories indicate a global 
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interconnectedness – the oil companies operating the Niger Delta, say, supply oil to 
petrol  stations  in Europe and North America  – such that  they may be said  to be 
indicative  of  a  more  general  problem  of  ecologically  unsustainable  patterns  of 
production  and  consumption.  The  global  picture  is  also  an  appropriate  level  for 
analysis  because environmental problems, particularly if air or water-borne, do not 
necessarily stay local. Pollution does not respect state borders, as demonstrated by 
acid rain in Scandinavia generated by Eastern European industry in the 1980s and 
early  1990s.  Similarly,  rivers  flowing through more than one country take wastes 
from each community downstream, and therefore require regional rather than national 
management.  Some important  features of the environment,  such as breathable air, 
oceans, and seas, as well as less obvious resources such as the life-support facilities 
afforded  by  biodiversity,  constitute  a  global  commons,  the  preservation  of  which 
requires coordinated effort. 
Looking at the global level, Alan Carter (1999:ch1) details the many ways in 
which our ability to feed ourselves is being seriously compromised. Firstly, global 
warming is contributing to changes in weather patterns that are likely to mean the loss 
of productivity in Europe because of a drop in temperatures with the disruption of the 
Atlantic gulf stream. At the same time, productivity in the American mid-west, the 
country’s  ‘bread basket’,  is  predicted to fall  because rising temperatures there are 
drying out the land, increasing desertification. Secondly, the increasing dominance of 
large  agricultural  business  enterprises,  which  typically  harvest  monocultures,  are 
undermining  biodiversity  and  leaving  crops  vulnerable  to  disease,  disease  that  is 
likely to be made worse by the increasing use of pesticides. Thirdly, intensive farming 
methods are depleting topsoils and contributing to an overall loss of bioproductive 
material in soils, particularly in Europe and the US. Finally, as freshwater supplies 
dwindle globally,  we are using more water for crop irrigation than at any time in 
human history.  All this is happening against a backdrop of exponential  population 
growth that is not expected to level out until the end of the twenty-first century, at 
around 10 billion people, up from 1 billion at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Carter’s  depressing  analysis  is  indicative  of  a  range  of  discussions  that 
conclude  that  an  ever-increasing  percentage  of  humans  will  face  environmental 
threats to their security of person if unsustainable practices are allowed to continue. 
The focus of this thesis is not specific practices and their consequences, but rather, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the social, political and economic structures that maintain 
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these practices. To that end, in section 3 I discuss the ways in which the globalisation 
of the economy contributes to the maintenance of unsustainable patterns of production 
and consumption. In the next section, I look at the globalisation of human rights. 
2.2 Globalisation and human rights
The study of  globalisation  and human rights  has  several  dimensions  to  it. 
Firstly, there is tension between what might be called the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
aspects of the globalisation of human rights – that is, between government-created 
international human rights frameworks and global civil society networks campaigning 
for governments to honour (and sometimes broaden) their human rights commitments. 
Secondly, there is the question of whether human rights represent the globalisation of 
Western norms, and the additional question of whether they should be rejected on that 
basis. These questions I address substantively in chapter 4, though they surface briefly 
in what follows. My concern here is to address two other recurrent questions in the 
literature  on  human rights  and  globalisation  –  firstly,  the  importance  and  alleged 
vulnerability of state sovereignty,  and secondly,  whether globalisation promotes or 
undermines human rights.
2.2.1 Globalisation and sovereignty
Globalisation is in some respects not new. A commentator writing in 1912 
noted the ‘incredible progress of rapidity in communications’ and increasing financial 
interdependence (quoted in Woods 2000:2). Yet many argue that the pace of change 
today is more rapid than it has been in previous periods of intensive economic driven 
social and political change, such as during the industrial revolution, or the period of 
European colonialism.3 Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that the world operates as 
a single economic system to a greater extent than ever before – neoliberal economic 
policies have integrated almost every national economy into the world market system, 
and there are global ‘regimes’, in the form of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for regulating that system. Rare exceptions 
survive, North Korea, for example, remains isolated, but the majority of states that 
were identified as communist during the cold war have made, or are in the process of 
3 The industrial revolution in Europe and North America took 200 years or so, while the period of 
colonialism began in the 1500s and continued until the late 1900s. Globalisation, by contrast, if dated 
to the aftermath of the Second World War, has been a period of massive change in 50 or 60 years 
(Howard-Hassmann 2005:8-13).
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making,  a  transition  to  a  capitalist  economy.  Countries  that  still  identify  as 
communist,  such  as  China  and  Laos,  whilst  retaining  one  party  systems,  have 
introduced capitalist enterprise (Pollis 2004:347-50). 
The  extent  to  which  this  assimilation  into  a  global  capitalist  economy  is 
chosen  or  forced  is  a  matter  of  some  debate.  Some  scholars  assert  that  state 
sovereignty is significantly weakened by the pressures of globalisation:
[T]here  can  be  little  doubt  that  economic  globalization  –  particularly 
developments  in  the  financial  and  commodity  markets  and  the 
consolidation of global production capacity by transnational corporations, 
supported by an extremely pervasive ideology of global neoliberalism – is 
significantly weakening the capacity of even the most powerful states to 
regulate economic  and social  affairs  within their  territorial  boundaries. 
(Stammers 1999:1001)
Such  weakened  capacity  has  important  implications  for  both  human  rights  and 
environmental sustainability. In particular, economic and social rights are said to be 
undermined by neoliberal economic policies that have led to the contraction of social 
welfare  budgets  as  well  as  the  removal  of  jobs  from  high-wage  countries.  State 
sovereignty is important here because the international human rights framework is 
inherently state-centric. States are responsible for protecting citizens’ human rights, 
states  are  the  agents  who  create  whatever  international  or  regional  human  rights 
instruments may be available, and states have recourse to the principle of sovereignty 
enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter in defending any action they take 
(or fail to take) that might be criticised by outside parties as violating human rights 
(Donnelly 2003:ch2). If it were true that sovereignty is being eroded by processes of 
globalisation, then this would have serious implications for the protection of human 
rights. Similarly, protection of environmental standards would also be threatened if 
state capacity and authority were undermined by globalisation. 
Yet  other  scholars  present  a  slightly  more  nuanced  picture.  Linda  Weiss 
suggests that, while globalisation affects all countries, the impacts differ depending on 
the existing capacities of the state and the way in which integration into the global 
economy is managed (Weiss 1998:4).  Ngaire Woods concurs, arguing that:
[T]he impact  of  globalisation varies,  and one  particular  determinant  is 
state strength. All states are affected by globalization, insofar as it alters 
their possibilities and opportunities. However, a much greater erosion of 
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autonomy  is  occurring  in  respect  of  weak  states  than  strong.  (Woods 
2000:10)
The prevalence of the idea that globalisation has left all or nearly all states powerless 
is explained by Weiss and others as emerging in part from the tendency of national 
governments to blame unpopular policies on globalisation (Weiss 1998:14-16). But 
this  perhaps  overstates  the  extent  to  which  governments  are  free  to  reject  the 
globalisation  of  the  economy.  As  discussed  below  in  relation  to  the  impact  of 
economic globalisation on the environment, it is certainly the case that the IMF has 
forced  neoliberal  economic  agendas  on  states  as  a  condition  of  receiving  loans. 
Insofar as states can decide that they do not need the loans after all, they may be said 
to be free not to accept these conditions. States may also accept the conditions and not 
implement them. But it is clear that there have been pressures on poorer states to 
accept neoliberal economic reform, particularly in the aftermath of the debt crisis of 
the 1980s (Woods 2000:11). The bargaining power of states in the WTO is similarly 
limited.4 Thus there is merit in Weiss’ vision of a dichotomy between weaker and 
more  powerful  states,  whereby  weaker  states  experience  some  degree  of  loss  of 
autonomy, whereas more powerful states play a role in facilitating global and regional 
economic integration (Weiss 1998:17-18). 
2.2.2 The global economy and human rights
Tony Evans’ and Jan Hancock’s assessment of the impact of globalisation on 
marginalized  communities,  particularly  the  rural  poor  and  subsistence  farmers,  is 
consistent with Weiss’ model and suggests the further dimension that experience of 
globalisation  is  differentiated  within  as  well  as  between  states:  ‘[G]lobalisation 
suggests  simultaneous  processes  of  integration  and  disintegration:  integration  of 
capital  and economic  relations  and disintegration of  traditional  values  that  define 
society and community’  (Evans and Hancock 1998:9). Drawing heavily from Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann finds that the erosion 
of  traditional  values,  and with  them community-based social  and welfare  support 
systems,  has  been  a  feature  of  previous  economic-driven  large  scale  social  and 
cultural  transformations,  such  as  the  industrial  revolution.  On  the  basis  of  this 
evidence,  Howard-Hassmann  argues  that  ‘whether  globalization  improves  or 
undermines human rights is not a matter that can be observed in the short term’, and 
4 The IMF and the WTO are discussed in more detail below, in section 3. 
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that while short-term effects may be negative, particularly for the poor and for those 
in predominantly rural  or subsistence economies,  the medium to long-term effects 
‘may well be positive’ (Howard-Hassman 2005:1). 
Howard-Hassmann  is  not  insensitive  to  current  human  rights  abuses,  but 
simply points out that the transformation observed today has parallels with previous 
ones that have led to what are now viewed as positive outcomes. One example is that, 
whereas feudal landlords were once responsible for providing a minimum of social 
welfare in rural Britain, as peasants were moved from the land and migrated to cities, 
looking for jobs in the newly emerging industries, the certainty of social welfare was 
lost, but rights and freedoms were gained. The idea of social inequality has lost its 
former legitimacy, and steps have since been taken to secure social welfare for all 
(Howard-Hassmann 2005:6-9). Globalisation, it is argued, may be effecting a similar 
shift – as people’s economic security is undermined by globalisation, ‘globalization 
has spread the idea of human rights world wide’ (Howard-Hassmann 2005:39). 
While  her  analysis  is  in  places  perceptive,  there  is  an  important  element 
missing  from  Howard-Hassmann’s  argument.  At  no  point  does  she  discuss  the 
environmental implications of a globalised economy. Her work is typical of a rather 
simplistic  approach  to  globalisation  and  the  environment  which  observes  an 
improvement  in  some  environmental  quality  indicators  correlated  with  increased 
wealth (Conca 2000:490). From this observation it is concluded that increased citizen 
wealth leads to improved environmental standards. Such a conclusion is all the more 
attractive  as  it  appears  to  fit  with  Ronald  Inglehart’s  notion  of  ‘post-materialist 
values’ and is confirmed by a parallel observation that the very poor in rural areas in 
developing countries often have a devastating impact on their environments at a local 
level,  because they overuse environmental  resources such as water  and pasture in 
order to survive (Carter 1999:25). 
Ken Conca points out the mistake in supposing that increased citizen wealth 
will  inevitably  improve  environmental  quality  –  some  immediately  identifiable 
environmental problems do improve with increases in citizen wealth, most notably air 
quality  (Conca 2000:490),  but  this  is  often at  the expense of  poorer communities 
elsewhere,  as  polluting  industries  relocate  to  countries  with  lower  regulatory 
standards.  Less  visible  problems,  such  as  the  depletion  of  soils  and  forests,  and 
stresses on global life support services afforded by the environment, are not generally 
improved by increases in per capita income. Moreover, McLaren (2003) rejects the 
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identification  of  over-use  of  environmental  resources  by  those  living  in  extreme 
poverty as a cause of environmental problems, and suggests instead that this should 
be seen as an effect of broader unsustainable patterns in the global economy. Failure 
to take note of the environmental problems associated with globalisation invalidates 
Howard-Hassmann’s  assertion  that  globalisation  on  its  current  path  may  have  a 
positive  long-term  effect  on  human  rights,  because  the  long-term  prospects  for 
environmental sustainability on current trends are bleak. Indeed, as suggested above, 
we can reasonably expect to see environment-related threats to human security, and 
thus human rights, increasing in the medium to long-term, if the globalisation of the 
economy continues on its present unsustainable path.
Woods points to the important role played by powerful states, particularly the 
USA,  not  only  in  creating  rules  regulating  economic  globalisation,  but  more 
fundamentally in legitimating the ideas that underpin these rules: ‘[T]he role of such 
powerful states lies not just in enforcing rules, but also in generating and forming 
ostensibly ‘universal’ ideas and consensus about what international rules should be’ 
(Woods 2000:9). Donnelly (1998) has suggested that the global consensus on human 
rights norms is so pervasive that human rights can now be considered a ‘standard of 
civilisation’, whereby compliance with human rights norms is the price of a seat at the 
table of international politics. Donnelly’s proposal is problematic for two reasons.5 
Firstly, a backlash against coercing human rights compliance through such measures 
as bilateral aid and loan conditionality has emerged (Balasubramaniam 1998; Hussein 
2001). This questions not only the purported consensus on human rights but also the 
legitimacy of powerful countries setting a global moral standard. The issue is further 
complicated by the possibility of the global standard changing (say from compliance 
with  human rights  to  cooperation in  a  war  on  terror).  Secondly,  it  is  difficult  to 
reconcile the apparent global consensus on human rights with the numerous, well-
documented violations of human rights that persist in the context of globalisation, 
some instances of which activists attribute to globalisation (in particular, of social and 
economic rights). Indeed, Donnelly elsewhere describes human rights as a necessary 
defence against the power of markets and states (Donnelly 2003:40). 
5 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see chapter 4.
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2.2.3 Human rights, globalisation, and social change
Human rights can be said to exist on two different levels: firstly, human rights 
in  their  institutionalised  form,  affirmed  by  states  and  identifiable  in  treaties  and 
positive  law  (what  may  be  called  the  contemporary  international  human  rights 
‘regime’), and secondly, human rights as moral rights, justified by reference to norms 
that are said to be universal, rather than positive law. The content of these two levels 
of rights does not necessarily correspond, for example, claims emerging in the last ten 
years or so for recognition of an environmental human right have not yet been created 
in positive law in most countries, and have not yet been the subject of international 
agreement. Indeed, it is possible that the former category of positive rights can be 
used  to  impede claims  presented  in  terms  of  the  latter  category  of  human rights 
(Evans  and  Hancock  1998;  Stammers  1999).  Thus  there  can  be  an  ambivalent 
relationship between human rights and social change. The globalisation of neoliberal 
economics,  strongly  supported  by  the  USA and other  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, presents a significant obstacle to 
those who argue for alternative models of rights (and duties), such as Thomas Pogge’s 
institutional  model  of  human  rights  (see  chapter  4),  and  the  accounts  of  duties 
typically  attributed to environmental  citizens  in  green theory (see chapter  6),  and 
indeed alternative models of economic organisation (see chapter 5), at the same time 
as the globalisation of human rights proceeds. A key question to be addressed in this 
thesis is whether human rights, as a global framework for addressing threats to human 
insecurity,  can  be  an  adequate  and  appropriate  framework  for  responding  to  the 
environmental challenges attendant upon globalisation. It is to the impact of economic 
globalisation on the environment that I now turn.
2.3 The environmental impact of the globalisation of the economy 
Ngaire  Woods  offers  a  succinct  summary  of  the  processes  of  economic 
globalisation:
Technological  change and government  deregulation have permitted the 
establishment of transnational networks in production, trade and finance. 
[…]  The  new  ‘production’  network  describes  firms  and  multinational 
enterprises  (MNEs)  who  use  advanced  means  of  communication,  and 
new,  flexible  techniques  of  production  so  as  to  spread  their  activities 
across the globe. In trade, globalization refers to the fact that the quantity 
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and speed of goods and services traded across the globe has increased, and 
so too has the geographical spread of participants, the strength and depth 
of institutions which facilitate trade, and the impact of trade on domestic 
economic  arrangements.  Finally,  in  finance,  globalization  has  been 
facilitated by new financial instruments which permit  a wider range of 
services to be bought and sold across the world economy. (Woods 2000:3)
These processes of economic globalisation are held to have had a positive impact on 
people’s lives for two reasons. Firstly, globalisation makes available a greater variety 
of goods and services, at cheaper prices, to consumers in all corners of the globe, in 
every season (Stiglitz 2002:ch1). Secondly, consequent upon the growth in the world-
wide economy that follows from the expansion of markets, world-wide prosperity is 
increased because of the ‘trickle-down’ effect, which can be explained with reference 
to Adam Smith’s idea that a rising tide lifts all boats.6 Indeed, former US President 
George Bush claimed that  ‘[g]rowth is  the agent of  change and the friend of the 
environment’ (quoted in Doyle 1998:773). Both these arguments can be shown to be 
misleading.  Firstly,  while  the  economic  cost  of  numerous  goods  has  fallen,  the 
ecological costs are often not counted, rather, they are ‘externalised’, but nevertheless 
accrue,  with  significant  repercussions  for  the  health  and  integrity  of  our  global 
ecosystems (Jacobs 1991; Conca 2000; Speth 2003). Moreover, the ecological costs 
of  globalisation  generally  affect  the  poor  first,  if  not  most.  Secondly,  while  total 
global wealth has been increasing in recent decades, the gap between rich and poor 
has also been increasing, both between North and South, and within countries (Woods 
2000; Shiva 2003; Pollis 2004). 
Some researchers have suggested another potential benefit of globalisation, in 
the form of an environmental Kuznets curve, ‘whereby environmental damage starts 
to decrease as a country becomes rich enough’ (Andersson and Lindroth 2001:113). 
Yet this too is misguided, as evidence from the analysis  of ‘ecological footprints’7 
suggests that richer communities displace their environmental costs onto poorer ones, 
both  within  and  between countries.  Environmental  damage  does  not  disappear,  it 
simply disappears from the sight of wealthy consumers, as was seen in relation to air 
pollution in section 2. Increasing disparities between rich and poor thus present an 
6 Though Smith envisaged capital staying within the community, whereas today capital is rather more 
mobile (Mander 2003:113).
7 For an explanation of ‘ecological footprints’, see section 4.
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ecological problem as well as a social one. The globalisation of the economy is, then, 
a complex matter. I propose to examine it by answering two questions: What drives 
globalisation and how it is managed? What effects does it have on the environment?8 
In the next section I go on to consider what means exist for controlling these effects. 
2.3.1 Bretton Woods Institutions
One possible starting place is the globalising agenda promoted by the Bretton 
Woods  Institutions,  in  particular  the  IMF  and  the  WTO.  This  is  an  appropriate 
beginning because, while globalisation is often (rightly) associated with advances in 
technology that facilitate communication and transport at faster and cheaper rates than 
at  any time in  history,  commentators  from the  political  economist  Ngaire  Woods 
(2000:3-4) to the anti-globalisation  campaigner Jerry Mander  (2003:109-110) note 
that globalisation is also made possible by policy choices. Globalisation is neither 
natural or inevitable. It is artificial, in the sense of being human-made, and it is driven 
not (only) by technological developments nor inexorable market forces, but by human 
choices  about  how  to  respond  to  these.  The  Bretton  Woods  Institutions  were 
established in the aftermath of the Second World War with the aim of financing the 
reconstruction  of  countries  devastated  by  the  war  and  of  stabilising  the  global 
economy following  the  destructive  effects  of  the  global  depression  of  the  1930s. 
Former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz records that the character and remit of 
the IMF changed somewhat in the 1980s with the adoption of a neoliberal outlook – 
promoting a global free market – which also came to dominate the WTO and to a 
lesser extent the World Bank (Stiglitz 2002:ch2). Certainly, the IMF and the WTO 
have been at the centre of debates and public demonstrations expressing concern and 
anger  about  the  negative  effects  of  globalisation  since  the  well-publicised 
demonstrations at the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999. 
Criticism of  the IMF centres on the fact  that  states receiving development 
loans  from the  World  Bank have,  since  the  1980s,  been  required  by the  IMF to 
implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), designed by IMF economists, 
intended to stimulate economic growth, stabilise the national economy, and reduce 
government debt.  SAPs typically entail significant cuts in public spending and the 
8 Note that I do not assume that environmental problems are unique to a globalised economy. The pre-
industrial  economy of  Easter  Island was  clearly  environmentally unsustainable.  My interest  in  the 
environmental problems associated with economic globalisation is due to the contemporary dominance 
of neoliberal economics and the environmental problems that these policies currently cause.  
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deregulation of agriculture and industry to facilitate the integration of a particular 
country into the world economy and attract foreign investment (Bryant and Bailey 
1997:60). In particular, poor and developing countries have been strongly encouraged 
by the  IMF to  welcome foreign direct  investment  (FDI)  and  to  invest  in  export-
oriented industries where they have a competitive advantage in the global market. 
Export-led growth has been key to the success of many ‘winners’  in the game of 
globalisation, such as South Korea and Singapore. 
The  environmentalist  objection  to  SAPs  is  three-fold.  Firstly,  and  most 
obviously, deregulating has an adverse effect on the environment where it involves 
reducing environmental standards. Moreover, some analysts suggest that deregulating 
does not, in fact, play a central role in attracting foreign investment, and that the so-
called ‘race-to-the-bottom’ is, if not a myth (Conca 2000), no more necessary than it 
is  desirable  (Weiss  1998:10-12;  Woods  2000:7;  Porter  1999).  Secondly,  cutting 
public spending has typically meant cutting environmental protection budgets (which 
is fine if there are no longer any standards to police) as well as those of other public 
services such as health, education, and welfare. This impacts on human rights as well 
as  the  environment.  Thirdly,  in  agriculture  –  a  key  component  of  the  national 
economy for most poor and developing countries – pursuing a competitive advantage 
in the global market has often meant abandoning subsistence crops in favour of cash 
crops, reducing or eliminating crop rotation, increasing pesticide use, and increasing 
pressure on irrigation sources. This has the effect of reducing the quality of soils and 
contributing to desalinisation, as well as making the country dependent on imports of 
foods, which in turn is dependent on the success of the SAP. In countries where SAPs 
have failed to deliver the hoped-for economic growth, rural farmers who previously 
ate what they grew have gone hungry (Shiva 2003). Raymond Bryant  and Sinéad 
Bailey  sum  up  the  problem  thus:  ‘[S]tructural  adjustment  programmes  often 
simultaneously reduce the ability of states to respond to environmental problems and 
increase  the  seriousness  and  intensity  of  those  problems’  (Bryant  and  Bailey 
1997:61).
The IMF is also criticised for being undemocratic, at the national level, in that 
SAPs may include measures, such as deregulating, that do not respect the will of the 
government receiving the loan, even where that government has been democratically 
elected. This can be seen as a further example of the ways in which globalisation 
undermines  state  sovereignty.  Additionally,  at  the  global  level,  loans  must  be 
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endorsed by 85% of contributing countries, and, as votes are weighted according to 
contributions  and  the  USA  contributes  17.5%  of  IMF  coffers,  the  American 
government has an effective veto on all IMF-approved loans. Strom Thacker (1999) 
demonstrates that a government’s failure to comply fully with IMF conditions on one 
loan has not generally been a barrier to receiving subsequent loans. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the pressure on poorer states to adopt a programme of neoliberal economic 
reform is considerable. 
The dominance of neoliberal economic ideas is also said to be evident in the 
activities of the WTO. The WTO, successor to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) established in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, is the forum in 
which global trade rules are agreed. The raison d’être of the WTO is to facilitate trade 
across the globe. Thus when Shiva (2003) criticises the WTO for its emphasis on 
‘barriers to trade’ rather than ‘barriers to justice’, she is criticising the WTO for doing 
exactly what it is supposed to do. Conca argues that the neoliberal agenda pursued in 
the WTO ‘promises the trade-based dismantling of three decades of environmental 
rule making and the selling of important dimensions of the global commons’ (Conca 
2000:492).  These  are  strong  claims.  In  assessing  the  impact  of  the  WTO on  the 
environment there are two questions to be asked. One concerns the way that the WTO 
contributes to the management of the global economy – are the WTO’s rules sensitive 
to environmental concerns? The other question to be asked is more fundamental – is 
global trade good for the environment? 
The WTO’s environmental record is much disputed. While Conca (2000) is 
scathingly critical of the WTO, and Robyn Eckersley (2004a) finds the WTO guilty of 
encouraging a ‘regulatory chill’ – that is, a reluctance on the part of governments to 
impose or enforce environmental regulations on private enterprise – others are more 
circumspect.  Examining  the  track  record  of  WTO  decisions  in  disputes  between 
member states over environment related restrictions on trade, Eric Neumeyer finds 
that  ‘WTO  jurisprudence  has  become  increasingly  environmentally  friendly’ 
(2004:1). Alasdair Young goes so far as to claim that environmental activists who 
claim that WTO rules are anti-ecological ‘may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy 
and contributing to a so-called “regulatory chill”’ (Young 2005:47). Both Neumeyer 
and Young have (independently) studied WTO rulings on disputes between member 
states relating to measures designed to protect the environment. Where the WTO has 
found that such measures have constituted unfair barriers to trade, the ruling body has 
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done so not because it challenges the right of states to protect the environment, but 
rather because the particular measure has been applied arbitrarily or inconsistently 
(Neumeyer 2004:1-4; Young 2005:50-62). Indeed, it is claimed that,
[t]he reason that the WTO, and the GATT before it, usually ruled against 
regulations that claimed environmental exceptions to international trade 
rules is that the regulations were not particularly good; they were either 
clear  attempts  at  industrial  protection  dressed  up  in  environmentalist 
clothes, or they were poorly thought through and inappropriate tools for 
the environmental management needed. (DeSombre and Barkin 2002:18)
Young (2005:53) also notes that GATT Article XX explicitly recognises the 
right  of  governments  to  set  standards  of  environmental  protection  above  those 
internationally agreed, both in terms of consumption (where products to be imported 
are  feared  to  have  polluting  effects  or  to  be  damaging to  human health,  such  as 
genetically modified organisms, or beef containing growth hormones), or production 
(where products have been produced in ways that are particularly damaging to the 
environment, such as dolphin un-friendly tuna, or unsustainably harvested wood). The 
WTO  has  affirmed  this  principle  also.  Neumeyer  has  further  suggested  that 
governments need not comply with WTO rulings if they do not wish to, they simply 
have to put up with sanctions. ‘But this is not really an option for poor and small 
developing  countries’  (Neumeyer  2004:4),  an  important  point,  one  would  think. 
Finally, while Eckersley (2004a) fears that the possibility of a clash with WTO rules 
inhibits  the  creation  of  strong  Multilateral  Environmental  Agreements  (MEAs), 
Neumeyer,  taking  a  different  view,  argues  that,  ‘it  is  important  to  note  that  no 
provision  contained  in  any  MEA or  any  trade  restriction  undertaken  in  (alleged) 
compliance with any MEA has ever been disputed at the WTO’ (Neumeyer 2004:4). 
Nevertheless, Neumeyer is pessimistic about the future of environmental standards at 
the  WTO.  He  laments  the  fact  that  WTO  rules  do  not  fully  incorporate  the 
precautionary  principle,9 and  that  the  Committee  for  Trade  and  the  Environment 
established by the GATT and continued in the WTO has proven to be ‘a forum for 
rather fruitless discussion’ (Neumeyer 2004:6). The balance of evidence here suggests 
that the primary obstruction to increasing environmental protection in the WTO is 
lack of political will on the part of governments and the absence of leadership. Shiva 
9 The precautionary principle, briefly stated, is the idea that given a product or development should be 
proven to be safe before it can be licensed, and that where there is scientific uncertainty,  approval 
should not be granted.
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(2003:142)  is  scathing  of  the  Indian  government’s  retreat  from  its  erstwhile 
enthusiasm for resisting global trade deals that undermined environmental protection. 
Neumeyer also touches on the troublesome issue of developing nations’ opposition to 
international  environmental  regulations:  ‘[D]eveloping  country  opposition  to  a 
greening of the WTO rules is rooted in a much deeper frustration with the distribution 
of  benefits  from  the  WTO  agreements,  which  are  regarded  as  biased  toward 
developed country interests’ (Neumeyer 2004:7).
One particularly notorious example of WTO rules that are unlikely to benefit 
all  equally,  and that  has  been criticised by both  environmental  and human rights 
activists, is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The rationale behind TRIPS is that it in order to encourage investment in 
Research  and  Development,  and  thus  innovation  that  will  ultimately  benefit 
consumers, private enterprises must be assured that their ideas will be protected from 
theft and exploitation by others. Several commentators have noted the prominent role 
played by American business interests in the development of the TRIPS agreement 
(Conca  2000;  Matthews  2002;  Shiva  2003).  According  to  Duncan  Matthews, 
pharmaceutical  companies and copyright  industries were particularly active in this 
‘because  these  sectors  had  relatively  low  entry  barriers  and  consequently  high 
exposure  to  piracy’  (Matthews  2002:5).  The  final  agreement  was  a  result  of 
negotiation and compromise, but succeeded in creating internationally binding rules 
regarding the recognition of copyright. 
Some activists are sceptical of the likelihood of the public interest winning out 
given the apparent close relationship between big business and government  in the 
creation of this agreement (Shiva 2003). What can be stated as fact, however, is that 
the TRIPS agreement allows for (among other things) the patenting of plant varieties 
and microbiological processes (FOEI 2005). This outcome has been widely attacked. 
In August 2000, the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights unanimously passed a resolution expressing concern about the human rights 
implications  of  the  TRIPS  agreement  (Singh  2000).  Conca  argues  that,  ‘[t]he 
enforcement of multinational property rights to biodiversity threatens to strip access 
from the communities  around the world that  previously had a stake in promoting 
biological conservation’ (Conca 2000:490). Conca here picks up on a broader theme 
in debates about economic globalisation. As governments seek to attract FDI, they are 
often  guilty  of  excluding  their  own  local  communities  from  decision-making 
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processes about the development of natural resources. In studies of conflicts between 
the norms of neoliberal driven economic globalisation on the one hand, and human 
rights  and the environment on the other,  Lynda Zarsky (2002) and others  present 
numerous cases of World Bank and IMF-backed development programmes that have 
threatened  access  of  communities  to  lands  that  they occupied  but  that  have been 
earmarked for development.10
Returning to the question of intellectual/biological property, Matthews (2002) 
argues that the consensus between the EU and the US that was crucial in achieving 
the  TRIPS  agreement  is  now  eroding  as  the  implications  of  this  far-reaching 
agreement become clearer, particularly in developing countries, but that substantive 
revision  of  the  agreement  is  nonetheless  unlikely.  To  date,  there  has  been  an 
amendment to the agreement to allow developing countries to import generic versions 
of some patented drugs, and Brazil and India are leading the efforts of a group of 
developing countries  calling for a  further  amendment  to TRIPS to require private 
enterprises  to  disclose  the  origin  of  plant  ‘inventions’,  or  plants  to  be  patented, 
thereby ensuring that the country of origin ‘received prior informed consent’ and  ‘fair 
and equitable benefit sharing’ would follow (WTO 2005). 
2.3.2 Environmental impacts
The second question to be asked in relation to the WTO, as one of the primary 
institutions  for  managing  global  trade,  is  whether  such  trade  is  good  for  the 
environment.  Trade  is  an  appropriate  focus  for  investigating  the  impact  of  a 
globalising economy on the environment because other factors in the global economy 
are linked to trade. The impetus for FDI follows from enterprises trying to find a 
competitive edge in the global market. Globalised production networks are similarly a 
consequence of the drive to reduce production costs so as to increase competitiveness. 
Sari lists three ways in which trade and FDI can affect the level of pollution in a given 
territory:
10 For instance, Philip Hirsch (2003) discusses the World Bank funded Nam Theun II dam project in 
Laos  PDR.  Hirsch  contends  that,  because  Laos  is  a  one  party  state,  civil  society  is  particularly 
underdeveloped and so consultation on the dam project has been ineffective. On the other hand, Fergus 
MacKay  (2002)  finds  that  Canadian  mining  companies  operating  with  contracts  granted  by  the 
government  of  Suriname  have  been  unwilling  to  engage  in  substantive  discussion  with  local 
communities,  and  that  the  mining  companies  have  had  the  active  assistance  of  the  Suriname 
government in excluding local people from their (claimed) former lands.
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[1] if trade and investment liberalization cause an expansion of economic 
activity, and the nature of that activity remains unchanged, then the total 
amount of pollution must increase.
[2] [the] composition effect, the effect derived from different comparative 
advantages  [where]  some  sectors  in  different  economies  will  expand, 
while others will contract. […] If the comparative advantage is derived 
largely from lower environmental standards, then the composition effect 
will be damaging to the environment.
[3] the efficiency effect, resulting from different technologies utilized in 
the  production  system.  Some  technologies  may  reduce  both  input 
requirements of environmental resources and the pollution produced, but 
others may not have this effect. (Sari 2002:128)
Perhaps most interesting of these is the composition effect. This is where the interplay 
between  countries’  different  comparative  advantages  often  serves  to  displace 
environmental costs. For instance, where particularly polluting or resource intensive 
industries  become more  expensive  in  developed  countries  because  of  the  cost  of 
meeting  increasing  environmental  standards,  they  may be  relocated to  developing 
countries where the costs are less because of lower standards. Sari cites the example 
of the steel industry. The drive to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in OECD countries 
is  pushing  up  energy  prices,  therefore  the  cost  of  producing  steel  –  an  energy-
intensive  process  –  is  also  increasing.  According  to  Sari  (2002)  steel  production 
increased  by  15% in  the  Asia  Pacific  region  in  the  early  1990s.  Carbon  dioxide 
emissions from Indonesia, the subject of Sari’s case study, are expected to rise as a 
consequence. 
The globalisation of the economy not only displaces environmental costs, it 
also creates new ones. A Danish government study that showed that ‘1 kilogram of 
food traded globally generates 10 kilograms of carbon dioxide’ (Shiva 2003:146). 
Given that countries like Britain typically export almost as much butter, for example, 
as is imported, the inefficiency of (at least some) global trade seems obvious (Shiva 
2003:147). A point that is made repeatedly in the literature on environmental politics 
and economics is the ecological absurdity of exporting a resource from one country, 
processing that resource in another, and exporting the product back to the original 
country  (see,  for  example,  Dobson  2000:89-90;  Mander  2003:117).  Yet  it  is 
economically efficient because of the income generated through exports (in the case 
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of  European and North American agricultural  exports,  of  products  that  are highly 
subsidised). The ecological cost of such economic benefits is too often overlooked. A 
study published in 2003 under the title ‘The Counter-Intuitive Relationship between 
Globalization and Climate Change’, found that the impact of globalised trade on the 
environment in terms of carbon emissions and other greenhouse gases depended on 
the mode of transportation used. Barkin, quoted above defending the record of the 
WTO, argues that, because the same amount of fuel will take a given cargo far further 
by sea than by rail, and further by rail than by road, it is more ‘cost-effective’ to ship 
beef from Brazil to the east coast of the United States, rather than from the Midwest 
by land (Barkin 2003:12). Barkin’s specified aim is to point out the complexities of 
policy-making with respect to the environment, yet he does not draw attention to the 
fact that beef raised for export in Brazil is often farmed on land that has been cleared 
of rainforest. This example is symptomatic of arguments that isolating one aspect of 
the processes involved in global trade rarely reveals the total ecological cost.
The  globalisation  of  the  economy  is  also  credited  with  exacerbating  the 
problem  of  global  insecurity  because  of  competition  for  crucial  environmental 
resources. This applies not only to commodities such as oil, which has long been a 
factor in security studies,  but also resources that  have previously been part of the 
global  commons,  such  as  water.  Competition  over  access  to  water  is  widely 
recognised as a factor in conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia (Lowi 2000; 
Dolatyar and Gray 2000). The pressure on global freshwater supplies from increased 
use by industry,  agriculture, and in human consumption has prompted widespread 
concern about its potential commodification, concerns that seem well founded given 
that  ‘NAFTA  and  the  WTO  already  have  provisions  that  define  water  as  a 
“commodity”  and  a  “tradeable  good”’  (Mander  2003:122-3).  The potential  global 
commodification  of  water  has  significant  human  rights  implications.  The  UN 
estimates  that  1  billion  people  world  wide  currently  do  not  have access  to  clean 
drinking water (Alvarez 2003:71). Ignacio J. Alvarez argues that governments whose 
citizens  lack  such  access  are  failing  to  fulfil  their  obligations  to  comply  with 
international human rights agreements. Without such protection, there is  reason to 
fear that the poor, in particular, would face greater hardship. Looking more generally 
at  the  use  of  ecological  resources,  it  is  also  argued  that  market-driven  economic 
growth necessarily  leads  to political  as  well  as  economic  competition:  ‘The more 
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resources one agent can master, the more resources competitors must acquire just to 
preserve their relative position’ (Andersson and Lindroth 2001:117).
However, it should be noted that, from an environmental point of view, the 
problem identified here is not just the globalisation of the economy, it is firstly the 
nature of the economy that has been globalised – a market economy that is neither 
completely free nor sufficiently regulated in ways that protect the environment (and 
so  is  criticised  by  free  market  environmentalists  as  well  as  by  those  who would 
advocate substantive interference in the market to protect the environment). Secondly, 
the problem is, most acutely, one of scale. As Speth (2003) notes, human population 
is estimated to have increased four-fold in the past century, and is expected to level 
out at 10 billion towards the end of the twenty-first century. ‘Since 1960, the size of 
the world economy has doubled and then doubled again’ (Speth 2003:2). In ecological 
terms, these developments represent a massive and rapid increase in the consumption 
of resources and production of wastes. On current trends, the global economy is not 
sustainable.
In  summary,  the globalisation of  the economy has serious implications  for 
environmental  sustainability.  Globalisation,  though  neither  natural  nor  inevitable, 
brings significant pressures, particularly to weaker states, which, often at the IMF’s 
insistence,  have  had  to  adopt  neoliberal  economic  policies  that  have  served  to 
undermine  environmental  protection.  The  scale  of  the  global  economy  is  also  a 
significant  concern  since  the  rate  at  which  environmental  resources  are  currently 
being used, and the volume of wastes being produced, is now widely recognised to be 
unsustainable. Global trade patterns contribute to this problem in a number of ways, 
firstly, by increasing transport use; secondly, in some cases by reducing the control 
local  communities  have  over  their  ecological  resources;  thirdly,  by  undermining 
biodiversity and threatening the commodification of the natural environment, as seen 
in  initiatives  like  the  TRIPS  agreement  and  in  the  increasing  prevalence  of 
monocultures  in  agribusiness;  fourthly,  by  increasing  global  insecurity  through 
competition for control of resources and by undermining food security in many poor 
and developing states; fifthly, by displacing ecological costs, a problem compounded 
by the  increasing inequalities  that  have accompanied globalisation;  and finally  by 
inhibiting environmental protection, as seen in the ‘race to the bottom’, and in the 
WTO’s lukewarm approach to such environmental  principles  as  the  precautionary 
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principle. As noted above, the evidence on this last point was mixed, however, in that 
it is clear from the analysis of a number of commentators that political will on the part 
of states is an important factor in the lack of enthusiasm for environmental protection 
at the WTO. While the autonomy of some poorer states is clearly compromised by 
their relatively weak position in the global economy, Neumeyer attributes developing 
countries’ resistance to environmental agreements at the WTO to a suspicion of richer 
countries’ motives, and in particular a desire to see Northern agricultural subsidies 
cut, rather than a lack of capacity or autonomy in the face of globalisation. Yet the 
dominance of neoliberal norms in the global economy may also inhibit environmental 
protection in that trade is prioritised, arguably at the expense of pursuing human rights 
and  environmental  sustainability.  However,  recent  efforts  in  global  environmental 
governance have affirmed the need to pursue policies of ‘sustainable development’. In 
the next section, I consider the effectiveness of such initiatives in the context of a 
global economy driven by neoliberal economic norms. 
2.4 Global environmental governance
Sustainable development is a much contested concept. It has been circulating 
in  green  political  and  development  theory  since  at  least  1987,  when  the  former 
Norwegian  Prime  Minister  Gro  Harlem  Brundtland,  in  the  report  of  the  World 
Commission  on  Environment  and  Development  (WCED),  called  for  a  strategy 
integrating  environment  and  development.  The  strategy  proposed  was  sustainable 
development, defined as, ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet  their  own needs’  (WCED 
1987:24). The  report  of  the  WCED was  the  principal  inspiration  for  the  United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Developed (UNCED), popularly known 
as the Earth Summit, held in Rio in 1992, which produced Agenda 21, a global plan 
of local action to realise sustainable development, and ten years later world leaders 
reconvened, this time in Johannesburg, to discuss the implementation of Agenda 21. 
The  report  of  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable  Development  (WSSD),  held  in 
Johannesburg  in  2002,  affirmed  the  need  to  ‘delink  economic  growth  from 
environmental degradation’ and ‘promote economic development within the carrying 
capacity of ecosystems’ (WSSD 2002:21). Some greens (see Dobson 1998) reject the 
principle of a growth-driven market economy altogether, and are deeply suspicious of 
sustainable development as a normative concept, located, as it clearly is, within an 
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anthropocentric  view of  environmental  ethics.  I  reflect  on competing visions of  a 
green  economy,  and  varying  interpretations  of  the  principle  of  sustainability,  in 
chapter  5.  Here  I  assess  the  prospects  for  delinking  economic  growth  from 
environmental degradation by means of global environmental regimes, the tools that 
are commonly recognised in international political forums such as the WSSD – that is, 
tools accepted, created and authorised by states. However, I first look at the problems 
of the state-centric approach, in view of the concerns of a number of green theorists 
who question the ecological appropriateness of nation-states as a model of political 
organisation.
2.4.1 The state and environmental protection
State-centric  environmental  regimes  share  some formal  characteristics  with 
human rights regimes:
the state is both the subject and the object of most environmental regimes. 
National  governments  as  agents  of  states  are  taken  as  authoritative 
subjects  of  regimes,  their  bargaining,  concurrence,  and  ratification 
determine  whether  a  legitimate  regime  exists,  and  they  assume 
responsibility  for  compliance.  States  are  also  the  primary  objects  of 
regimes:  governmental  compliance  is  the  presumed  key  to  regime 
effectiveness, and governmental implementation is the regime’s primary 
task as a means to that end. (Conca 2005:188)
As  with  human rights  regimes,  it  is  the  acceptance  of  norms of  sovereignty  that 
legitimates  states’  ability  to  participate  as  the  only  authoritative actors  in 
environmental  regimes,  and it  is  the  principle of  sovereignty that  also confers  on 
states  the  right  not  to  participate  in  cooperative  regimes  to  resolve  global 
environmental problems.11 The much discussed weakening of sovereign autonomy in 
the  context  of  globalisation  is  a  factor  in  environmental  problems  insofar  as  the 
pressure  to  adopt  neoliberal  economic  policies  is  widely  seen  as  undermining 
environmental  protection,  but  it  is  not  necessarily  a  lack  of  agency  that  impedes 
global  efforts  towards  sustainability.  The  recent  reluctance  of  the  USA,  the  most 
powerful  nation  on  earth,  and  in  the  1970s  a  global  champion  of  environmental 
causes,  to  engage  in  global  environmental  regimes  or  even  to  accept  need  for 
11 Though other actors may have a role in advising, agenda setting, lobbying, etc.
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substantial  change  of  our  environmentally-damaging  economic  practices,  is  well 
known and much lamented.12
Studies focussing on the civil society actors often over-emphasise the power 
that they have (Conca 2005; Vogler 2005). While states rely on now well-established 
international  networks  of  physical  scientists  for  assessments  of  environmental 
problems, state governments choose which scientists to listen to. NGOs, who perhaps 
listen  to  different  scientists,  typically  call  on  governments to  take action.  Indeed, 
‘NGOs in practice and in theory remain in a highly symbiotic relationship with state 
governments  and international  institutions,  working to improve and redirect  rather 
than supplant the latter’ (Vogler 2005:281). That said, non-state actors are far from 
incidental  to  environmental  regimes.  Edmondson thinks it  ‘unlikely that  the IPCC 
[International  Panel  on  Climate  Change]  would  have  been  formed  without  the 
initiatives of experts and scientists’ (Edmondson 2001:47), a finding consistent with 
Conca’s assertion that ‘there has been a palpable loss of agenda-setting power’ on the 
part of states involved in environmental regimes (Conca 2005:202). Moreover, in a 
study of participation in 22 environmental treaties, Roberts et al (2004) found a strong 
statistical relationship between the existence of vocal and active domestic NGOs and 
a willingness on the part of governments to sign and ratify environmental treaties. 
However, Roberts et al record another finding, less cheering for environmental 
NGOs: ‘[T]he strongest predictor by far of likelihood to sign [environmental treaties] 
is the narrowness of a nation’s export base which directly and indirectly explained 
nearly  sixty percent  of  the treaty ratification  rates’  (Roberts  et  al  2004:45).  They 
therefore conclude that ‘OECD nations must help poor countries diversify their export 
profiles’ (2004:45). Roberts and his colleagues may be correct in surmising that such 
a  step  might  improve  poor  countries’  willingness  to  sign  up  to  and  ratify 
environmental  treaties,  but  a  narrow  identification  of  the  specific  problem  to  be 
solved limits the scope of the answer that Roberts et al are able to arrive at, as well as 
neglecting  the  laggard  status  of  the  most  wealthy  country  on  earth,  the  USA,  in 
environmental regimes. 
If the problem is simply described in terms of how to increase willingness to 
sign up to environmental treaties, and most countries who are most willing to do so at 
present are in general wealthier and have a diverse export base, then it follows that 
12 It  is  possible  that  this  is  beginning  to  change.  In  February  2007  the  American  government 
participated in a multilateral forum on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol (Bhat et al 2007), however, 
generally speaking, the USA has not been a champion of environmentalism in recent years.
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environmentalists should try to diversify the export bases of poorer countries as a 
means  to  increasing  their  wealth  and  decreasing  their  vulnerability  to  suffering 
economic downturn as a result of treaty ratification. But the broader question is why 
environmental treaties are valued – they are endorsed by environmentalists insofar as 
they  are  aimed  at  achieving  some  degree  of  environmental  sustainability.  The 
question looked at from this perspective is not, then, how to broaden the export bases 
of poorer countries, but how to move all  countries,  rich and poor,  from currently 
unsustainable  patterns  of  production  and  consumption,  to  environmental 
sustainability.  The analysis  of  Roberts  et  al  points in the direction of  altering the 
behaviour of poorer states, whereas, in view of massive over-consumption on the part 
of wealthier states, a more critical analysis suggests that a change in the behaviour of 
wealthier countries is also urgently needed.
2.4.2 The ecological footprint and global environmental regimes
 John Vogler has highlighted what he regards as a somewhat fruitless debate 
within  green  theory  as  to  the  proper  attitude  to  take  towards  the  state  and 
environmental sustainability:
For  theorists  of  radical  political  ecology,  the  state  and  interstate 
institutions  are  indissolubly  bound  up  with  processes  of  capitalist 
accumulation and domination. […] The state is not irrelevant to global 
environmental degradation; it is necessarily an agent of that degradation. 
This  constitutes  an  axiomatic  point  that  non-Marxist  international 
relations scholars will simply deny. (Vogler 2005:236)
Vogler is aware that debate conducted in these terms can lead to ‘a situation where 
adherents simply “talk past each other”’ (Vogler 2005:234). One possible route into 
the debate that  need not  rely on Marxist  assumptions about the state as agent-of-
capital  is  to  explore  the  idea  of  ecological  footprints.  Simply  put,  the  ecological 
footprint is the total ecological impact of a given thing, be it a consumable product, an 
individual,  a  family,  or  a  nation.  It  is  a  particularly  appealing  concept  in 
environmental politics because it demonstrates, in a way that market values do not, 
the full ecological cost of whatever is being measured, and, in sophisticated models, 
can illustrate  the distribution of that cost.  The idea was originally put forward by 
Mathis  Wackernagel  and  William  Rees  to  measure  the  ‘area  of  ecologically 
productive land (and water) […] required on a continuous basis to (a) provide all the 
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energy/material  resources consumed, and (b) absorb all the wastes discharged […] 
wherever  that  land  is  located’,  by  a  given  population  (Andersson  and  Lindroth 
2001:114). Such measurements enable researchers to identify countries that run an 
ecological deficit – that is, use up more ecological space than is available within their 
territory. Two thirds of OECD countries run an ecological deficit, including the UK, 
the USA, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Earth Council 1997). Among non-
OECD countries, the worst offenders are Singapore, Hong Kong and Israel. 
 Assessing global environmental regimes by means of the ecological footprint 
approach can reveal serious flaws in their rationale. One example, the Kyoto Protocol, 
according to some environmental campaigners,  looks less like a solution to global 
warming  and  more  like  an  opportunity  to  increase  the  commodification  of  the 
erstwhile  environmental  commons  (Mander  2003).  Agreed  in  1997,  the  Kyoto 
Protocol  aims to cut  the  emission of greenhouse gases by creating a  scheme that 
allocates a given country a right to pollute up to a certain level, and allows those 
countries  who  pollute  less  than  that  level  to  sell  their  surplus  allocation.  It  also 
includes a credit scheme for carbon sinks, chiefly forests. It has been criticised for not 
doing enough to avoid the threat of climate change – even if the aimed for reduction 
of 5.2% of 1990 levels of global greenhouse gas emissions is met, a drop in global 
temperatures is not predicted. Indeed, it is far from clear that global greenhouse gas 
emissions at the rate of 98.4% of 1990 levels are ecologically sustainable without a 
significant increase in carbon sinks. There are further problems, for example, relating 
to the USA’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto agreement.13 But most troubling to some is 
the very idea of a right to pollute, or to trade in clean air. The commodification of the 
natural environment represented by this system is anathema to some greens:
The basic concept – to solve the problem wherever it is cheapest to reduce 
emissions – closely tracks the logic of comparative advantage. […] That 
the debate has moved so quickly to this techno-managerial level illustrates 
13 The USA, the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, responsible for about 23% of 
emissions on 2003 figures, is widely criticised for having failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol – indeed 
the regime would have collapsed had the Russian government not decided to ratify the treaty in late 
2004. The USA, however,  points  to the exclusion of China,  the second largest  polluter,  and other 
rapidly developing countries, such as India, from the provisions of the Kyoto agreement as a crucial 
flaw, and indeed this represents a significant obstacle to using the Kyoto Protocol to ensure that global 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions are sustainable. But American president George Bush has made 
clear that his opposition to the Kyoto agreement is in large part due to the cost to American business 
(White  House  2001).  Nevertheless,  as  noted  above,  the  American  government  has  signalled  its 
tentative support for a successor to the Kyoto regime which will include China and India.
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the  power  of  the  neoliberal  logic  within  which  environmental  regime 
formation processes are increasingly ensnared. (Conca 2000:490-91)
Moreover,  the  Kyoto  agreement  does  not  challenge,  but  rather  reaffirms,  the 
legitimacy of a country running an ecological deficit, so long as it has the economic 
resources to pay other countries whose share of ecological resources the offending 
country is using (see chapter 5). This is objectionable to some because it does not 
reflect  a  genuine  effort  to  foster  global  environmental  sustainability,  but  rather 
maintains an unequal distribution of environmental costs and benefits.
The  Kyoto  Protocol  is  essentially  a  single-issue  agreement.  Agenda  21,  a 
blueprint of action to be taken globally to manage human impacts on the environment, 
agreed at the UNCED in 1992 and reaffirmed at the WSSD in 2002, represents a more 
comprehensive attempt to manage the global economy so as to reduce environmental 
degradation. Indeed, the report of the WSSD explicitly recognised a need to ‘delink 
economic growth and environmental degradation’ (WSSD 2002:14). Yet Agenda 21 
is also criticised by environmentalists for a variety of reasons. As Picolotti observes, 
‘[t]he main concern of Agenda 21 is to meet the basic needs of human beings, such as 
nutrition,  health preservation, decent housing,  and education,  each of which has a 
corresponding human right’ (Picolotti 2003:49). Ecocentrists will identify this as an 
obviously anthropocentric set of concerns. Even for those who reject ecocentrism as a 
basis for environmental ethics, this is not a trivial point. A model of environmental 
sustainability built upon preserving the environmental only insofar as it is necessary 
to meet human’s basic needs is potentially a very weak model of sustainability (see 
chapter 5). Indeed, the weakness of the vision of sustainability implicit in Agenda 21 
is roundly criticised by some environmentalists.  Timothy Doyle (1998) claims that 
Agenda  21  presents  a  vision  of  sustainable  development  that  ‘constructs  all 
environmental problems as ‘efficiency’ issues’, and thus does not question the logic 
of  equating  human  development  with  economic  development,  nor  of  prioritising 
economic growth over other goals. 
Many environmentalists are sceptical more generally of the genuine benefits 
that accrue to the environment from massive intergovernmental conferences on the 
scale of UNCED and WSSD. Seyfang (2003) notes the dismay of many activists at 
the  lack  of  any  substantive  new  agreements  at  the  WSSD,  while  Vogler  wryly 
remarks  that  the  results  of  an  ecological  impact  assessment  on  international 
environmental diplomacy since 1992 ‘would no doubt be shameful in terms of the 
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contribution  to  global  warming  of  the  millions  of  air  miles  travelled  and  to 
deforestation  of  the  mountains  of  paper  consumed’  (Vogler  2005:237).  Vogler 
nonetheless applauds the success of some international cooperative efforts, such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and the Basel Convention 
on Hazardous Waste, as vindicating state-centric environmental regimes. Eckersley 
(2004a) however, argues that prospect of similarly groundbreaking initiatives being 
successfully  negotiated  in  the  near  future  is  bleak.  This  she  attributes  to  the 
‘regulatory chill’ described above. While it may be accurate to say that fears of WTO 
rulings that would undo the good work done by environmental regimes may be ill-
founded, it is also the case that actors’ perceptions do not always match realities, and 
that in any case there is good reason to perceive obstacles to environmental regimes. 
It is appropriate to return again to a theme raised in the discussion of human rights, 
the idea of a global standard based on a particular norm, whether it be Donnelly’s 
human rights  based standard of civilisation  or  the global dominance of neoliberal 
economics,  Woods  pointed  to  the  role  played  by  the  most  powerful  countries  in 
legitimating and forming consensus around dominant norms. It is clear, not only from 
the failure to ratify the Kyoto treaty, but also from the fact the USA was one of the 
few countries not to send its President or Prime Minister to the 2002 WSSD, but 
rather send a deputy, that the USA does not offer leadership on environmental issues. 
There is some sense that the EU has sought to fill the gap, but this effort is hampered 
by lack of consensus within the EU, and by conflicting messages in terms of EU 
policy on issues such as fisheries and agriculture (Jokela 2001). The dominance of 
neoliberalism  in  economic  policy  presents  a  serious  challenge  to  environmental 
sustainability, a challenge that there is apparently little appetite for at the level of 
global governance.
2.5 Conclusion
Economic globalisation, driven by a neoliberal economic agenda, is causing 
and exacerbating environmental degradation, whilst the globalisation of human rights 
proceeds. At the same time, environmental issues impact on human security and thus 
present  a  challenge for  human rights.  The dominance  of  neoliberal  norms,  which 
underwrite  policies  promoting  globalisation,  weakens  the  autonomy  of  poorer 
countries. Donnelly’s research suggests that the autonomy of states to resist at least 
formal acceptance of internationally recognised human rights standards has also been 
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weakened, insofar as compliance with such standards has been made a condition of 
bilateral trade and aid deals. The autonomy of states to resist global environmental 
governance  is  not,  however,  the  most  significant  obstacle  to  achieving  global 
environmental  sustainability.  Lack  of  strong  leadership  and  the  challenge  that 
environmental  sustainability presents to prevailing norms are more substantial  and 
immediate  problems.  Just  as  human rights  are  seen by some to  be threatened by 
economic  globalisation,  it  is  similarly  difficult  to  envisage  compatibility  between 
economic globalisation pursued in terms of the neoliberal model and environmental 
sustainability pursued in terms advocated by most greens.14 Advocates of ‘sustainable 
development’  claim  that  economic  growth  can  be  ‘delinked’  from environmental 
degradation. In chapter 5 I explore some of the strategies that have been proposed for 
doing so, and suggest that the most robust definition of environmental sustainability is 
incompatible with currently dominant economic norms. The fundamental question at 
issue in this thesis is whether human rights, as a framework for addressing threats to 
human  security,  can  ground  an  adequate  and  appropriate  response  to  the 
environmental problems associated with globalisation. In chapter 4 I consider some 
doubts  about  the  contemporary  international  human  rights  regime.  However, 
problems with  the  contemporary  human rights  regime do  not  necessarily  indicate 
problems with  human rights  per se;  it  may be  that  human rights  in  national  and 
international  law  and  politics  could  be  reformed  so  as  to  better  facilitate 
environmental sustainability. Therefore, in chapter 3 I look at the plausibility of the 
justifications offered for supporting human rights as universal morals. 
14 Free  market  environmentalists  are  an  exception  here,  but  in  chapter  5  I  reject  free  market 
environmentalism as a viable strategy for achieving environmental sustainability.
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Chapter 3: Justifying universal human rights
What human rights are and what it means for us to have them are important 
questions.  The answers to these questions not only tell  us what  our human rights 
obligations are, but also help us to understand whether or not the institution of human 
rights  is  up  to  the  job  of  protecting  individuals  from  the  negative  impacts  of 
environmental problems.15 The question animating this chapter is why we have human 
rights, but as Charles Beitz (1979:53) notes, addressing this question also entails some 
engagement with the issue of what human rights are.
One  answer  to  the  question  ‘what  are  human  rights’  can  be  obtained  by 
looking  at  documents  of  international  law,  such  as  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights  (UDHR).  Understood  in  these  terms,  human  rights  are  whatever 
governments collectively and individually proclaim them to be in acts of parliaments 
or  international  covenants.  But  this  is  not  ordinarily  thought  to  be  an  adequate 
explanation of what human rights are, for human rights are also moral claims about 
the rights that persons should have. Indeed, Chris Brown argues that legal rights are 
not,  strictly  speaking,  human  rights:  ‘Rights  associated  with  positive  law  are 
associated with particular jurisdictions and thus are not, as such, human rights – but, 
on the other hand, their ontological status is secure’ (Brown 1997:45). It is the moral 
character of human rights that is at the root of their controversy. The existence of 
human rights in positive law gives them a solid foundation that human rights as moral 
claims lack. These moral claims are said to be fundamental in that they are justified 
regardless of whether they are recognised by those in authority within the state or 
internationally. Indeed, historically, human rights have evolved as a set of rights the 
individual can claim by way of protection against the power of the state (Donnelly 
1999a, Freeman 2002:167-8). But the idea that we have these rights simply in virtue 
of  being  human,  and  that  their  denial  or  modification  is  beyond  the  legitimate 
authority of governments (elected or otherwise), continues to be controversial.
This chapter therefore explores some of the ways in which political theorists 
have sought to justify support for human rights. Reasons for supporting human rights 
are important if we are to decide whether or not the idea of environmental human 
rights is a promising one. If human rights represent a universal truth, then justifying 
environmental sustainability in human rights terms might be more of a vital task than 
if human rights are held to be historically constructed. On the other hand, if measures 
15 For a discussion of the kind of environmental problems referred to, see chapter 2.
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deemed necessary to ensure environmental sustainability are seen to conflict with our 
human rights, we need to know how strong our commitment to human rights should 
be. Finally, if, as is often thought to be the case, human rights are understood to be 
the authoritative medium for making moral claims in local and global politics, then 
we will want to know if the human rights framework is hospitable to the normative 
claims made with respect to environmental sustainability. 
Justifying support for human rights continues to be a contentious enterprise. 
Jacques Maritain’s story of UNESCO delegates who could agree on a list of human 
rights,  so long as they were not  asked why they agreed (Maritain 1949:9),  might 
easily have been the story of contemporary theorists. In this chapter I compress the 
range of contemporary debate to three positions: firstly, I consider the possibility of 
elaborating a philosophical foundation for universal human rights, starting with the 
work  of  Alan  Gewirth;  secondly,  I  discuss  an  attempt  to  bypass  philosophical 
foundations by positing an overlapping consensus (in the Rawlsian sense) on human 
rights, as proposed by Jack Donnelly; thirdly, I look at Richard Rorty’s ‘postmodern 
liberal’ defence of human rights, whereby human rights are regarded as a culture to be 
promoted  by  means  of  a  ‘sentimental  education’.  Clearly,  this  discussion  is  not 
exhaustive; many more theorists have attempted to justify support for human rights.16 
The three approaches considered here nonetheless cover significant contributions to 
human rights theory in recent years, and the debate that can be drawn out between 
them is illustrative of the validity of Anthony J. Langlois’ (2003) contention that we 
are  some  considerable  distance  from  finding  a  universally,  or  even  broadly, 
persuasive reason for supporting the idea of universal human rights. 
One final note of introduction. In the course of this chapter and the remainder 
of the thesis I will make reference to various documents of international law, such as, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  (1948),  the International  Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and  Cultural  Rights  (1966),  which  together  form what  is  commonly  called  ‘The 
International Bill of Rights’. It would be possible and perhaps plausible to defend the 
idea of human rights whilst regarding this particular statement of them as seriously 
flawed. But it is this statement of them, and especially the UDHR version, to which 
16 I make brief reference, in footnotes, to some of these, where they share features with the approaches 
discussed in detail here.
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reference is most commonly made in the various attempts to justify support for human 
rights. For the most part, I follow this convention.17  
3.1 A philosophical foundation for human rights
Alasdair  MacIntyre,  who  is  hostile  to  the  idea  of  universal  human rights, 
nonetheless praises Gewirth’s account of the justification for claiming that there are in 
fact  universal  human rights  as  one  of  the  clearest  and  most  analytically  rigorous 
available  (MacIntyre  1994:66).  Gewirth’s  account  is  grounded  in  analytical 
philosophy, and aims to demonstrate that because the right to two fundamental goods 
– freedom and well-being – is a necessary truth, these rights are universally valid and 
thus must, on pain of self-contradiction, be accepted by all humans. Though other 
approaches could be studied here,18 Gewirth thus seems a good candidate to examine 
as an influential example of the attempt to justify support for universal human rights 
by means of appeal to philosophical foundations.
MacIntyre’s best known objection to the idea that there are universal human 
rights is that the institution of rights is historically specific. Thus he argues that one 
reason Gewirth’s defence of universal rights fails is because the means of recognising 
rights to freedom and well-being have not been universally available:
One reason why claims about goods necessary for rational agency are so 
different from claims to the possession of rights is that the latter in fact 
presuppose, as the former do not, the existence of a socially established 
set  of  rules.  […]  (As  a  matter  of  historical  fact  such  types  of  social 
institution or practice have not existed universally in human societies.) 
Lacking any such social form, the making of a claim to a right would be 
like  presenting  a  check  for  payment  in  a  social  order  that  lacked  the 
institution of money. (MacIntyre 1994: 67)
17 Obviously, ‘environmental human rights’ do not feature in the UDHR, but even where environmental 
human rights are under discussion the UDHR is frequently a reference point, for example, in Hancock 
(2003).
18 See, for example, John Finnis’ (1980) account of ‘natural rights’ derived from natural law, which has 
been influential in some circles and clearly meets the criterion of attempting a philosophical foundation 
for human rights that would insulate rights from the doubts of relativists and other sceptics. However, 
Finnis’ reliance on a particular religious framework potentially limits his appeal, and while his seven 
categories of ‘intrinsically valuable basic goods’ rely to some extent on intuition to prove their appeal, 
Gewirth’s approach aims to be universally valid and demonstrable by rational thought alone. More 
influential has been H.L.A. Hart’s (1967) answer to the question, ‘Are there any natural rights’, in 
which Hart posits an underlying equal right of all to liberty, from which further rights can be derived. I 
suggest  below,  however,  that  the  idea  of  all persons  having  an  equal right  to  liberty  is  in  fact 
historically peculiar, and that reasons in support of the idea are thus at the very least desirable.
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So, the claim of universal human rights runs aground on the fact that the institution of 
rights is a peculiarly modern and Western invention. It cannot be denied that the idea 
that  all  humans  everywhere  are  morally  equal  has  not  universally  been  endorsed 
throughout human history. But to say that the existence of universal rights depends 
upon the existence of  institutions to recognise those rights,  as  the ‘presupposition 
argument’ suggests, is to mischaracterize rights. As Donnelly (2003:8) notes, rights 
are claimed not when they are protected by courts and other institutions, but precisely 
when they are denied. Rights are claims about how societies should be organised, or 
more specifically about how individuals should be treated by those in authority in a 
society. It is only when rights are threatened that individuals have need of their rights. 
In  this  respect,  rights  are  very  different  from  cheques  and  money.  Moreover, 
MacIntyre’s  argument  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  human  rights,  as  an 
institution, could become universal, nor that the institutional forms the recognition of 
rights  takes could vary. Indeed, with the advent of globalisation and the apparent 
acceptance of human rights regimes both at the global and regional level, it would 
appear to some that we now inhabit a world where the institution of human rights is 
universally acknowledged, if not adhered to. But this remains a controversial claim, 
which will be investigated further in chapter 4.
3.1.1 Rational agency
A more telling objection to Gewirth’s theory relates to his argument that as a 
matter  of  logical  necessity,  individuals  have  universal  rights.  The  dialectically 
necessary method that Gewirth employs is intended to prove that it follows from an 
individual’s  conceptual  need of certain conditions for action that  there are human 
rights  to which all  persons  are  entitled,  a  claim which  Gewirth  argues  cannot  be 
denied without self-contradiction or logical error (Gewirth 1982:46). These are rights 
to freedom and well-being, which Gewirth holds to be the necessary conditions for 
action. From this basis it would not be difficult to draw up a list of rights that would 
not be significantly divergent from those found in the International Bill of Rights.19 
On  the  other  hand,  given  that  the  capacity  for  rational  agency  is  central  to  his 
argument, it is plain that Gewirth’s thesis cannot support rights for children and the 
19 It  does seem unlikely,  however, that Gewirth’s theory would support the full list of rights found 
there.  As Maurice Cranston (1967) scathingly suggested,  the right to  ‘periodic holidays  with  pay’ 
(proclaimed  in  Article  24)  may  not,  in  fact,  be  fundamental  and  inalienable,  at  least  not  within 
Gewirth’s scheme.
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insane,  a  point  he  concedes  himself  (Gewirth  1982:55).  This  exclusion  does  not 
preclude persons having duties of care or respect towards children and the insane, but 
it does suggest that they are not morally equal to ‘purposive agents’, as Gewirth terms 
rights bearers.20 
It might be asked, at this point, what is meant by ‘the capacity for rational 
agency’. Implicit in this is a putative theory of human nature, whereby to be human is 
to  identify  purposes  and  pursue  them in  a  rational  fashion.  Clearly,  this  putative 
theory of human nature excludes from the status of rights bearers those who are not 
capable of rationally pursuing their purposes. Insofar as this applies to people who 
may  be  thought  incapable  of  caring  for  themselves,  this  is  perhaps  a  relatively 
uncontroversial  step.  But  it  is  more  problematic  than  Gewirth  would  appear  to 
acknowledge, since, as Rorty argues (see section 3 below), oppression of one people 
by another has often been justified in terms of the oppressed persons not being fully 
rational and thus not being seen to be fully human. On Gewirth’s model, identifying 
someone as a fellow human being entails making a judgment about the rationality of 
their conduct in pursuit of defined goals. Thus, it may be thought, Gewirth does not in 
fact offer a defence of rights that persons have simply in virtue of being human, as 
there is a further ‘capacity’ that persons must possess in order to qualify as a bearer of 
universal rights. This is not to say that Gewirth would wish his work to be used to 
justify the denial of rights to a group of persons who were deemed to be irrational, but 
there is, nonetheless, scope for such a strategy within his argument. 
A further problem arises in the links between steps in his argument; from the 
logical  necessity  of  the  individual  agent  asserting  that  he  has  need  of  certain 
conditions for action to the agent having rights to freedom and well-being. He sums 
up his argument in seven steps, quoted here in full:
[I]f any agent denies that he has rights to freedom and well-being, he can 
be seen to contradict himself. For, as we have seen, he must accept (1) 
“My freedom and well-being are necessary goods”. Hence, the agent must 
also accept (2) “I, as an actual or prospective agent, must have freedom 
and  well-being”,  and  hence  also  (3)  “All  other  persons  must  at  least 
refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being”. 
20 Jeremy  Waldron  also  identifies  this  problem  in  Hart’s  theory:  ‘Hart’s  analysis  is  in  principle 
incompatible with the attribution of rights to beings incapable of exercising powers, such as babies…’ 
(Waldron 1984:12). One of the attractions of Rorty’s theory (see below, section 3), is that it does not 
fall foul of this problem. 
49
For if other persons remove or interfere with these, then he will not have 
what he has said he must have. Now suppose the agent denies (4) “I have 
rights to freedom and well-being”. Then he must also deny (5) “all other 
persons ought at least to refrain from removing or interfering with my 
freedom and well-being”. By denying (5) he must accept (6) “It is not the 
case  that  all  other  persons  at  least  ought  to  refrain  from removing or 
interfering with  my freedom and well-being”,  and hence he  must  also 
accept (7) “Other persons may (are permitted to) remove or interfere with 
my freedom and well-being”. But (7) contradicts (3). Since, as we have 
seen, every agent must accept (3), he cannot consistently accept (7). Since 
(7) is entailed by the denial of (4), “I have rights to freedom and well-
being”, it follows that any agent who denies that he has rights to freedom 
and well-being contradicts himself. (Gewirth 1982:50-51)
The problem arises between points (2) and (3). It only follows from “I, as an actual or 
prospective agent, must have freedom and well-being” that “All others persons must 
at least refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being” if there 
is something special about purposive agents (myself included) that means they are 
entitled to what they need for action. It may be that there is some special quality that 
so  distinguishes  purposive  agents,  but  Gewirth  has  not  specified  it.  Argument  is 
needed here, as MacIntyre (1994:66-70) has complained. 
Gewirth has amplified his argument elsewhere:  
[T]he  agent  is  saying  that  because  freedom  and  basic  well-being  are 
necessary  goods  for  him,  other  persons  strictly  ought  to  refrain  from 
interfering with his having them. And this is equivalent to saying that he 
has  a  right  to  them,  because  the  agent  holds  that  this  strict  duty  of 
noninterference by other persons is owed to him (Gewirth 1976:291).
However, this thesis remains unsatisfactory because the equivalence Gewirth asserts 
is  not  self-evident.  Joseph  Raz  has  complained  that  Gewirth  ‘misconceives  the 
relation between value and rights’ (2006:4), in that he assumes that something that has 
crucial value for a person must be the subject of a right that person holds. Raz, on the 
other  hand,  argues  that  there  may  be  necessary  goods  that  persons  would  not 
necessarily have rights to. Another problem is that a person does not automatically 
have a right to those conditions which are necessary for agency without the further 
criterion that he ought to have those things which are necessary for agency, because 
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he has some special status which means that his agency has intrinsic moral value. This 
point can be better understood if a person is substituted for another living being, say, a 
shark. It is not usually argued, even by ecocentrists, that individual sharks should all 
have rights to the necessary conditions for pursuing their chosen purposes.21 Thus it 
can be seen that a moral significance is being attached to the agency of humans in 
Gewirth’s theory that is not generally held to be true of other beings. 
The question at issue is then what is the source of that moral significance. 
Gewirth’s argument would seem to suggest that rationality is the determining factor, 
but,  as argued above,  making rationality  the determinant  of special  status may be 
problematic, in that this sort of standard has been used to justify the oppression of 
non-Western  peoples,  and  women  everywhere,  in  the  past.  What  is  implicit  in 
Gewirth’s theory here is a notion of what it  is to be human, whereby humans are 
definitionally  understood to  be  rational  agents  pursuing  individual  goals.  But  this 
rational, individualistic notion of what it is to be human is not universally assented to. 
What is needed, then, is an alternative explanation of what it is that makes humans, 
whether as purposive agents or any other notion of human nature, special, such that in 
virtue of X persons have rights to what they need to pursue their purposes.
The difficulty here has been summed up by Michael Freeman; ‘the theory of 
human rights presupposes a moral ontology in which human persons not only exist 
but have special value. Such an ontology is not universal’ (Freeman 1994:510). Not 
only is it not universally agreed that humans have special value, rather than, say, male 
humans, or white humans, or French humans, or any number of versions of ‘these 
particular humans’, the reasons for claiming that all humans have special value that 
have been put forward have tended to be based on a religious worldview. Even where 
this is not the case, as in Gewirth’s theory, a particular notion of what it is to be 
human  is  implicitly  described.  What  is  problematic  here  is  that  people  have 
competing visions of what it is to be human. As Langlois argues, 
it is not clear, and it has never been clear, how authoritatively to give 
content to subjective rights simply on the basis of their claim to derive 
from  our  humanity,  while  providing  a  cordon  sanitaire  between  this 
humanity and any substantive human tradition or conception of the good. 
(Langlois 2003:511)
21 For a brief discussion of ecocentrism, see chapter 5, section 1.
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 The International Bill of Rights sets out in international law the position that 
human beings  are  special,  (that  is,  they  are  ‘sacred’,  ‘inviolable’,  ‘endowed  with 
dignity’  and  so  on)  and  that  they  therefore  have  certain  universal  human 
(‘inalienable’) rights. These are two separate claims: (1) that humans are special, and, 
(2) that it follows from this that they have rights. Michael J. Perry (1998:58) holds 
that  there are two possible challenges to the claim that human beings are special, 
sacred, inviolable, etc.
(1) There are no persuasive reasons why any human beings are sacred.
(2) Only some human beings are sacred (those of the agent’s own tribe, community, 
etc.).
Clearly, the second claim would not be endorsed by human rights advocates, but it is 
asserted  by  cultural  relativists,  or  at  least,  the  universality  of  human  rights  is 
sometimes denied on the basis that morality makes sense only within the context of 
the cultural community which gives it meaning. A common response to this type of 
argument is to point out that cultures are not static, and that it is therefore possible 
that cultural traditions that appear to be incompatible with human rights can, in fact, 
develop towards a convergence with human rights norms. Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im 
foresees just such a development with regard to Islam: ‘It may take some innovative 
reinterpretation of traditional [Islamic] norms to bring them into complete accord with 
the  present  formulation  of  the  international  standards,  but  the  essence  of  these 
standards is already present’ (quoted in Caney 2003:87).
The  idea  that  conflicting  cultural  (or  ethical,  to  use  Simon  Caney’s 
terminology) traditions contain within them an essence or core of norms which are in 
fact universal has also been suggested, for example by Bhikhu Parekh (1999:135). 
Parekh, however, thinks the list of such values is very short – human unity, human 
dignity,  human  worth,  promotion  of  human  well-being,  and  equality  (Parekh 
1999:149-150). Taking a more pessimistic view, Peter Jones doubts the worth of any 
common values that could be identified, claiming that, ‘[e]ven if we could find values 
that have been endorsed by everyone everywhere, these are likely to be so meagre, so 
denuded of content, that they will provide a set of human rights that is hardly worth 
having’ (Jones 2003:35). But others find the empirical case persuasive. Ken Booth 
(1999) points out that all cultures have a notion of such virtues as hospitality, civility, 
right behaviour, and so on. Thus he endorses Donald Puchala in claiming that ‘at a 
fundamental level, moral behaviour is not a cultural trait but a human predeliction’ 
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(quoted in Booth 1999:59). The argument here is that relativists mistakenly fail to 
recognise these values that find (differing) expression in all cultures. Insofar as these 
values are common to all cultural or ethical traditions, universal values are certainly 
possible. 
This is persuasive as far as it goes, but the fact that all cultures share the concept 
of moral behaviour does not prove that all cultures share the  same notion of what 
constitutes moral behaviour, that is, that all cultures interpret and express these virtues 
in  the  same  way.  Illustrating  this  point,  Micheline  R.  Ishay  (2004:365)  cites 
Herodotus’ tale of the Persian king Darius, highlighting the different ways in which 
Greeks  and  Indians  honoured  their  dead;  though  both  recognise  the  value of 
honouring their dead, each community found the others’  practices offensive. Ishay 
nonetheless rejects relativism, but a significant obstacle to universalising respect for 
human rights as practice is the range of persons towards whom virtuous conduct is 
held to be appropriate  or requisite.  Parekh claims that,  insofar  as we can identify 
human values, ‘it is self-contradictory to say that we should respect the dignity of our 
fellow-citizens but not that of outsiders’ (1999:150).  But fear of self-contradiction 
does not appear to have inhibited the violation of human rights. What should be noted 
here is that the idea of treating all humans equally and endowing them with rights 
simply in virtue of their being human, rather than in virtue of some cultural, national, 
or other status,  is historically peculiar, and it is precisely this peculiar idea that the 
concept of human rights is invoked to universalise. 
3.1.2 Human dignity
Turning to Perry’s first claim (that there are no persuasive reasons why any 
human beings are sacred), to describe human beings as sacred obviously introduces a 
religious terminology, but it captures the sense of moral significance that is evidently 
attributed to humans both in Gewirth’s attempt to find philosophical foundations for 
human  rights,  and  in  existing  international  human  rights  covenants  such  as  the 
International Bill of Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights talks in its 
preamble of  ‘recognition of  the  inherent  dignity  and of  the  equal  and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family’ as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world’ (in Brownlie 1995:256). In the Vienna Declaration of 1993, the 
latter is entailed upon the former: ‘all human rights derive from the dignity and worth 
inherent  in the human person’ (UN 1993).  Perry’s question,  then,  is,  what  is  this 
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inherent worth? Clearly, religious belief could supply an answer.  If  we are God’s 
creation, and God has endowed us with dignity, as the Christian faith holds, then we 
each have inherent dignity, and, from that, in Christian terms duties follow (love one 
another)  and  in  the  terms  of  the  International  Bill  of  Rights,  rights  follow  (a 
considerable  list).  These  duties  and  rights  apply  universally  because  we  are  all, 
equally, God’s creations, all children of God, all part of the same family. Taking God 
out of the picture, however, opens the way to the now familiar Nietzschean riposte 
that Christian morality is nothing more than a plea from the weak for equal treatment 
from the  strong,  a  plea  that  ceases  to be  compelling  in  the  absence of  a  God to 
sanction it. As will be discussed in section 3 of this chapter, Rorty is impressed by the 
Nietzschean critique, yet  in his project of a sentimental education, seeks to find a 
means to bypass it. (It is not immediately clear that the idea of equal human worth is 
readily intelligible in terms of all faiths – Hindus and Buddhists, for example, do not 
hold that we are all of equal worth, though a system of duties is nevertheless intrinsic 
to each religion.)
If we are to embrace a universal set  of rights entailed upon inherent human 
dignity,  however, there must be intelligible reason(s) for accepting that humans do 
possess such a quality. Langlois (2004) bemoans the lack of engagement, on the part 
of  contemporary  philosophers  and  political  theorists,  with  this  difficult  question. 
Freeman’s recent work (2004) aims to sketch the role that religious belief might play 
in this, suggesting that different religious beliefs might simultaneously but separately 
sustain support for universal human rights, but Freeman has no answer to the problem 
of secularism. Yet the (Western) culture that inspired the human rights project we 
now  find  gaining  credence  throughout  the  world  has  become  secularised  to  a 
considerable degree. Thus, in addition to religious understandings of the special status 
of human beings, secular conceptions of human sacredness are necessary (Freeman 
2002:55). 
A  point  often  glossed  over,  though,  is  that  neither  secular  nor  religious 
understandings  of  human  sacredness  are  ‘neutral’,  nor  necessarily  compatible. 
Freeman describes Gewirth’s  thesis  as  ‘resolutely secular’.  Indeed,  Freeman finds 
Gewirth’s logically necessary method of rationally defining human rights so hostile to 
a religiously based defence of human rights as to be ‘an implausible solution to the 
problem  of  diversity’  (Freeman  2004:395).  Instead,  Freeman  begins  to  look 
approvingly towards the work of John Rawls for a means to support human rights 
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whilst accommodating diversity of belief.22 He concludes by endorsing Peter Jones in 
saying that, ‘It is not the task of human rights theory to determine ultimate religious or 
philosophical truths, but to identify the rules that ought to govern the relations among 
persons with different beliefs’ (Freeman 2004:400). This seems to endorse something 
like  the  Rawlsian  conception  of  ‘justice  as  fairness’,  whereby  fundamental 
philosophical and religious beliefs are a private matter, and only political questions 
are a matter  of public concern (Rawls 1985). Freeman’s apparent acceptance of a 
reduced role for philosophy in providing justifications for human rights would seem 
to contradict some of his earlier work – as recently as 2002 he claimed that, 
[w]e need reasons to support our human-rights actions, both because it is 
often not clear which actions human-rights principles require and because 
opponents of human rights can support their opposition with reasons. We 
must  understand  whether  our  reasons  are  superior,  and,  if  so,  why. 
(Freeman 2002:56)
It  is  difficult  to  reconcile this  need with the  modest  understanding of  the  role  of 
philosophical foundations in justifying human rights expressed in the conclusion of 
Freeman’s 2004 article. 
Nevertheless,  Freeman’s  retreat  from  philosophical  foundations  may  be 
prudent in view of Perry’s conclusions regarding the possibility of finding a secular 
basis on which to justify the claim that human beings have a special status in virtue of 
which they have inalienable rights.  Discussing Ronald Dworkin’s  response  to the 
question of what a secular notion of inherent human dignity might look like, Perry 
(1998:ch1)  argues that  something more is  inferred in  the quality  of  being sacred, 
inviolable,  etc.,  than can be supplied in a secular  cosmology. A secular notion of 
inherent  human dignity  would  have  to  assert  that  there  is  meaning and  worth  in 
humanity in the context of a view of the universe as meaningless or a view that is 
agnostic about the possibility of meaning. Humanity, then, is the only solid reference 
point. For Perry,  Dworkin’s argument rests on the ‘two combined and intersecting 
bases of the sacred: natural  and human creation’, that is, natural evolution and the 
development  of  social  institutions  (Perry  1998:27)  –  human  beings  are  seen  to 
embody the pinnacle of both, thus human beings inspire unique awe in themselves. As 
Perry notes:
22 Given that Rawls explicitly excludes religious reasons from the range of acceptable justifications for 
endorsing a given conception of justice in the context of an overlapping consensus, it is not clear that 
an overlapping consensus based on competing religious doctrines is entirely coherent. 
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Dworkin  seems  to  be  using  “sacred”  in  what  we can  call  a  weak,  or 
“subjective”, sense – something (e.g., a human life) is sacred because, or 
in the sense that, it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to it – 
rather than in the strong, or “objective”, sense – something is sacred and 
therefore it  inspires  awe  in  us  and  we attach  great  value  to  it  (Perry 
1998:28).
The idea that beings that inspire awe in us should be protected by special rights is 
something  that  ecocentrists  could  easily  endorse,  but  it  would  be  unclear,  to 
ecocentrists at least, why humans should have rights and animals not. Indeed, on the 
basis of something inspiring awe in us, it is not clear why the Great Wall of China, 
and other inanimate objects, should not have rights. The majority of ecocentrists do 
seek to differentiate between the moral status of humans and other beings. Robyn 
Eckersley  (1992)  explains  one  ecocentric  approach,  ‘autopoietic  intrinsic  value 
theory’,  wherein  value  is  ascribed  to  ‘self-generating  living  things’,  which  can 
encompass species,  ecosystems, or individuals. This approach still  requires human 
judgement about what counts as a self-generating living thing (amoeba? humans in 
catatonic states?) and is therefore worthy of the respect consistent with intrinsic value, 
and there is still the issue of differentiation with respect to (potentially competing) 
degrees of value accorded to different species or individuals in a particular context. 
What is problematic here for human rights advocates is the degree of the subjective 
element involved. It is further complicated by the variety, not necessarily overlapping, 
indeed often differing, of things in which human beings find awe. Relying on ‘awe’ to 
ground a commitment to the intrinsic value of beings in a lexical order determined by 
human  judgment  is  a  considerable  distance  from  Gewirth’s  hoped  for  logically 
necessary standard of universal human rights. 
But such a standard may not ultimately be available. By Perry’s logic, if the 
idea of human dignity is central to human rights, and is inescapably religious, then the 
idea of human rights is itself inescapably religious. In the context of a multi-cultural 
world, that would seem to be a singularly unhelpful attribute for a system of universal 
rights. Equally unhelpful is Freeman’s conclusion that Gewirth’s attempt to provide a 
secular justification for support for human rights is logically compelled to assert that, 
‘[a]ll  cultures  that  seem to  lack  the  concept  of  human rights  must  either  have  it 
implicitly or they are in a state of logical and moral error’ (Freeman 2004:394). It may 
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yet prove to be the case that there is one true religion, and that our status as children 
of a (hopefully) loving God is what underwrites our ‘human’ rights. There again it is 
equally possible that cultures that do not accept a given conception of human rights 
(whatever that may be) are indeed in logical and moral error. But neither argument 
seems useful to the champion of human rights in a multi-cultural, post-colonial world. 
Wars have been fought  over  claims similar  to  the former,  and the latter  claim is 
patronising or insulting. Neither claim seems likely to cut much ice in contemporary 
political debate. We would seem, then, to have reached an impasse. Like Freeman, 
Perry is nevertheless committed to the idea of human rights. Unlike Rorty (see section 
3 below) he thinks it matters that human rights may be inescapably religious, but he 
finds  the  argument  for  human  rights  compelling  nonetheless.  Perry  finds  himself 
caught between his conviction that the justification for human rights is inescapably 
religious, and his conviction that, despite the lack of agreement in religious belief, 
there  must  nevertheless  be  universal  human  rights.  Given  that  an  appeal  to 
philosophical  foundations,  such  as  that  attempted  by  Gewirth,  seems  unable  to 
advance us beyond this problem, the latter two sections of this chapter are devoted to 
two theorists whose arguments begin with the premise that philosophical foundations 
for human rights are unavailable, and attempt to find ways around this problem. 
3.2 An overlapping consensus on human rights
Jack Donnelly has written extensively on human rights theory and practice. Of 
interest here are the arguments he has proposed in justifying the idea of universal 
human rights. These are two-fold. Firstly, Donnelly understands human rights as a 
necessary tool of the weak in protecting themselves against the strong in the context 
of a globalised world. Human rights are therefore necessary not in the logically true 
sense that Gewirth describes, but rather in the contingent sense of being an essential 
feature of modern social relations that enables persons to protect themselves from the 
excessive  power  of  others  in  the  context  of  a  particular  model  of  political  and 
economic organisation. It follows from this that human rights are not to be ‘found’ by 
means  of  rational  thought,  but  instead  are  socially  ‘constructed’  in  response  to 
specific threats (Donnelly 1999a). They are nonetheless universal, Donnelly argues, 
insofar as the threats they combat, ‘modern markets and states’, are now universal, or 
near-universal (Donnelly 2003; 2007).
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Secondly, Donnelly holds human rights to be the subject of what he calls an 
overlapping consensus,  whereby human rights  are a moral  standard that  is  almost 
universally assented to, and as such is morally persuasive. Neither of these arguments 
appeals  to  philosophical  foundations,  indeed,  Donnelly  regards  such  appeals  as 
misguided because of the contested nature of philosophical beliefs, but argues that 
this is not unique to human rights: 
Like all social practices, human rights come with, and in an important 
sense  require,  justifications.  But  those  justifications  appeal  to 
“foundations” that  are ultimately a  matter  of  agreement  or  assumption 
rather than proof. Problems of “circularity” or “vulnerability” are common 
to  all  moral  concepts  and  practices,  not  specific  to  human  rights. 
(Donnelly 2003:21)
It  follows,  according  to  Donnelly’s  argument,  that  where  there  is  evidence  of 
agreement,  then  that  is  sufficient  reason to  consider  as  valid  a  moral  concept  or 
practice, such as human rights. Such agreement need not be absolute; instead, it can 
take  the  form  of  an  ‘overlapping  consensus’,  as  Rawls  proposed  in  regard  to 
establishing a shared conception of justice on ‘political, not metaphysical’ grounds. 
At the heart of Donnelly’s approach, then, is a rejection of the ideas put forward by 
both Gewirth and Perry. 
Donnelly claims there is a ‘remarkable international normative consensus on 
the list of human rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the International 
Human Rights  Covenants’  (Donnelly 2003:17).  Although Donnelly  does not  offer 
much in the way of empirical evidence for this claim, it would be easy enough to find 
evidence in terms of the overwhelming number of countries that have signalled their 
endorsement of the UDHR and that have ratified the two International Covenants.23 
Similarly, the proliferation of regional human rights agreements over the latter half of 
the  twentieth  century  points  to  broad  support  for  human  rights  at  the  level  of 
governments  at  least.24 But  others  have come to probe the  depth of  this  apparent 
consensus on human rights and in particular to explore what motivates governments 
to accept and adhere to (or not) human rights agreements. These arguments will be 
considered in chapter 4. In this chapter, I take Donnelly at his word in claiming there 
23 For instance, as of December 2006, the ICCPR has 67 signatories and 160 parties, and the ICESCR 
has 66 signatories and 155 parties. (OHCHR 2006)
24 Examples include the European Convention on Human Rights (1953) and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). 
58
is an international consensus on human rights and consider what, if anything, can be 
said about the normative status of human rights on the basis of them being widely 
endorsed. 
Donnelly argues that the consensus on human rights circumvents the need for 
a substantive theory of human nature on which to ground human rights. In this way, 
Donnelly hopes to outline a theory that provides conceptual support for human rights 
whilst avoiding claims about the special status of human beings. This is fortunate, 
because ‘[g]iven that philosophical anthropologies are so controversial, there are great 
dangers in tying one’s analysis  of human rights to any particular theory of human 
nature.’  (Donnelly  2003:17)  Clearly,  if  human  rights  are  linked  to  a  particular 
understanding of what it is to be human, such as the individual as rational agent, as in 
Gewirth’s theory,  or as adherent of a particular religious faith,  then the appeal of 
human rights may be undermined in the eyes of those who do not share that particular 
view. This much is implicit in Freeman’s concern that Gewirth’s resolute secularism 
is problematic in the context of cultural pluralism. So Donnelly’s strategy of avoiding 
philosophical and religious justifications for human rights has much to recommend it. 
But  there  is  a  problem  in  the  way  that  Donnelly  uses  the  idea  of  an 
overlapping consensus, for he seems to want this device to do two things. Firstly, the 
idea  of  overlapping  rather  than  complete  consensus  is  invoked  to  explain  how 
agreement  on  a  given  list  of  human  rights  is  possible  in  the  context  of  cultural 
pluralism. Addressing Rawls’ question, how can there be ‘a stable and just society 
whose  free  and  equal  citizens  are  deeply  divided  by  conflicting  and  even 
incommensurable  religious,  philosophical,  and moral  doctrines?’,  Donnelly  claims 
that the idea of an overlapping consensus ‘offers a plausible answer’ which ‘has an 
obvious  extension  to  international  society,  particularly  a  culturally  and  politically 
diverse pluralist international society’ (Donnelly 2003:40). However, Caney has noted 
that Rawls thought that an overlapping consensus on justice could hold in pluralistic 
societies that shared political institutions and had some degree of history of working 
in concert, factors which would inspire persons of differing fundamental beliefs to see 
the  benefit  of  reaching a  less  deeply  held  political  agreement  about  how society 
should be organised so as to facilitate justice. ‘The problem with the idea of a global 
overlapping consensus’,  Caney concludes,  ‘is  that  these  factors  (such  as  a  shared 
political system with its dynamics encouraging convergence) are absent at the global 
level’ (Caney 2003:54). Indeed, Rawls himself specified a number of conditions that 
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would have to hold in order for an overlapping consensus to be used as a means to 
ground a political conception of justice, all of which apply, in Rawls’ scheme, within 
societies (Rawls 1985:225; Hampton 1989:795-6). 
Donnelly accepts that Rawls intended the idea of an overlapping consensus as 
a solution to pluralism within states, but Donnelly nonetheless believes that it can be 
applied  beyond  the  domestic  sphere,  because,  he  argues,  in  the  context  of 
globalisation, modern markets and states have spread around the globe and are now 
near-universal (Donnelly 1999b:69; 2003:57-60). In a footnote he recognises modern 
markets and states as ‘contingently Western’ in the sense of having originated in the 
West, but as these means of economic and political organisation have ‘spread, in very 
similar  forms, throughout the globe’ (Donnelly 2003:59),  they can be taken to be 
universal. Human rights have often been described as having evolved in the West as a 
means  of  protecting  the  relatively  weak  individual,  wrenched  from earlier  social 
relations of family and community that were more fixed and enduring, against the 
power of the state and the market in the post-industrial world, an assessment with 
which  Donnelly  would  appear  to  concur  (Goodhart  2003:943).  Thus  Donnelly 
construes human rights as a  necessary response to the problems associated with the 
power of the modern state and the modern market. Freeman takes a complementary, if 
not identical, line when he writes,
[a]ll  human  societies  have  power  structures,  and  many  of  them have 
throughout  history  had  some  conception  of  the  abuse  of  power.  The 
concepts  of  natural  rights and  human  rights are  particular  ways  of 
expressing this concern about the abuse of power. (Freeman 2002:167-8)
The spread of the modern state around the globe is, by Donnelly’s reckoning, a 
response  to  Western  colonialism,  while  the  spread  of  international  markets,  the 
processes of globalisation in general, has been led by Western economic expansion. 
(Donnelly notes  in passing that,  in  a world of sovereign states,  ‘markets...  are an 
obvious choice’ (Donnelly 2003:68), but he does not say what makes this obvious.) 
So, the (Western) human rights regime that is necessary to protect individuals from 
the potential excesses of markets and states have become a necessary universal feature 
in virtue of the fact that the Western models of political and economic organisation 
have been exported around the globe. This process of export would presumably not 
have been possible without the attendant Western supremacy in matters military and 
economic. The point to be made here is that the export of human rights, even as a tool 
60
to  protect  the  weak  from the  excesses  of  power  made  possible  by  the  export  of 
Western models of economic and political organisation,  is  not morally  neutral,  as 
Donnelly seems to imagine it is. The closest he comes to responding to this criticism 
of human rights is this:
There is no doubt that human rights are more individualistic than many 
other social and political practices. But to rail against it in the absence of 
an  alternative  solution  to  the  very  real  problems  of  protecting  the 
individual and human dignity in the face of modern markets and states is, 
at best, utopian or short sighted. (Donnelly 2003: 114) 
It may be that to attack the only tool available to do an important job is foolish and 
short-sighted.  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  one  must  subscribe  to  the 
consensus  on human rights,  rather  than  looking for  an alternative  solution.  In  his 
discussion of globalisation as a background condition against which human rights are 
necessary, Donnelly comes close to reifying the globalisation of markets and states. 
Yet Donnelly is also critical of an ‘unthinking acceptance of a world of sovereign 
states’ (Donnelly 2003:66). As noted in the previous chapter, globalisation is neither 
natural  nor inevitable.  It  is  the consequence of policy choices.  Donnelly seems at 
times to foreclose the possibility of making alternative choices about both the manner 
of economic or political organisation a society might adopt, and whether to endorse 
universal human rights as articulated in the UDHR. Green theorists, on the other hand, 
point out that alternative models of economic and political organisation are not only 
feasible but also desirable (see chapters 5 and 6).  
3.2.1 Human rights as practice, human dignity as value
The second problem with  the  way in  which Donnelly  uses  the  idea of  an 
overlapping  consensus  on  human  rights  is  indicated  in  the  preceding  argument. 
Consensus is held to be a persuasive reason to endorse human rights. In short, the fact 
of  consensus  proves  the  moral  worth  of  human  rights.  Donnelly  is  not  alone  is 
subscribing to such a view. In proposing a ‘non-ethnocentric universalism’, Parekh 
also makes reference to the ‘moral authority based on the consensus of world opinion’ 
(1999:140).  But, as Freeman observes,  this appeal to consensus as proof of moral 
status does not stand up: ‘It [Donnelly’s thesis] is unconvincing, however, not only 
because it is not clear that a sincere consensus exists, but also because consensus is 
factual  not  moral,  and  therefore,  in  itself,  justifies  nothing’  (Freeman  2002:  64). 
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Similarly, Nigel Dower argues, ‘whatever the importance of consensus in theory (as 
well as in practice) it cannot by itself be sufficient or be a substitute for other theories 
[…]  which  provide  the  materials  from  which  the  consensus  is  drawn’  (Dower 
1997:95). An example here would be the prevalence in Europe for many years of the 
view that Jews were inferior to other persons. The appalling treatment of Jews by the 
Nazi regime during the Second World War was one of the key factors that inspired 
the  revival  of  the  idea  of  human  rights  in  the  aftermath  of  that  war  (Donnelly 
1999a:72; Langlois 2001:80). This example illustrates two points. Firstly, consensus 
on a particular idea does not demonstrate its moral or right or just character. Secondly, 
consensus on a given idea now does not guarantee that the popularity or acceptability 
of the idea will persist. It is therefore apparent that consensus rests on something else, 
a point Rawls himself understood – one of the purposes of introducing the idea of an 
‘original position’ into the reasoning process for deciding principles of justice is to 
eliminate the potential for power relations to influence outcomes. The absence of such 
constraints in the real world is at the root of a significant criticism of human rights, 
which will be discussed in chapter 4. 
In  a  recent  article  clarifying  his  position  on  human  rights  universalism, 
Donnelly  describes  human rights  as  a  ‘social  practice’,  not  a  value,  and  justifies 
human rights as a universal practice in the following terms: 
The  functional  universality  of  human  rights  depends  on  human  rights 
providing  attractive  remedies  for  some  of  the  most  pressing  systemic 
threats to human dignity. […] Whatever our other problems, we all must 
deal  with  market  economies  and  bureaucratic  states.  Whatever  our 
religious,  moral,  legal,  and  political  resources,  we  all  need  equal  and 
inalienable  universal  human  rights  to  protect  us  from  those  threats. 
(Donnelly 2007:288) 
The  argument  here  seems  to  be  that  human  rights  as  a  practice  are  universally 
accepted insofar as they provide effective defence against the threats to human dignity 
posed  by  two  institutions  (markets  and  states)  which  happen  to  have  been 
universalised.  If  that  is  the case,  then the value at  the core of human rights as  a 
practice  is  human dignity.  This  much is  perhaps  uncontroversial.  But  it  does  not 
necessarily follow from there being the same threats to human dignity in places A and 
B that the same practices are appropriate in defending human dignity in A and B, 
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unless it is the case that human dignity is understood in almost exactly the same ways 
in both places. 
Donnelly deals with this point by suggesting that human rights are ‘relatively 
universal’, that is, they are universal at the conceptual level, but can be implemented 
and interpreted in different ways. This point is perhaps intelligible in the abstract, but 
the examples he offers suggest a more universalistic than relativistic understanding of 
human dignity. These include the possibility of designing electoral systems differently 
in different countries (which presupposes democracy) (Donnelly 2007:299), tolerance 
of a prohibition on apostasy as long as it is not incompatible with human rights (a 
position that renders ambiguous as much as it clarifies) (Donnelly 2007:301). Such 
examples do little to combat the argument of opponents such as Brown, who claims 
that ‘the contemporary human rights regime is in general, and, for the most part, in 
detail,  simply  a  contemporary,  internationalised  and  universalised,  version  of  the 
liberal position on rights’ (Brown 1997:43). This is perhaps a bolder claim than can 
easily be sustained. As Jeremy Waldron (1987:ch1) has argued, there is more than one 
liberalism.  Criticism of human rights  as  a liberal  discourse fails  to  recognise that 
liberals,  such  as  Jeremy  Bentham  and  John  Stuart  Mill,  have  been  among  the 
strongest critics of the idea of natural or human rights. But many have concurred with 
Brown  in  highlighting  the  individualism,  secularism  and  rationalism  inherent  in 
human rights as articulated in the UDHR (see, for example, Pollis and Schwab 1994). 
The historical constructedness of human rights identified by both Donnelly 
(1999a)  and  Freeman  (2004)  suggests  that  a  reconstruction  of  human  rights  is 
possible, but it is not obvious how universal human rights could be reconstructed so 
as  to  avoid  entirely  the  charge  of  favouring  liberalism without  them losing  their 
coherence. One possible answer is suggested by Rowan Cruft (2005a), who explores 
the idea that human rights should be justified individualistically. In such a scheme, 
religious and moral beliefs, at both an individual and a community level, would play a 
central part in justifying human rights, but they would not be deterministic: 
Both a  person’s  society and a person’s  own choices can influence the 
features that justify human rights for that person, but this influence is not 
inevitable.  It  follows  that  a  person’s  individualistic  right-justifying 
features can be fairly epistemologically inaccessible. (Cruft 2005a:81)
Cruft’s proposal would presumably not be endorsed by Donnelly, since it leads to the 
conclusion that human rights are to an extent non-universal, in the sense that different 
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persons  may  have  different  human  rights,  depending  on  which  (perhaps 
epistemologically  inaccessible)  features  of  their  interests  are  said  to  justify  their 
specific human rights. It is also unclear how such rights might be institutionalised. 
The legal interpretation of rights has often been undertaken with regard to relevant 
precedents,  but Cruft’s scheme would render the authoritative status of precedents 
unclear  at  best.  Cruft’s  argument  is  instructive,  though,  in  recognising  the 
implausibility of either cultural influence or reason exercising a determining influence 
in support for human rights at an individual level. In view of this, and absent from the 
domestic  conditions  that  Rawls  thought  would  encourage  convergence  around  an 
overlapping consensus, it seems doubtful that the idea of an exclusively ‘political’ 
overlapping consensus of the type Donnelly envisages would spontaneously ground 
support for human rights.25 The idea of separating our political (public) beliefs from 
our religious or philosophical (private) convictions is itself a liberal idea and is not a 
strategy that all people will find appropriate when agreeing common standards of how 
individuals should be treated. Donnelly (2003:50) explicitly supports liberal neutrality 
as an appropriate strategy to adopt, because, he argues, in absence of ‘knowing’ what 
the good life should be it is prudent to be tolerant of competing visions of how one 
should live. But this liberalism is itself insensitive to the complexity of conceptions of 
human dignity as described by Cruft.  
This  is  not  to  say  that  political  agreement  across  cultural  or  ethical 
perspectives is not possible. For instance, research on tension over water resources in 
the  Middle  East  has  yielded  some  potentially  encouraging  results.  A  number  of 
academics and politicians have maintained that, in recent history, water scarcity has 
been a source of tension in the region, to the extent that it has been a cause of war. On 
the basis of their analysis of conflict in the Jordan River Basin, the Euphrates-Tigris 
Basin, and the Arabian Peninsula – three areas that have seen exponential growth in 
demands on water resources in the past 100 years – Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray 
test a different hypothesis. They find that while the scarcity of water resources has 
raised tensions, it has not been sufficient to spark conflict in the absence of other 
factors leading to war, such as, in particular, antithetical ideologies. Importantly, they 
present a further finding that, in some instances, the scarcity of water seems to have 
been a crucial factor in motivating actors to put aside ideological differences and to 
25 Yet there is clear evidence of international support for human rights, as Donnelly claims. However, I 
argue in chapter 4 that there are plausible grounds for claiming some of this support is coerced. 
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pursue a diplomatic solution to conflict  over access to resources.  ‘In other words, 
water  is  too  vital  a  resource  to  be  put  at  risk  by  war;  increasing  water  scarcity 
generally concentrates the minds of decision-makers to find sustainable solutions by 
means  of  co-ordinated,  co-operative  and conciliatory  arrangements’  (Dolatyar  and 
Gray 2000:67). In short, it seems that environmental security as a factor in practical 
reasoning could legitimate  (even necessitate)  the  exclusion of  fundamental  beliefs 
from questions of politics,  especially the distribution of common goods, as Rawls 
envisages in his idea of an overlapping consensus. 
But there is an important difference between this example and the debate over 
human rights,  and  indeed,  the  debate  about  environmental  sustainability.  What  is 
distinctive about the situations that Dolatyar and Gray studied is that the participants 
in  the  negotiating  process  shared  a  common  understanding  of  the  problem to  be 
addressed. In these circumstances, practical reasoning – reasoning about what to do 
with  regard  to  a  given  problem  –  is  possible  even  in  the  presence  of  divergent 
fundamental beliefs. What is missing from some discussions about human rights, and 
many debates about environmental sustainability, is a common understanding of the 
problem to be addressed. In short, the problem is not ‘given’, but is itself contested. 
Fundamental (metaphysical) beliefs play a role in shaping people’s understanding of a 
particular  problem.  For  ecocentrists  the  problem  of  realising  environmental 
sustainability is not simply a matter of reorganising our economy in a way that limits 
environmental damage. Rather, it is also a matter of recognising the inherent value in 
the  natural  environment  and  modifying  our  behaviour  accordingly.  A  substantial 
element of achieving environmental sustainability from an ecocentric point of view 
therefore entails enlarging our moral community to include within the scope of moral 
concern non-human animals, plants, and even sand and stones (see Eckersley 1992; 
O’Neill 1993). 
Similarly,  fundamental  beliefs  reflecting  metaphysical  commitments 
contribute to the kind of non-universal human rights Cruft envisages. Cruft considers 
it possible that allowing ‘cultural’ practices, such as female genital mutilation, is a 
human  rights  violation  for  some  women,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  banning  such 
practices could be a violation of human rights for others. Which of these is the case 
depends upon the interplay between the women’s own sense of their  cultural and 
individual identity and the interests that their human rights should therefore protect 
(Cruft 2005a:280-1). A comparable argument is found in Talal Asad (1997), a study 
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of the variability of the idea of torture. The agreement that no individual should suffer 
‘cruel,  inhuman and degrading treatment’  (Article  5  of  the  UDHR) is  held  to be 
‘universal in scope, but particular in prescriptive content’ (Asad 1997:111), and the 
difficulty Asad finds in identifying a dividing line between some aspects of torture 
and  (consensual)  sado-masochist  practices  again  highlights  the  problem  of 
epistemological accessibility. 
Some feminists would certainly be sceptical of the evident conservatism of 
such arguments, particularly the specific example advanced by Cruft, which is neither 
defended  nor  disputed  here.  It  is,  however,  illustrative  of  the  way  in  which 
fundamental beliefs – religious, moral, the type of beliefs excluded from playing a 
justificatory role in an overlapping consensus – may well influence the ways in which 
problems are understood.26 Yet Donnelly would argue that Cruft and Asad here make 
the mistake drawing normative conclusions from the fact that cultural practices differ. 
Cultural  relativism,  Donnelly  argues,  is  an  ‘important  antidote  to  misplaced 
universalism’ (Donnelly 2007:296). But he remains committed to human rights as a 
universal  practice  able  to  defend  individuals  from  the  threats  to  human  dignity 
inherent in modern markets and states, and is not too troubled by the idea that, since 
human dignity could be understood in different ways, human rights, as a universal 
practice,  may  presuppose  a  conception  of  human  dignity  that  is  not,  in  fact, 
universally shared. In this respect he comes close to Rorty, who is unapologetic in his 
defence  of  liberalism  as  the  best  set  of  values  currently  available,  and  whose 
justification for human rights is considered in the next section. 
 
3.3 Human rights as a ‘sentimental education’ 
Like Donnelly, Richard Rorty does not offer a defence of human rights based 
on  philosophical  foundations.  Instead,  he  argues  that  human  rights  should  be 
understood as a ‘culture’, a culture that is perhaps inevitably liberal. However, where 
liberalism is ascribed to in a ‘contingent’, ‘ironic’, and ‘post-modern’ way, rather than 
a more solidly committed way, Rorty believes that human rights proponents need not 
26 A  complementary  argument  is  developed  by  Brian  Feltham (2003),  who  argues  for  allowing  a 
persons’ values to play a role in practical reasoning. The merit of this, he claims, is ‘the value of being 
able to take a certain attitude towards one’s own life, to be able to endorse it as a life well lived, […] 
this value can ground reasons that bear on what we ought to do’ (Feltham 2003:28-29). To fail to 
recognise  the  values  that  people  have  and  their  relevance  to  practical  reasoning,  on  Feltham’s 
argument,  is  to  invite  frustration  and  resentment  –  clearly  this  is  not  an  ideal  outcome if  one  is 
concerned to promote universal human rights. 
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apologise for their liberalism. Moreover, Rorty’s liberalism differs from that of other 
liberal rights theorists such as Hart or Gewirth or Thomas Pogge,27 in that he insists 
that human rights do not rely on the typically liberal appeal to rationalism, but are 
instead the product of what he calls a ‘sentimental education’. He therefore rejects 
appeals to what he calls ‘foundational truths’. A sentimental education proceeds by 
the telling of sad and sentimental stories that invite the listener to imagine what it is 
like  to  be  in  the  victim’s  position,  and  therefore  inspire  sympathy.  He  shares 
Donnelly’s  belief that  the existing consensus on human rights  makes enquiry into 
their philosophical foundations redundant, but is nevertheless concerned to point out 
the error of philosophers in searching for such foundations because the rationalism 
that has characterised such endeavours has led to the belief that human rights can be 
promoted by pointing out that those who fail to support them are irrational. On the 
contrary,  Rorty argues  that  what  opponents  of  human rights  typically  lack  is  not 
reason, but rather sympathy and security. The project of increasing support for human 
rights is therefore advanced by increasing these two vital commodities. 
3.3.1 Suffering as a transcultural fact
Rorty has explicitly called on human rights theorists to abandon their search 
for philosophical foundations, not least because he regards the types of answers that 
have thus far been advanced as not being terribly useful. Hence, he endorses Eduardo 
Rabossi  in  saying  that,  ‘the  human  rights  phenomenon  renders  human  rights 
foundationalism outmoded and irrelevant’ (quoted in Rorty 1993:116). There are two 
purported reasons for this. First, the manifest consensus on human rights belies the 
need  for  philosophical  defences  –  we  are  already  agreed  that  human  rights  are 
contingently a good thing; we need not waste our time squabbling with philosophers 
over why they are so good. In discussing Donnelly’s reliance on consensus, above, it 
became apparent that consensus in itself tells us little about the (potential) value of the 
thing at issue. This same criticism applies to Rorty’s use of the consensus argument in 
support of human rights. However, there is a second and more important claim in 
Rorty’s work: he agrees with Rabossi in asserting that there are no ‘morally relevant 
transcultural  facts’  (Rorty  1993:116).  What  he  means  by  this  is  that  the  various 
attempts adherents of human rights have made to ground human rights in ‘facts’ about 
27 Pogge’s account of human rights, though intended as a critique of, and alternative to, ‘mainstream’ 
approaches, is nevertheless clearly rooted in a liberal, rationalistic approach to rights theorising. His 
‘institutional’ model is discussed in chapter 4.
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human nature, such as humans’ inherent rationality, or their status as the creation of a 
particular God, cannot be universally supported in the context of a plural world. It 
follows that the spread of the idea of human rights to the point of there being the 
consensus he and Donnelly now herald, has not been consequent upon appeal to such 
‘transcultural facts’. That being the case, the debate about transcultural facts has no 
practical value: ‘Since no useful work seems to be done by insisting on a purportedly 
ahistorical human nature, there probably is no such nature, or at least nothing in that 
nature that is relevant to our moral choices’ (Rorty 1993:119).
However, Rorty in fact smuggles both a ‘transculturally relevant fact’ and an 
implicit  theory of  human nature  into  his  defence of  human rights.  The appeal  to 
sympathy  suggests  that  there  is  something  all  humans  are  capable  of:  suffering. 
Because all humans can suffer, all humans can, in theory, imagine what it is like to 
experience a particular manifestation of suffering that another person experiences, and 
that, in theory, should elicit sympathy. Animals also suffer, but Rorty suggests that 
the most useful way to differentiate animals from humans is to say that ‘we can feel 
for each other to a much greater extent than they can’ (Rorty 1993:122, emphasis in 
original). This sounds suspiciously like a tentative theory of human nature, something 
Rorty  has  unequivocally  denounced  as  not  having  any  analytical  value  (Hayden 
1999:61). Indeed, Christopher Berry suggests that, where Rorty posits sympathy as a 
device that facilitates the identification of sufferers as ‘one of us’, it seems that, ‘after 
all, some standard notion of human nature does have some work to do by rendering 
identification possible’ (Berry 1986:129). Furthermore, Rorty’s comparison of human 
rights with aspirin – both are remedies to common problems, and no-one who has 
known their benefits would subsequently refuse them – not only simplifies to a degree 
that might discount the need for local variations in the interpretation of human rights, 
it also seems to presuppose some degree of universality, the possibility of which in 
moral or cultural terms Rorty denies (Rorty 2000, Peerenboom, 2000). 
Rorty would perhaps respond that the ‘inevitable’ preference for liberalism is 
contingent upon it being the best idea around at present – this is not a universalist 
position because the argument is  not that liberalism will always be the best option. 
But there are further problems in Rorty’s work that result from his commitment to 
liberalism, however ironic or contingent. Richard Bernstein has complained that, 
[s]ometimes Rorty concedes that there are important differences among 
the  varieties  of  liberalism,  but  these  differences  are  political not 
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philosophical... [but] he does not clarify what constitutes “the political” or 
how one is to evaluate critically competing political arguments. (Bernstein 
1987:547)
In an essay written by way of response to Bernstein, Rorty tells us that philosophers 
are  ‘useful  for,  roughly,  private  rather  than  public  purposes’  (Rorty  1987:572). 
Elsewhere,  however,  he  endorses  Rawls’  ‘Difference  Principle’  as  an  example  of 
what philosophy can ‘hope to do’,  which is,  ‘summarize our culturally influenced 
intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations’ (Rorty 1993:117). There is 
clearly  some ambiguity  in  Rorty’s  separation  of  public  and  private,  political  and 
philosophical.  The  separation  of  the  public  from the  private  is  a  familiar  liberal 
strategy which has stimulated an established body of criticism, some of which leaves 
Rorty’s theory looking rather vulnerable. Rorty may feel that no particular work is 
needed to demonstrate why philosophers should address some questions rather than 
others, but he is misguided if he thinks that this also applies to political agents. As Jo 
Burrows  rightly  points  out:  ‘Often  political  issues  cannot  even  be  identified 
pragmatically,  that is non-ideologically’ (Burrows 1990:328). Indeed, Nancy Fraser 
attacks Rorty’s liberalism on the grounds that,
[Rorty’s  theory] stands or falls with the possibility of drawing a sharp 
boundary between public and private life. But is this really possible? [...] 
the social movements of the last hundred or so years have taught us to see 
the  power-laden and therefore political  character  of  interactions which 
classical liberalism considered private. (Fraser 1990:312)
3.3.2 The failure of reason
Despite this, Rorty’s theory of human rights is instructive because he offers a 
convincing explanation of the failure appeals to respect human rights as the rational 
thing to do. Rorty points to the example of Thomas Jefferson:
The founder of my university was able both to own slaves and to think it 
self-evident  that  all  men  were  endowed  by  their  creator  with  certain 
inalienable rights … Like the Serbs, Mr. Jefferson did not think of himself 
as violating human rights. (Rorty 1993:112)
The  simplistic  character  of  some of  Rorty’s  comments  about  the  Balkan  conflict 
notwithstanding, Rorty here makes the important point that the problem for human 
rights activists is not the rare case of the psychopath who treats ‘human beings’ in an 
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inhumane way, but rather, the average member of a community who fails to recognise 
people  who  are  not  members  of  his  or  her  (self-defined)  community  as  ‘human 
beings’. Justifications of human rights that rely on accepting our common humanity 
on the basis of our rationality (such as that espoused by Gewirth) are bound to fail, in 
Rorty’s view, because, ‘everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being, as a 
rational  agent  in  the  only  relevant  sense  –  the  sense  in  which rational  agency is 
synonymous with membership in our moral community’ (Rorty 1993:124). The same 
holds  true  for  religious  based defences  of  human rights,  or  any other  defence  of 
human rights that rests on a truth claim – human rights are violated not because the 
(universal) truth is repudiated, but because the validating characteristic of humanity is 
used as a tool for exclusion. Thus it is possible for persecutors to think of themselves, 
like Jefferson, as not violating universal rights. 
In responding to proponents of such arguments, Rorty finds it instructive to 
think of them as deprived, not of rationality, but rather: ‘It would be better – more 
suggestive of possible remedies – to think of them as deprived of two more concrete 
things:  security  and sympathy.’  (Rorty 1993:128) It  can be noted that  this  hardly 
applies to Rorty’s chosen example – Jefferson – who does not seem to have lacked 
either  sympathy  or  security,  but  these  two  values  are  at  the  heart  of  Rorty’s 
understanding of human rights as a ‘human rights culture’, and furnish an answer to 
the second question proposed above, namely, what does Rorty think does the work of 
expanding  our  moral  community  and  bolstering  our  support  for  human  rights,  if 
philosophical or religious foundations are doomed to failure. 
The example of Jefferson clearly needs to be explained, but it is first worth 
pursuing Rorty’s argument further. He amplifies his argument against an appeal to 
philosophical or religious foundations by identifying an alternative strategy he thinks 
more  likely  to  be  effective.  If,  he  claims,  saying  that  ‘our  little  differences  are 
insignificant compared to the one big commonality of a universal truth’ has no impact 
on the moral choices people make, then the best strategy is to hope that a ‘sentimental 
education’  can  ‘redescribe’  the  little  differences  in  a  way  that  renders  them 
insignificant (Rorty 1999:86). Thus, rather than suggesting, with Immanuel Kant or 
Gewirth, that our rationality can ground a universal morality, Rorty proposes that we 
should look to David Hume’s notion of the human capacity to experience cruelty and 
sympathy.  Quoting  Annette  Baier,  he  explains,  ‘Hume  held  that  “corrected 
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(sometimes rule-corrected) sympathy, not law-discerning reason, is the fundamental 
moral capacity”’. (Rorty 1993:129)
Patrick Hayden has claimed that Baier’s work on Hume, one of the sources 
from  which  Rorty  derives  his  thesis,  does  not  support  Rorty’s  conclusions. 
Specifically, Hayden points to the fact that Hume thought that ‘“artificial” rules of 
justice [are required] to lead our sentiments beyond their local partiality’  (Hayden 
1999:62).  But Rorty clearly  acknowledges here Hume’s belief that  rules  might  of 
necessity play a part in guiding sentiment. Nevertheless, the emphasis in Rorty’s work 
is on a sentimental education, not the development of rules, though perhaps human 
rights could be interpreted as the sort of rules a sentimental education might inspire 
people to adhere to.  A sentimental education proceeds by way of hearing sad and 
sentimental  stories  that  encourage  sympathy  for  the  victims.  Such  an  education 
encourages  individuals  to  see  the  (little)  differences  between  themselves  and  the 
victims of the stories as less significant than the (equally little) similarities between 
us, ‘such little, superficial, similarities as cherishing our parents and our children – 
similarities  that  do not interestingly distinguish us from many nonhuman animals’ 
(Rorty 1993:129). According to Rorty, while little progress has been made by those 
who tell us that ‘kinship and custom are morally irrelevant’, the telling of such stories 
has encouraged us in the West to enlarge our moral community. Thus, the success of 
the international human rights regime, to date, is held to owe more to ‘agents of love’ 
(anthropologists, artists and journalists) than to ‘agents of justice’ (judges, theologians 
and philosophers) (Rorty 1991). 
There  is  a  clear  debt  to  Christianity  in  Rorty’s  thinking:  Implicit  in  the 
sentimental  stories  he  appeals  to  is  the  universal  Christian  command  ‘love  thy 
neighbour’,  which Rorty (1993:122) describes as  Christ’s  fundamental  message,  a 
message he explicitly  hopes to secularise.  As  well  as  being aware of  the  debt  to 
Christianity  in  his  proposed  human  rights  culture  Rorty  also  notes  Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s contempt for its message of brotherly love. Acknowledged, too, is ‘our 
sense that sentiment is too weak a force’ and that we resist this as a basis for morality 
largely because it follows that the fate of those whose human rights are not secure 
rests in the hands of those who already enjoy security. In order for those currently 
threatened to have a better, more secure future, it depends upon the powerful taking 
the trouble to care (Rorty 1993:129-30). This fits the story of Jefferson’s apparently 
hypocritical  behaviour  better  than  Rorty’s  suggestion  that  people  who  disrespect 
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human rights  are  in  some way deprived.  It  also  suggests  that  something  more  is 
needed than security and a capacity for sympathy in order for a sentimental education 
to be effective. 
Rorty’s reading of the history of the concept of human rights would seem to 
suggest that the limits of liberal tolerance are enlarged each time a given community 
learns to think of some new group of outsiders as within the scope of moral concern, 
and therefore being due the courtesy of being treated with dignity and respect. But the 
question  of  what  determines  the  location  of  that  boundary  requires  further 
investigation.  Rorty  hopes  a  sentimental  education  will  push  it  ever  wider,  but 
‘harder’ contingencies, such as the material conditions in which people live, equally 
play  a  role.  Rawls  cites  the  example  of  the  European  wars  of  religion,  whereby 
religion  shifted  from being  a  matter  of  public  policy  to  being  a  private  concern, 
primarily because it was too costly to pursue disagreements over religious differences 
at the state level (Rawls 1985:225). For Rorty, it is no coincidence that the West, the 
most  industrialised  and  technologically  advanced  culture  in  history,  is  also  the 
historical home of the concept of human rights and the most promising candidate for 
adopting  a  human  rights  culture.  As  Rorty  explains:  ‘Security  and  sympathy  go 
together. […] Sentimental education only works on those who can relax long enough 
to listen’ (Rorty 1993:128).
There are obvious parallels here with the difficulties for Donnelly’s argument 
from consensus on human rights to a justification for human rights. Consensus on a 
given norm is contingent, as Rorty readily accepts, but given that contingencies can 
be ‘hard’ as well as ‘soft’, there are reasons to suspect that the consensus on human 
rights would not be so strong if human rights had not found their way into the foreign 
policies of many of the most powerful governments in the world today. Moreover, the 
problem  of  human  rights  being  contingent  upon  ‘security’  demonstrates  that 
continued or growing consensus is not inevitable. Just as the boundary between those 
within and outwith the scope of equal moral concern expands, it can also retract (as it 
did in 1930s Germany), and this is most likely to be correlated with a decrease in our 
sense of our own security. As discussed in chapter 2, the increasing likelihood of 
environmental  threats  to  human  security  that  are  caused  by  environmentally 
unsustainable patterns of economic globalisation are therefore, on Rorty’s reading, 
likely to undermine the purported consensus on human rights. This is not a problem 
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Rorty can adequately respond to. As both Brown (1997) and Freeman (1994; 2002) 
conclude, Rorty’s proposed sentimental education is ultimately too weak to provide 
the kind of intellectual defence for human rights that many activists would hope for.28 
This leaves the advocate of human rights seeking to justify support for human rights 
in  philosophical  terms  at  an  impasse:  Rational  justifications  fail;  the  purported 
consensus  on  human rights  does  not  in  itself  furnish  reasons  to  support  them;  a 
sentimental education is too weak to withstand a decrease in our security, which is 
precisely the point when human rights are vulnerable.  Freeman concludes that the 
only option left is to make ‘a nonrational decision either to accept or reject solidarity 
with humanity’ (Freeman 1994:514), which, despite Freeman’s doubts about Rorty’s 
approach, clearly echoes the latter’s conclusions.  
3.4 Conclusion
Of the three possible routes to justifying universal human rights considered 
here;  firstly  by  means  of  rational  enquiry,  secondly  by  means  of  an  overlapping 
consensus, and thirdly by means of a sentimental education; none of proved entirely 
satisfactory. Rational approaches such as Gewirth’s presuppose something that cannot 
be rationally proven and moreover is to some extent at odds with the secularism of a 
rational approach; that is,  that humans beings have some inherent, intrinsic worth. 
Moreover, the secularism of Gewirth’s approach, which is said to be characteristic of 
the contemporary human rights regime in general, is offensive to some people whose 
world view is fundamentally religious. 
The  overlapping  consensus  model  proposed  by  Donnelly  failed  largely 
because consensus in itself does not indicate that the subject of the consensus is good 
or bad or desirable or not. In the next chapter, I also discuss some doubts about the 
empirical claim that there is an overlapping consensus on human rights. A further 
28 Langlois  (2001) also finds Rorty’s  theory too weak, and proposes an alternative based on Cass 
Sunstein’s  idea  of  ‘incompletely  theorised  agreements’,  which  are  supposed  to  represent  an 
improvement  on  the  consensus  model  that  Donnelly  proposes  in  that  the  incompletely  theorised 
agreement allows for metaphysical beliefs to play a part in justifying commitments. Support for human 
rights on the basis of an incompletely theorised agreement, according to Langlois, would be contingent 
upon individual beliefs, so that those who found rights to religious freedom, say, contrary to their 
position, could essentially derogate from that aspect of the overlapping agreement on human rights. 
Beliefs would also be expected to change over time. This basis for universal human rights seems to me 
to  be  even  weaker  than  Rorty’s  proposed  sentimental  education,  which  Langlois  attacks,  and,  as 
Langlois  himself  concedes,  ‘[a]n incompletely theorised agreement is  inadequate,  however,  for  the 
important question of dissent from the dominant human rights discourse’ (Langlois 2001:123), which 
Rorty finds the most difficult problem that human rights advocates confront.
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difficulty  in  Donnelly’s  argument  arose  in  relation  to  his  understanding  of  the 
universalism of human rights, which was contingent upon the globalisation of markets 
and states.  Human rights  were understood to be the best tool  available to protect 
human dignity in the face of the threats presented by markets and states. Implicit in 
this account is a relatively universalistic account of human dignity, one in which to be 
a flourishing human being is  to exercise autonomy,  self-determination,  democratic 
self-expression, and so on. Absent, however, from Donnelly’s understanding of the 
threats posed by markets and states are the environmental problems argued in chapter 
2 to be attendant upon economic globalisation.
The final approach discussed above was Rorty’s idea of human rights as a 
sentimental  education.  Rorty  accepts  that  human rights  are  inherently  liberal,  but 
argues that a contingent commitment to liberalism should not deter adherents from 
asserting the universal value of human rights. Rorty is convincing in his claim that 
human rights advocates who appeal to what he calls ‘foundational truths’, such as 
God, or reason, cannot provide a persuasive answer to the question of why someone 
should care about the human rights of a stranger unless they share those particular 
foundational truths. The better strategy, Rorty concludes, is to appeal to sentimental 
stories that invite imagination and sympathy. Given that sympathy, in Rorty’s view, is 
to some extent contingent upon security, the probability of increasing environmental 
problems and the attendant threat to human security discussed in chapter 2 indicates 
that there is reason for concern about future levels of support and respect for human 
rights. In view of these and other threats, it is not surprising that most commentators 
find Rorty’s prescription of a sentimental education too weak a basis for justifying 
human rights. 
On the other hand, Freeman’s conclusion that individuals must choose (or not) 
a nonrational commitment to solidarity with humanity is arguably also weak. But it is 
not necessarily liberal, as Rorty avowedly is. Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter 6, 
the notion of solidarity has also been a feature of green communitarian writing. The 
commitment  to  solidarity,  however,  does  not  necessarily  entail  a  commitment  to 
human rights as the best means of acting on this value. The next chapter explores 
some  of  the  criticisms  that  have  been  levelled  at  the  contemporary  international 
human rights regime, and considers a possible alternative.  
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Chapter 4: The contemporary international human rights regime:
Some criticisms and an alternative
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  raised  doubts  about  the  purported  international 
consensus on human rights. This is not to suggest that human rights are not widely 
endorsed  by  governments,  intergovernmental  organisations  such  as  the  African 
Union,  the  European  Union,  and  the  United  Nations,  and  by  non-governmental 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as the 
Red  Cross.  However,  when  looking  at  support  for  human  rights  professed  by 
governments, it is claimed that some of this support is a matter of  realpolitik rather 
than spontaneous endorsement, particularly in non-Western states. On this reading, a 
degree of support for human rights is in fact coerced. A framework for understanding 
and examining this claim is provided by Jack Donnelly’s work on the idea of human 
rights as a ‘standard of civilisation’. Donnelly argues that support for human rights is 
coming to be seen by the international community as the price of a place at the table 
in international politics. In the final section of this chapter, I suggest a similar idea 
plays a role in Thomas Pogge’s thinking about human rights. While human rights 
advocates might welcome the scope for encouraging greater compliance with human 
rights norms, towards the end of the chapter I argue that using human rights as a 
standard by which to judge others can be problematic.
 Moving away from state elites to the grass roots level, it has also been claimed 
that the purported consensus on human rights is less evident than adherents would 
wish.  But  many  commentators  attribute  some  of  this  apparent  resistance  to  the 
contemporary human rights regime not to the idea of human rights per se, but rather, 
to  human rights  as  they  tend to be  interpreted and implemented  in contemporary 
world politics. Critics in this debate point to the state-centrism of human rights, and to 
what  has  been  called  the  ‘ambivalence  with  respect  to  power’  that  has  been 
characteristic of human rights practice. Commentators such as Abdullahi An-Na‘im 
conclude that, in view of these criticisms, a reconceptualisation of human rights is 
needed. One possible candidate for a new way of understanding human rights that 
could address the problems of state-centrism and ambivalence with respect to power 
is  proposed  by  Pogge.  Pogge’s  ‘insititutional’  model  of  human  rights  aims  to 
demonstrate how the chronic ‘underfulfilment’ of human rights, particularly socio-
economic rights, in developing countries, could be addressed if human rights were re-
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conceptualised on an insititutional, as distinct from an interactional, model. I argue 
that this new orientation towards the chronic underfulfilment of human rights is better 
equipped to address the kind of human rights issues likely to arise as a consequence of 
environmental degradation than the contemporary international human rights regime. 
Before  discussing  Pogge’s  institutional  model,  I  consider  two  kinds  of  criticisms 
about the contemporary human rights regime; firstly, doubts about the consensus that 
is claimed to endorse the International Bill of Rights, and secondly, the ambivalence 
of human rights with respect to power.  
4.1 Doubts about consensus
One oft-studied field that may shed light on doubts about consensus is the so-
called ‘Asian values’ debate. The Asian values debate began in the aftermath of the 
Asian economic boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, and though it has died down a 
little since the 1997 economic collapse, it is nevertheless instructive to consider some 
of  the  arguments  presented  in  that  context.  Public  and  academic  attention  was 
particularly sparked by the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, made by a group of Asian 
leaders by way of prelude to the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The 
‘debate’ responds to the claims made in that document and in public statements by a 
number of Asian government officials, notably from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia 
and  Thailand,  that  there  are  specifically  Asian  values,  and  that  these  values  are 
distinct from and (in some versions) incompatible with the UDHR model of human 
rights (Bauer and Bell 1999:3-23; Othman 1999:171; Langlois 2001:12-45). Anthony 
J. Langlois summarises these values as broadly concerning culture, economics, and 
the  role  of  the  state,  with  the  arguments  being  used  by  Asian  state  leaders  to 
‘legitimate  a  soft-authoritarianism  style  of  leadership  in  which  the  individual  is 
subservient to the good of the community’, and where civil and political rights are 
held to be depend upon social and economic rights, therefore legitimising policies that 
prioritise economic development at the expense of civil and political rights (Langlois 
2001:24). Hence Vitit Muntarbhorn’s finding that, while remarkable consensus exists 
over economic and social rights in Asia, with considerable attention paid to a ‘right to 
development’, recognition of and subscription to the ‘universal’ rights to such goods 
as freedom of thought, expression and association, and freedom of religion, is far less 
certain in the region (Muntarbhorn 2001:81-92).
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Much of the criticism of human rights advanced by those engaged in the Asian 
values debate is not new. To give only one example, Malaysian politician and human 
rights  scholar  Hishammuddin  Tun Hussein  enumerates  seven points  of  contention 
with respect to the ‘North’s’29 understanding of universal human rights (2001:76-79). 
(1) Diversity is not taken seriously. (2) The South is blamed for problems for which 
the North is  at  least  in  part responsible,  for example,  drug trafficking (when it  is 
people in the North who do the majority of the drug consuming). (3) Human rights do 
not  take into  account  the  place  of  community.  Human rights  are  secular,  yet  the 
majority  of  the  world’s  inhabitants  profess  a  religion.  These  religions  generally 
promote ethics of duties or the right, rather than rights. (4) Human rights are unevenly 
upheld  by  the  international  community.  The  example  given  relates  to  the  very 
different  international  welcomes  received  by  Myanmar  and  Israel.  Human  rights 
should not be a matter of ‘realpolitik’ (2001:77). (5) Nations of the South require time 
to  develop  their  own  (appropriate)  institutions  −  ‘Abrupt  transplants  never  work’ 
(2001:77). (6) The North focuses on civil and political rights, whereas, ‘imperilled by 
the twin forces of globalisation and liberalisation’, Asian people ‘are more concerned 
with the right to food, the right to shelter and the right to work’ (2001:79). (7) Linking 
human  rights  to  aid,  trade  and  foreign  direct  investment  undermines  the  alleged 
universalism − ‘If the right to development is to be truly inalienable and fundamental, 
there cannot be conditionalities’ (2001:79).
There are broadly two types of criticism here – one relates to hypocrisy or 
double standards on the part of the West, (points (2), (4), and (7)), – the other relates 
to the claim that there are distinctly Asian values that are not recognised, and are 
undermined by the supposedly universal doctrine of human rights. In response to this 
latter charge, it is worth noting that many of the problems raised have in fact been 
highlighted before by Western critics of human rights. Waldron’s (1987) review of 
the arguments Jeremy Bentham, Edmund Burke and Karl Marx advanced against the 
idea of natural rights reveals a long history of intellectual concern over the concept of 
inalienable rights of man qua man, many of which are echoed in more recent debate. 
Hussein’s first complaint, that the doctrine of human rights does not take the fact of 
diversity seriously, is an echo of Burke’s complaint that the French revolutionary idea 
of the natural rights of man abstracted from one circumstance to another, thus failing 
29 I take those Hussein identifies as ‘the North’ to be roughly synonymous with ‘the West’, though both 
these terms are inadequate.
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to  take  account  of  local  particularity  (Waldron  1987:85;  166-8).  The  sixth  point 
Hussein raises is compatible with much of Marx’s critique of the rights of man as the 
rights of the bourgeois liberal30 (Waldron 1987:126-30). Similarly, the individualism 
of natural  rights,  attacked differently  by Marx and Burke (Waldron 1987:184-90), 
finds  a  fellow critic  in the  third  point  of  Hussein’s  attack on human rights.  This 
demonstrates, if nothing else, that neither ‘Western values’ nor ‘Asian values’ will be 
subscribed  to  by  all  those  who  are  thought  to  be  ‘Western’  or  ‘Asian’.  Indeed, 
scholars have pointed out that those who claim to defend particular cultural values 
against the universalism of human rights have often been guilty of oppressing the 
people they claim to represent, whereas the language of human rights has been taken 
up by oppressed peoples in countries where elites have rejected it (see, for example, 
Wilson 1987a:8-10). Cultural relativism, it is argued, goes hand in hand with political 
conservatism. 
To test the idea that some state leaders have used the purported Asian values 
to defend their own positions, rather than their people, Langlois (2001:46-72) studied 
grass roots support for human rights (as defined in the UDHR model) in South-East 
Asia. He conducted fifty interviews with academics, activists, NGO staff and think-
tank members from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The questions posed included 
‘are there human rights,  how do we know, and which rights are they?’ For many 
interviewees, religion played a major part in their worldview, such that God (Allah, in 
fact)  supplied the answer  to these questions.  According to Langlois (2001:63-65), 
discussions of such varied issues as women’s rights, gay rights31, and most strikingly, 
religious  freedom,  revealed  that,  where  people’s  understanding  of  the  world  is 
religious − that is, people support human rights because those rights specify standards 
of  behaviour that  it  is  one’s  religious duty to uphold;  one knows this  because of 
revelation; the content of these rights is knowable because religious texts and their 
interpreters  can  explicate  them  −  then  human  rights  are  not  universal,  because 
different  rights  are specified.  This  finding is  to  some extent  in  harmony with the 
argument  in the previous chapter  regarding the role that  fundamental  religious or 
philosophical beliefs play in shaping beliefs about human rights.
30 That said,  Waldron argues that Marx’s view of these rights as the rights of citizens, rather than of 
man, was more ambivalent (see Waldron 1987:158).
31 The right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is not included in the 
International Bill of Rights. Langlois nonetheless documents hostility to gay rights on the part of his 
interviewees, and notes their identification of gay rights as ‘Western’.
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As noted in the previous chapter, Donnelly (2003:96-98) argues that variation 
in the interpretation of rights can be accommodated if rights are universally endorsed 
at the conceptual level. But Langlois believes that the differences he finds at the level 
of  interpretation  cast  doubt  on the  plausibility  of  consensus  on  the  concept.  This 
argument can be illustrated with reference to Langlois’ (2001:67-72) discussion of 
rights to religious freedom. In a study focused on Islam as practised in South-East 
Asia, and its compatibility with the UDHR, he finds that, ‘there is not, within Islam, 
latitude such that people are ‘free to get free’ as they are in the West. On the contrary, 
the  only  freedom  to  be  legitimately  had  is  freedom  within  the  ethics  of  Islam’ 
(Langlois  2001:68).  In  the  opinion  of  a  number  of  interviewees,  Islam  is  not 
conceptualised as a religion that one can choose to ‘give up’, in the way that one can 
choose to change job, or house. This is not to say that all South-East Asians, or even 
all  Muslim South-East  Asians,  do not  accept  a  human right  to  religious freedom. 
However, it is to say that the interpretations here are so radically different that these 
rights to religious freedom can be described in the same terms if, and only if, one 
chooses  not  to  examine  the  contested  meaning  of  the  terms.  Religious  freedom 
understood as the freedom to practice a religion is quite different from the freedom to 
choose not to practice a religion, and is something different again from the freedoms 
granted by a given religious code. 
But others remain critical of this sort of argument. Norani Othman (1999), 
studying the possibility of grounding human rights in Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia 
–  two of  Langlois’  test  cases  –  argues  that  ‘although Islam may be  as  culturally 
contingent as its Western counterpart, it nevertheless has the capacity to yield a notion 
of universal human rights’ (Otham 1999:170). Othman acknowledges that there are, 
those Muslims who claim outright that current human rights concepts and 
standards  (especially  those  incorporated  within  prevailing  international 
human rights documents) are completely alien to Islam and incompatible 
with Islamic law as they interpret it. (Othman 1999:171)
But she points to struggles for women’s rights in Malaysia as evidence of people 
challenging the particular interpretation of Islam that opposes human rights. Neither 
Islam nor human rights emerge from this process of challenge and re-interpretation as 
the  previously  ‘fixed’  concepts  that  were held  to  be  antithetical.  This  idea  of  re-
interpretation of human rights through challenges from different social movements is 
also present in the recent work of a number of Western scholars. Those who highlight 
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the historical constructedness of human rights, such as Stammers (1999) and Freeman 
(2002) demonstrate that the focus and content of human rights has evolved over time 
and  is  unlikely  to  remain  as  it  is.  Approaching  the  debate  from the  other  side, 
Raimundo  Panikkar  (1982)  and  An-Na‘im  (1999;  2001)  argue  that  cultural  or 
religious doctrines such as Islam are also not static. Moreover, resigning oneself to the 
belief that human rights and particular world views are incompatible offers little by 
way of constructive practical advice on how to respond to the fact of human rights 
abuses or underfulfilment. Notwithstanding Asad’s (1997) point that what constitutes 
suffering is culturally and even individually variable, there are, as Freeman (1998) 
argues, nonetheless instances of practices that seem intuitively to be wrong to the 
extent that no-one should be subjected to them. The epistemic difficulties raised by 
Asad and Cruft, as discussed in the previous chapter, suggest that it may sometimes 
be difficult to determine whether or not a practice that seems intuitively to be a human 
rights violation should in fact be so understood. But sometimes it may not. In neither 
case does it straightforwardly follow that no action should be taken. Similarly, the 
claim that different values are held by those responsible for, or complicit in, practices 
that  are  judged to  be human rights  violations  does not  unproblematically  provide 
grounds for inaction by others. As Andrew J. Nathan observes:
To  refrain  from  intervening  is  to  side  with  those  on  top.  Given  the 
ubiquity of power, between and within cultures, there is no option of a 
power-free discourse over values. One way or another, moral choice is 
unavoidable. (Nathan 2001:358)
Doubts about consensus, then, are no more a guide to (in)action on human rights than 
is consensus. 
4.1.1 Human rights as a ‘standard of civilisation’
Donnelly  thinks  the  unavoidable  choice  is  in  favour  of  human rights,  not 
because of power relations within cultures, but because of the power of markets and 
states. Thus, he responds to the claimed particularity of Asian values by reiterating his 
commitment to the view that the fallout from the globalisation of markets and states 
makes human rights universally necessary, even if they are not universally supported: 
‘[C]ontemporary Asian individuals, families, and societies face the same threats from 
modern markets and states that Western societies do, and therefore need the same 
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protections  of  human  rights’  (Donnelly  1999b:69).  Stammers,  who  is  otherwise 
critical of Donnelly, reaches a very similar conclusion: 
[I]t  is  not  necessary  to  accept  the  legitimacy  of  a  teleological 
modernization  thesis  to  recognize  the  extent  to  which  the  globalizing 
dynamics  of  political  and  economic  power  have  created  powerful 
tendencies towards universalization and homogenization.  So,  even if  it 
were true that peoples of particular cultures did not need human rights 
before,  a  good case may be made that  they certainly  need them now! 
(Stammers 1999:993)
But  Donnelly  (1998)  has  also  described  human  rights  as  a  nascent  ‘standard  of 
civilisation’, whereby respect for human rights is the price to be paid for a place at the 
table  in  international  politics.  Tracing  the  history  of  the  idea  of  ‘standards  of 
civilisation’  in  international  relations  from  the  nineteenth  century  to  the  present, 
Donnelly finds that powerful states have used their own standard of civilisation to 
determine  the  kind  of  relations  they  will  have  with  weaker  states.  Only  those 
governments that powerful (Western) governments considered legitimate have been 
recognised  as  equal  players  in  the  game that  is  international  politics,  and treated 
accordingly.  States  not  meeting  this  standard  have  been  the  subject  of  ‘extra-
territoriality  agreements’,  or  in  extreme  cases,  colonialism  (Donnelly  1998:3-11). 
Today, we can see parallels of this sort of differentiation at the international level in 
the existence of so-called ‘pariah states’, or ‘rogue states’, such as North Korea, or, 
formerly, South Africa. Another manifestation of this sort of discrimination is found 
in the European Union’s criteria for membership. 
This constructivist understanding of human rights recognises that state actors, 
in  an  arena  where  peer  recognition  brings  considerable  benefits,  have  powerful 
incentives to meet the standard of civilisation demanded by those who support human 
rights  if such actors occupy positions of power. One of the ways in which powerful 
state actors can and do practically incentivise support for human rights is by attaching 
human rights conditions to trade and aid packages (Neumeyer 2003). The use of such 
strategies leads Hussein to complain that ‘the entire issue [of compliance with human 
rights norms] is reduced to a question of political might and  realpolitik’  (Hussein 
2001:77). A similar claim is made by Langlois (2003:512). If these doubts are valid, 
then the Rawlsian overlapping consensus that Donnelly finds with respect to human 
rights is in fact closer to what Rawls called a modus vivendi, a less stable agreement 
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where such consensus as may be found is a product of shifting power relations and 
interests,  which may develop into an overlapping consensus,  but  may not  (Rawls 
1993:164-166). The purported consensus on human rights is met with a degree of 
cynicism by some commentators who see the universalism of human rights as a form 
of  neo-imperialism on the part  of Western powers  (Evans and Hancock 1998).  A 
similar  cynicism  has  met  some  interpretations  of  the  idea  of  ‘sustainable 
development’,  particularly  where  industrialised  Western  powers  seek  to  curb  the 
industrialising options of  poorer  countries.  One  Malaysian  scholar  claims that  the 
environmentalist  pretensions  of  the  West  are  simply  a  public  excuse  for  forcing 
developing  countries  to  buy  Western  environmentally  friendly  technology  whilst 
obtaining the rights to seed patents developed from Southern hemisphere resources. 
He also dismisses human rights:
[A]lthough the campaign for democracy and human rights is in the name 
of protecting the interests and rights of minorities, in essence, it works to 
secure the view held by the advanced countries on the subject and, thus 
giving the campaign a hegemonic character. (Balasubramaniam 1998:389)
One point to note here is that, should the most powerful actors withdraw their support 
for human rights, or should the international arena change such that those who do not 
support  human rights  become more  powerful  without  meeting  the  ‘human rights’ 
standard of civilisation, then, where international politics is seen as a zero-sum game, 
the power of those supporting human rights is weakened, and so actors would have 
(cynical) reasons to abandon their support for human rights. 
The idea of human rights as a standard of civilisation also casts some light on 
the claim that Western powers are hypocritical in their approach to human rights. One 
of the key ideas embodied in the contemporary idea of human rights is the right to 
self-determination.32 This  right  recognises  that  all  individuals  are  morally  equal, 
insofar as each person has the right to determine for himself his own preferred course 
of action (provided his choice does not infringe the rights of others). It is, therefore, 
an essentially democratic right, because it affirms that no-one can legitimately assert 
authority over another without their consent. This right can clearly be said to be in a 
liberal tradition, with a history traceable back at least as far as John Locke’s idea of a 
32 As Iris Marion Young (2001:26) notes, the right to self-determination does not appear in the UDHR, 
but it  has nevertheless been hugely influential  in the post-Second World War discourse on human 
rights, and was incorporated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which was drafted in 1966 and went into force ten years later. 
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social contract. But the liberal values embodied in this right are not at issue here. 
What is problematic is that, if support for human rights is coerced, then it would seem 
that  the  democratic  values  embodied  in  the  right  to  self-determination  are  not 
respected. 
It  might  be  countered  that,  while  support  for  human  rights  may  be 
incentivised, to say that support is coerced is too strong a claim. Countries have a 
choice about whether or not to accept the loans or aid packages that come with human 
rights  (or  other)  conditions  attached.  Moreover,  governments  who  accept  such 
conditions can also exercise some discretion in how or even whether to implement 
them.  Indeed,  Neumeyer  (2003)  has  found  that  non-compliance  with  conditions 
attached to multilateral aid has rarely been a factor in determining whether subsequent 
funds would be made available to the defaulting country. But, as discussed in chapter 
2, many argue that, in the context of globalisation, poorer countries have very little 
real  choice  about  whether  or  not  to  accept  the  conditions  imposed  by  Western 
institutions when negotiating trade and aid deals (Shiva 1999; Speth 2003). On the 
other  hand,  it  can  be  argued  that  power  relations  are  inevitable  in  any  political 
situation, and so to conclude that a decision has been coerced because one party was 
more powerful than another is no more than to say that it is a decision that has been 
made  in  the  context  of  politics,  and  that  practically,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  what 
conditions would be necessary in order for there not to be the possibility of unequal 
power relations influencing a  decision (not)  to  support  international  human rights 
standards. Iris Marion Young (2001) would respond that it is precisely because social 
interaction is inevitable, and because unequal power relations are likely, that political 
institutions  must  be  designed  to  take  account  of  the  interests  and  preferences  of 
participants in any decision-making practice.33 As is argued in the next section, the 
ambivalence of human rights with respect to power raises some difficult issues in this 
regard.
4.2 The ambivalence of human rights with respect to power
Social  movements  have  long  politicised  ideas  of  natural  rights,  and  later 
human rights, in pursuit of their goals. Stammers (1999) holds that, insofar as human 
33 Young offers a nuanced account of the obstacles to freedom in view of the inevitability of social 
interaction. ‘Freedom, then, means regulating and negotiating relationships so that all persons are able 
to  be secure  in  the  knowledge  that  their  interests,  opinions,  and desires  for  action  are  taken into 
account’ (Young 2001:35).  
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rights remain contested, they are an important instrument in campaigns for justice. 
However, when particular sets of rights become institutionalised, they may come to be 
used to defend the status quo, rather than to advance the claims of the disadvantaged 
and disenfranchised. In the latter half of the twentieth century social movements in a 
number  of  colonised  states  successfully  claimed  their  human  right  to  self-
determination. These claims were in part presented in the European idiom of rights 
going back to Locke.  The success  of  these movements  led  to independence from 
European powers, however, the experience of many African and some Asian post-
colonial states has not been the widespread protection of human rights. Moreover, the 
language  of  rights  is  sometimes  used  by  leaders  to  frustrate  external  efforts  to 
promote human rights. This paradox in human rights is not new. Although human 
rights are not synonymous with the natural rights claimed by early liberals, there is a 
comparison to be drawn in the use of natural rights and human rights:
[T]he idea of natural rights ceased to be an instrument for political change 
and,  rather,  “came  to  be  used  to  impede  further  change”  when  “the 
original  and  largely  bourgeois  proponents  of  natural  rights  gradually 
moved out of political opposition and into control”. (Stammers 1999:996, 
quoting Donnelly)
Two  points  are  of  interest  here.  Firstly,  the  argument  of  the  anti-colonial 
movements  was  based  in  part  on  identifying  an  anomaly  in  dominant  political 
practice, namely, the West proclaimed rights to self-determination for Europe but not 
for  Africa.34 Operating  within  the  dominant  paradigm,  it  has  been  possible  for 
movements to achieve results by arguing that a set of values that are claimed to be 
universal  ought  to  be  universally  applied.  This  has  also  been  the  basis  of  some 
arguments concerning rights for women, where success has been mixed (Rao 1995). 
Social movements are not guaranteed success simply by working within the terms of 
the power structures they seek to challenge.  For one thing,  success  in claiming a 
particular right depends, as Rorty rightly observes, on getting the powerful to care 
(see previous chapter). The ‘progress’ of human rights, by which is meant increasing 
recognition of rights for previously excluded groups of people, has been a product not 
only of identifying and resolving anomalies in the application of supposedly universal 
rights,  but  also  identifying  previously  unnoticed  threats  to  human  rights.  This 
34 An-Na‘im (2001:100) notes that the idea of human rights was cited by both African leaders and 
European colonial powers in the struggles over decolonisation (see also Bain 2003:133-6).
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identification,  in  turn,  engenders  further  reflection  on  what  specific  human rights 
there are, as well as asserting that previously excluded groups ought to be included. A 
relevant example here is the emerging idea of environmental human rights. A number 
of  human rights  scholars,  including  Freeman  (2004),  Donnelly  (2003),  Stammers 
(1999),  and  Langlois  (2001),  have  mooted  the  possibility  of  there  being  legal 
recognition of some form of environmental human right in the future. But none have 
considered the implications of the hostility of much green political  thought to the 
liberalism  and  individualism  of  human  rights  (see  chapter  7).  If  environmental 
concerns are to be assimilated into the human rights framework, then some degree of 
renegotiation  of  both  the  form  and  content  of  human  rights  will  be  (probably) 
required. 
4.2.1 State-centrism and human rights
One point to consider when exploring the ambivalence of human rights with 
respect  to  power,  then,  concerns  the  structure  of  the  human rights  framework.  If 
human rights are about protecting human dignity, and threats to human dignity come 
in the form of abuses of power,  then human rights,  as they are conceptualised in 
international  and national  law and politics,  need to be oriented to  the location of 
power. The centralised state was and is a site of extraordinary power that has the 
potential  to present considerable threats to individuals and/or groups. As Donnelly 
repeatedly notes, modern markets, as well as states, also pose considerable threats to 
human dignity. Moreover, as noted in chapter 2 and discussed further in chapter 5, the 
globalised economy is having a damaging impact on the environment, which in turn 
poses further threats to human security.  But the contemporary international human 
rights  framework  established  in  the  International  Bill  of  Rights  is  notably  state-
centric.
An-Na’im (2001) holds that all  societies and communities can relate to the 
notion of struggles for justice, thus he agrees with Donnelly that the Western practice 
of human rights can achieve a Rawlsian overlapping consensus. For these scholars, 
the globalisation of Western political and economic forms, achieved in part, or at least 
begun, through coercive means, need not entail the wholesale adoption of Western 
forms  of  resistance  to  the  negative  fall-out  from these  phenomena.  Instead,  local 
populations  can  approve  the  institution  of  universal  human rights,  but  give  local 
flavour to their normative content (An-Na‘im 2001:93-9; Donnelly 2003:96-98). But 
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An-Na‘im has doubts about the plausibility of a consensus on human rights as they 
are currently institutionalised. Human rights, as set out in the UDHR, are rights to be 
protected from the state. Pogge (2002:58-64) illustrates this point by highlighting the 
differences between a common assault and an assault by a police officer. The latter, 
perpetrated by an agent of the state, is taken to be a human rights violation, whereas 
the  former,  perpetrated  by  a  private  citizen,  is  not.35 At  the  same  time,  it  is  the 
government  of  the  state,  through its  agents,  that  is  simultaneously responsible for 
protecting human rights. As An-Na‘im (2001:96) puts it: ‘Although the purpose of the 
modern conception of human rights is to restrict the exclusive power of the state, it is 
the same state that controls the means by which that purpose is to be achieved.’ Onora 
O’Neill has compared this to ‘putting foxes in charge of hen houses’. She is certainly 
correct in observing that while having the capacity, in terms of legitimate power and 
authority,  to ensure respect  for human rights,  may be a necessary qualification of 
whichever agent is to be responsible for human rights, it does not follow that those 
who have such a capacity ‘can be trusted to do so’ (O’Neill 2005:435). On the other 
hand,  the only plausible  alternative to state-centrism, that  agents  outwith the state 
might be made in some way responsible for ensuring that governments honour their 
human rights commitments, is impeded by the norm of state sovereignty, enshrined in 
the UN Charter.
Sovereignty is both a norm, the principle of which is that the autonomy of 
states  should  be  respected,  and  an  institution,  an  established  model  of  political 
organisation.  It  is  also  an  expression  and  exercise  of  our  human  right  to  self-
determination (An-Na‘im 2001:96-7; Bain 2003:134), and the most proven means yet 
devised for managing plurality and achieving tolerance in a diverse and globalising 
world (Jackson 2000:156-183). The international human rights regime initiated in the 
aftermath  of  the  horrors  of  the  Second  World  War  was  created  with  the  aim of 
preventing governments from abusing their citizens on the massive scale seen in the 
Nazi  inflicted  Holocaust.  The  human  rights  framework  thus  pre-supposes  the 
existence of functioning sovereign states. While Freeman (2002:154-156) is rightly 
sceptical about the supposed autonomy of many (perhaps the majority of) sovereign 
35 This oversimplifies somewhat; Pogge devotes some time to explicating the ‘official’ nature of human 
rights abuses or ‘underfulfilment’. For instance, if the police officer refused to stop or apprehend the 
private citizen who assaulted another individual that would also constitute a human rights violation, 
again, on the part of the police officer. Pogge concludes that the defining feature of a human rights 
violation is that they involve some form of ‘official disrespect’ (Pogge 2002:64). See also Richard 
Wilson (1987b:140-141) on the distinction between human rights violations and ‘common crime’. 
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states  in  reality,  and  particularly  in  the  context  of  globalisation,  the  doctrine  of 
sovereign  autonomy  is  nonetheless  at  the  heart  of  the  human  rights  regime. 
Individuals have rights against the state for which the state is responsible. Other states 
can take action to hold a government accountable if it should fail to honour these 
obligations (Freeman 2002:155). Indeed, Raz (2006) sees human rights as marking 
the limits  of legitimate  sovereignty.  But action in support  of human rights  and in 
conflict  with  sovereign  autonomy  has  rarely  been  anything  more  than  public 
statements of disapproval, and, particularly during the Cold War, there was very little 
appetite on the part of governments to actively promote human rights internationally 
(Donnelly  1999a).36 This  to some extent  changed under  the  presidency of  Jimmy 
Carter in the US (see Shue (1980) and Beitz (1979)), but it remains the case that states 
have appealed to the right to have their sovereign authority respected when criticised 
by external agents over human rights.37 
As  Robert  Jackson  somewhat  glibly  notes  with  reference  to  failed  states, 
‘Sovereignty can be dangerous’ (Jackson 2000:294). Where there is no state, there is 
no agent responsible for the security of human rights: 
“Failed states”  such as  Somalia  suggest  that  one  of  the  few things  as 
frightening in the contemporary world as an efficiently repressive state is 
no state at all. (Donnelly 2003:36)
Following  through  the  logic  of  Donnelly’s  argument,  if  (as  Donnelly  claims;  see 
above) human rights have emerged globally as a necessary response to the sovereign 
state (and market economies), and human rights depend upon the sovereign state for 
recognition and implementation, yet states may fail, then there would seem to be a 
flaw in the system. Of course, to exclude the possibility of failure implies embracing 
paternalism, and it would hardly make sense to sacrifice the liberal value of freedom 
in order to guarantee human rights. However, where the failure is systemic rather than 
individual,  there  is  reason  to  doubt  the  suitability  of  recognising  states  as  the 
36 In  the  aftermath of  the  Cold  War,  there  was  some optimism regarding  the  alleged ‘triumph of 
liberalism’ and an expectation of greater willingness to put concern for human rights at the centre of 
foreign policy (see Fukuyama 1992; Brown 2005). The only humanitarian intervention to date that has 
been undertaken without the consent of the sovereign government was the NATO led action in Kosovo 
in 1999, which can at best be viewed as a partial success (see Wheeler and Bellamy 2002:481-483). 
Since  the  international  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11th 2001,  the  prominence  of  human  rights 
concerns in foreign policy has diminished somewhat.
37 Similarly, states have been able to use the norm of sovereignty in order to frustrate international 
efforts to take binding action on environmental problems such as climate change (see Conca 1994). 
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appropriate agents to protect human rights.38 To illustrate, R.J. Vincent compares the 
international sovereignty based regime to an egg carton, and individual states to eggs 
(Vincent  1986:123-5).  If  an  individual  egg  goes  rotten  there  may  be  identifiable 
internal reasons for that. But, given the diversity of beliefs and ideologies, as well as 
physical circumstances and capacities (of states), it is not necessarily the case that 
they will  all  slot unproblematically into identical  spaces in the carton. This is the 
essence of Christopher Clapham’s complaint:
[T]he idea of statehood presupposes that human beings can be organized 
into  territorially-based  hierarchies  which  they  can  be  compelled  or 
induced to accept, and that the economic resources will be forthcoming to 
maintain the rather expensive institutions which statehood entails.  That 
such a form of organization can be made to work throughout the world is 
improbable;  that  it  can  be  made  to  coincide  with  the  territories  often 
haphazardly bequeathed to newly independent governments by departing 
colonial powers is staggering in its presumption. (Clapham 1999: 531)
The ability  of  the sovereign state to respond to the  pressures  of economic 
globalisation varies significantly, with post-colonial states being among those least 
able  to  protect  their  citizens  from the  negative  fallout  of  the  global  market  that 
Donnelly recognises as a serious threat to human rights (see chapter 2, above). In 
view of the significant resources required to ensure the protection of human rights, 
O’Neill complains ‘[i]t is an empty gesture to assign obligations needed for human 
rights to weak states’ (O’Neill  2005:435).  Similarly,  on the basis of the resources 
required,  An-Na‘im  doubts  the  universal  suitability  of  what  he  identifies  as  the 
Western model of human rights protection, specifically, the legal protection of human 
rights  by pursuing prosecution of  perpetrators  as  both a  punishment of individual 
offenders and an example to others. According to An-Na‘im, the legalistic paradigm 
developed and currently pursued in the West is ill-suited to post-colonial Africa, and 
indeed compounds many of the problems such states presently face.  The Western 
model ‘presupposes that the violation of rights is the exception rather than the rule’ 
(An-Na‘im 2001:105). Where it is not the case that the violation of human rights is 
the  exception,  a  number  of  problems render  the  standard  human rights  paradigm 
ineffective: (1) The systematic nature of human rights abuses in post-colonial Africa, 
38 In chapter 6 I also discuss doubts about the exclusive sovereignty-based international order from an 
environmental perspective. 
88
especially in terms of social and economic rights but also in terms of political and 
civil  rights,  is  such  that  the  courts  could not  cope with  the  numbers  of  potential 
claimants  without  significant  additional  investment  in  resources  both  human  and 
material. Such investment is not presently forthcoming, nor is it likely to be so given 
the economic constraints faced by most states in these circumstances. (2) Potential 
claimants also often lack the financial resources to press their claims, for example, in 
terms of access to legal advice and time off work. More fundamentally, many victims 
of human rights violations lack the education to make them aware of the opportunities 
that they could pursue with respect to the legal protection of their human rights. (3) 
The courts in a number of post-colonial states are weak and/or corrupt.39 For these 
reasons, An-Na‘im claims:
Although the problem is lack of conditions and requirements, it can be 
argued that the modern conception of human rights itself is an instrument 
of  social  injustice  and  repression.  […] what  should  be  rejected  is  the 
universalization of specific assumptions and institutional arrangements for 
the legal protection of human rights. (An-Na‘im 2001:102)
In light of these difficulties, he proposes that alternative strategies of implementation 
(rather  than  protection)  of  human  rights  should  be  pursued.  Such  an  approach 
implicitly recognises the limits of the state-centric model of human rights, but, rather 
than  rejecting  the  concept  of  human  rights  altogether,  attempts  to  find  locally 
appropriate solutions to the problem of implementing human rights within a universal 
framework that does not serve many post-colonial states well.  It is at this point that 
An-Na’im becomes  regrettably vague: the details  of  what  alternative  strategies  of 
implementation might be are wanting. He proposes that the legal approach should 
continue but be broadened to include ‘mediation,  arbitration, and other customary 
mechanisms to resolve disputes that are more appropriate to the social and economic 
conditions in Africa’  (An-Na‘im 2001:110),  but  also that  root  causes of  systemic 
human  rights  abuses  must  be  addressed.  However,  An-Na‘im  recognises  that 
‘addressing the root causes of human rights violations is an extremely complex and 
protracted  task’  (An-Na‘im  2001:110).  Among  his  specific  recommendations  are 
‘drastic  structural  changes  in  international  economic  and  political  relations’,  the 
details of which he does not provide. In addition, he speaks of a need to address 
39 An-Na‘im’s findings are based on a study of fourteen post-colonial African states, but he believes his 
research is more generally applicable.
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‘delicate  issues  of  sovereignty  and  the  paradox  of  self-regulation’  (An-Na‘im 
2001:113), and speculates on an increased role for the UN or similar international 
agencies. Insofar as An-Na’im makes a case for these changes, he is persuasive, but 
the details are not trivial. 
One potentially fruitful innovation in human rights that moves away from the 
state-centric paradigm is the nascent idea of corporate responsibility for human rights 
(and environmental protection). Recent developments in this area include the OECD’s 
‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, first drafted in 1976, then largely ignored 
for almost twenty-five years before being significantly revived and revised in 2000; 
and  the  United  Nations’  Global  Compact,  initiated  in  2000,  enumerating  nine 
principles of corporate responsibility for human rights, and social and environmental 
issues (King 2001; MacLeod and Lewis 2004:79-80, 83-85). Both sets of standards 
are voluntary, and while the OECD’s guidelines rely on governments to encourage 
compliance  and  implement  monitoring  systems,  the  UN’s  Global  Compact  is 
facilitated directly by the UN. The jury is still out on whether these initiatives will 
deliver on human rights protections,40 however, given that both remain committed to a 
global  capitalist  agenda,  these  strategies  are  unlikely  to  provide the  basis  for  the 
radical  action  needed  to  ensure  environmental  sustainability.  Moreover,  as  co-
operation with these initiatives remains voluntary there is no scope for those suffering 
from  the  violation  or  underfulfilment  of  human  rights  to  insist  that  corporate 
organisations  be  held  accountable.  This  (limited)  movement  away  from  the 
established norm of the state as the sole agent with responsibility for human rights 
suggests growing recognition of the need for alternative ways of responding to human 
rights issues. But this is very much an emerging practice and the developments are to 
some extent ad hoc. In the next section, I consider a much more systematic attempt to 
theorise  an  alternative  to  the  contemporary  international  human  rights  regime, 
Pogge’s institutional model.
40 The initial signs were not as encouraging as might have been wished. Of the thirty corporations 
reporting on their  human rights  activities  in the first  year  of  the UN Global Compact,  none were 
deemed ‘worthy of publication’ (MacLeod and Lewis 2004:84), which is to say that none of the efforts 
made by corporate participants were thought significant enough to merit the Global Compact’s public 
approval. On the other hand, this also indicates that the UN Global Compact’s Advisory Council is 
prepared to act more rigorously than some sceptics feared – it is not prepared to ‘rubber stamp’ just any 
initiative that is claimed to be an example of corporate social responsibility. 
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4.3 Thomas Pogge’s ‘institutional’ model of human rights
Thomas Pogge has proposed a new way of understanding human rights that 
differs  quite  radically  from  conventional  understandings,  and  which,  if  accepted, 
would  have  far-reaching  implications  for  political  and  economic  institutions  at  a 
national  and  global  level.  One  of  Pogge’s  key  innovations  is  the  proposal  that 
underfulfilment, rather than violation, should be the standard by which the security of 
human rights is assessed, and by which the human rights credentials of governments 
and other institutions are judged. What Pogge refers to as the ‘institutional’ model of 
human rights, as distinct from an interactional model, focuses on the way that human 
rights are understood to operate, rather than what the content of human rights is. A 
further distinction of Pogge’s model is that he explicitly defends a moral conception 
of human rights, rather than being committed to legal rights as the paradigmatic aim 
of human rights claims. Finally, the institutional model Pogge proposes is claimed to 
be immune from the attacks of libertarians who have traditionally been opposed to the 
obligations implicit in honouring social and economic rights, where these rights are 
seen to be positive rights.41 If these claims can be verified, then Pogge’s theory would 
not  only answer  the  challenge of  addressing a  situation of  endemic  human rights 
violations (or underfulfilment, in Pogge’s vocabulary), and have gone some way to 
outlining a plausible way of responding to the problem of state-centrism, but it would 
have done so whilst maintaining broad acceptability within mainstream politics. This 
would be quite an achievement. Before testing these claims, I briefly outline Pogge’s 
institutional model. 
One important feature of the institutional model is that it is explicitly a ‘moral 
approach’ (Pogge 2002:54),  in that  it  enjoins people to take responsibility for the 
human rights of others by not supporting human rights-violating institutions. Pogge 
thus  defines  human rights  as  ‘moral  claims on  the  organization of  one’s  society’ 
(Pogge 2002:64), or, put differently, ‘postulating a human right to X is tantamount to 
declaring that every society ought to be so organized that all its members enjoy secure 
41 The libertarian critique (see, for example, Nozick 1978) relates to the infringement of liberty that is 
supposedly entailed in recognising positive rights. Whereas respecting negative rights requires only 
that the agent refrain from a particular action, respecting positive rights, it is argued, requires the agent 
to take some specific action, such as provide food or economic support. Typically, civil and political 
rights are said to be negative rights, and social and economic rights are said to be positive rights. But 
this distinction is contentious. As both Henry Shue (1980) and Vandana Shiva (1999) have argued, a 
hungry man is not a free man, thus the two sets of rights are interdependent. It is also not the case that 
civil  and  political  rights  are  only  negative,  and  social  and  economic  rights  positive.  One  of  the 
obstacles  An-Na‘im identified above to  the fulfilment  of  civil  and political  rights  in  post-colonial 
Africa is a lack of education.  
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access to X’ (Pogge 2000:52).  Pogge is  looking beyond the legal  route to human 
rights protection. The fulfilment of human rights relies on morally motivated action of 
citizens rather than just legal recognition and codification of human rights. 
Tim Hayward  (2005a:40-42)  doubts  the  wisdom of  this  aspect  of  Pogge’s 
approach.  Pogge explicitly  rejects  what  he calls  the ‘familiar’  institutional  model, 
‘that  conceives  a  human right  to  X as  a  kind  of  meta-right:  a  moral  right  to  an 
effective legal right to X’ (Pogge 2002:45). Instead, Pogge is open to different ways 
of implementing human rights in different societies and cultures, and therefore rejects 
the idea of a necessary link between legal and moral rights. This is consistent with 
An-Na‘im’s approach, but Samantha Besson points out that Pogge undermines his 
own argument by elsewhere insisting on some degree of constitutional guarantees for 
democracy (Besson 2003:520). However, Pogge’s inconsistency does not answer the 
question of whether human rights should necessarily aspire to be legal rights. This is 
the way that Donnelly (2003:40) understands them, claiming that human rights aim to 
be ‘self-liquidating’; the moral right is claimed by a social movement campaigning for 
a legal right that will then make appeal to moral rights unnecessary because the right 
will have been secured. But An-Na‘im’s point is that legal protection does not equate 
to  fulfilment  of  rights  in  many post-colonial  states.  It  is  this  problem of  the  gap 
between protection and fulfilment that leads Pogge to embrace the idea of alternatives 
to legal protection. Thus while Hayward is justified in observing that, ‘if a human 
right is to ‘constrain legal and economic institutions’, as Pogge envisages, it is hard to 
see  how  it  will  unless  it  has  some  constitutional  force  that  can  be  applied,  as 
necessary,  through  law’  (Hayward  2005a:41),  it  is  also  appropriate  to  draw  a 
distinction  between  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions.  The  legal  protection  of 
human rights may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. 
 A  related  point  to  be  elucidated  is  Pogge’s  distinction  between  the 
‘observance’ and the ‘fulfilment’  of human rights  (Pogge 2000:50).  While  human 
rights  may be observed by a  government  insofar as  they are legally  codified and 
publicly endorsed, those rights may yet  remain underfulfilled, even if they are not 
violated  in  the  conventional  sense.  If  a  person  does  not  speak  out  against  her 
government  for  fear  of  persecution  from  others  in  her  society,  from  which  she 
reasonably expects that her government will not protect her, then it cannot necessarily 
be said that her right to freedom of speech has been violated, since the government 
has done nothing actively to prevent her from speaking out, but Pogge argues that her 
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right to freedom of speech is underfulfilled, because she does not securely enjoy the 
right  to  freedom  of  speech  (Pogge  2000;  2002).42 Conversely,  if  a  person  were 
assaulted by a police officer in a society where human rights are generally respected 
and  where  inappropriate  behaviour  by agents  of  the  government  is  independently 
investigated  and  punished,  then,  on  the  institutional  model,  human rights  are  not 
underfulfilled. It is the general (in)security of human rights that matters here. Pogge 
acknowledges that not every society could plausibly guarantee the human rights of 
every person under their jurisdiction all the time, but he proposes,
an idea of reasonable security thresholds [whereby]: Your human rights 
are fully realized (fulfilled) when their objects are sufficiently secure – 
with the required degrees of security suitably adapted to the means and 
circumstances of the relevant social system. (Pogge 2000:52)
A third important feature of Pogge’s institutional model of human rights is his 
claim that negative, rather than positive, duties arise with respect to human rights, in 
that one has first the negative duty not to uphold coercive institutions that undermine 
the  fulfilment  of  the  human  rights  of  others,  though,  if  this  is  not  possible, 
compensatory action may be appropriate. So, according to Pogge, a person who owns 
no  slaves  in  a  society  of  slave  owners  is  nevertheless  responsible  for  the 
underfulfilment of human rights if she ‘contributes taxes to the government’ or her 
‘labor to the economy’ (Pogge 2002:66). As such, she is failing to fulfil the negative 
duty not to support  human rights-disrespecting institutions and contributing to the 
underfulfilment of human rights in her society. Pogge thinks it important that negative 
rather than positive duties be involved for two reasons. Firstly,  as noted above, he 
claims thereby to be insulated from the libertarian critique of positive duties,  and 
secondly, negative duties are, according to Pogge (2000), more onerous or morally 
compelling than positive ones:
The most remarkable feature of this institutional understanding is that it 
can go well beyond minimalist libertarianism without denying its central 
tenet: that human rights entail only negative duties. The normative force 
of others’ human rights for me is that I must not help uphold and impose 
upon  them coercive  social  institutions  under  which  they  do  not  have 
secure access to the objects of their human rights. (Pogge 2002:66) 
42 There is, however, a subjective element to this that may be problematic – how can ‘reasonable’ fears 
of being left unprotected be distinguished from unreasonable fears by any objectively verifiable means? 
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The last  feature  to note is  that,  on Pogge’s  understanding of  the  way that 
human  rights  claims  work,  the  duty  not  to  support  coercively  imposed  social 
institutions  that  cause  or  contribute  to  human  rights  insecurity  extends  globally 
insofar as we are implicated in a global social system.43 In support of this he makes 
reference to Article 28 of the UDHR, which states that,  ‘Everyone is entitled to a 
social  and  international  order  in  which  the  rights  and  freedoms  set  forth  in  this 
Declaration can be fully realized’. Article 28 does not itself specify a right, but rather, 
makes reference to the institutional setting within which the other rights listed may be 
realised, or, in Pogge’s language, fulfilled. Thus he claims:
Our  responsibilities  entailed  by  human  rights  are  engaged  by  our 
participation  in  any  coercively  imposed  institutional  order  in  which 
persons avoidably lack secure access to the objects of their human rights, 
and  these  (negative)  responsibilities  are  extended,  then,  through  the 
emergence of a global institutional order in whose coercive imposition we 
collaborate. (Pogge 2000:55)
Note  that  Pogge  states  that  human  rights  responsibilities  kick  in  when  people 
‘avoidably’ lack secure access to the objects of their human rights. There are three 
issues to be clarified here. The first is what counts as secure access, a question dealt 
with,  albeit  perhaps  unsatisfactorily,  by  introducing  the  ‘reasonable  security 
threshold’ mentioned above. The second is how it can be established that persons 
avoidably lack secure access to the objects of their human rights. The third is Pogge’s 
implicit  claim  that  the  global  institutional  order,  rather  than  local  or  national 
problems, is either the explanatory factor, or a significant contributory factor, to the 
lack of secure access some persons have to the objects of their human rights. 
In contrast to Rawls,44 Pogge argues that human rights problems often found in 
developing  countries  are  a  consequence  not  (exclusively)  of  local  corruption  and 
oppression,  but  rather  of  a  global  system that,  as  well  as  being  characterised  by 
43 It follows from this that, where persons do not share to some extent in ‘our’ social institutions, then 
we have no legitimate interest in the security of their human rights. But Pogge thinks it extremely 
unlikely for any individual living under conditions of a globalised economy to be so isolated. 
44 Rawls  has  argued  that  his  ‘difference  principle’  should  not  apply  globally  because  one  of  the 
conditions for the difference principle to hold is that the persons it covers should be engaged in social 
cooperation. Rawls finds that this cooperation is not evident at a global level, but rather, applies within 
states only. Pogge (2002:104-116) takes issue with Rawls on this point and argues that one effect of 
economic globalisation is that people who live in different states are engaged in social cooperation, 
which, Pogge argues, need not be advantageous to all parties in order for relations of justice to arise. 
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massive inequality, also makes corruption attractive and fails to foster democracy.45 
Alan Patten has complained that  ‘Pogge never really shows how the international 
factors he emphasizes account for global poverty’ (Patten 2005:21). This is a valid 
complaint up to a point – Pogge does not provide a detailed explanation of specific 
policies and their causal impacts. But there is a considerable literature analysing the 
variable  impacts  of  globalisation.  Pogge’s  position  is  broadly  consistent  with  the 
conclusions  of  Clapham  (1999)  and  An-Na‘im  (2001),  as  well  my  argument  in 
chapter 2, which claim that both the institutions of sovereignty and the global market 
economy undermine the capacity of governments in weak states to address human 
rights issues, including the chronic underfulfilment of social and economic rights. 
To demonstrate that this situation could be otherwise, Pogge (2002:196-215) 
proposes what he calls a ‘Global Resources Dividend’ (GRD), effectively a tax on the 
extraction or use of natural resources to be levied on the governments of the territories 
where the resources are found, and used to alleviate severe poverty, either in the form 
of direct payments to governments to fund poverty eradication, or, where government 
corruption is a concern, to NGOs, such as Oxfam, who can be trusted to devote the 
resources to alleviating suffering and addressing the underfulfilment of human rights. 
The proposal is ‘moderate’ in the sense of being realisable without substantial change 
to  existing  institutional  arrangements,  and  Pogge  argues  that  it  would  have  an 
additional benefit of improving environmental conditions, because in taxing the use of 
natural  resources it  would provide an incentive for the development of alternative 
resources.46 The GRD has been criticised by some as missing its target – taxing the 
use of natural resources in the countries where they are extracted, rather than where 
they are processed and/or consumed makes it likely that the burden of taxes will fall 
disproportionately on those countries whose primary industries are the export of raw 
materials, predominantly poor countries. Pogge counters that the tax would be passed 
on to consumers in developed countries,  but  some remain unconvinced (Hayward 
2005b). Despite these criticisms, the GRD does serve to validate Pogge’s claim that 
45 In this regard he makes reference to the international borrowing rights and exclusive property rights 
to natural resources that governments enjoy, regardless of the way they came to power. Pogge (2000) 
thus proposes a number of measures to disincentivise coups d’etat;  measures he claims that would 
render democracy in transition countries more stable.
46 Hayward (2005b) doubts the veracity of this last claim, because, he argues, there is a contradiction 
between relying on taxing the use of natural resources to fund a dividend that will generate sufficient 
funds to eradicate severe poverty at the same time as hoping to discourage the use of the very resources 
that  need  to  be  used  in  order  to  generate  the  tax.  He  also  highlights  the  arbitrariness,  from  an 
environmental point of view, of taxing resources that are easily accountable, such as oil,  as Pogge 
proposes, rather than taxing the use of resources that are particularly environmentally harmful. 
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severe  poverty  is  avoidable  in  that  an  alternative  institutional  arrangement  could 
alleviate the problem. The underfulfilment of human rights is not, therefore, a matter 
of a lack of resources, it is a political problem. The solution Pogge proposes is the 
replacement  of  the  contemporary  human  rights  regime  with  his  new institutional 
model of human rights. 
4.3.1 Negative human rights duties
One of Pogge’s primary concerns in specifying a negative duty not to support 
institutions that  disrespect  human rights is  to  insulate himself  from the libertarian 
critique of  positive  duties  as  an infringement  of  the  duty-bearers’  rights.  Pogge’s 
intention is not to attack the libertarian position, but rather, to find a way around the 
force of the criticism of positive duties, normally associated in particular with social 
and economic rights. According to one critic (Besson 2003:513-9), the success of this 
approach depends in  part  on being able  to maintain  the  distinction between what 
Pogge  calls  institutional  and  interactional  understandings  of  human rights.  On  an 
interactional model, a person may discharge his human rights duties by not actively 
violating anyone’s human rights. But, on the interactional model, economic and social 
rights  may  be  violated  (or  underfulfilled)  unless  one  takes  positive  action.  For 
example, if someone has the right to be free from hunger, on an interactional account, 
the only way to avoid violating that right when confronted with a starving person is to 
take the positive action of giving him food. It is this obligation to take positive action 
that is objectionable to the libertarian. 
The  institutional  understanding  that  Pogge  proposes  assumes  the  prior 
existence of institutions, which the interactional model  does not,  and makes those 
institutions  responsible  for  human  rights,  but  individuals  have  human  rights 
responsibilities vis-à-vis institutions insofar as they must not support institutions that 
contribute  to  the  underfulfilment  of  human  rights.  Thus,  the  government  is 
responsible for ensuring freedom of speech, and to discharge its duties sufficiently, it 
must  not  only  directly  protect  freedom  of  speech  through  refraining  from 
unreasonable censorship, but also by protecting individuals from any private threat to 
freedom of speech, such as intimidation. The individual is then able to discharge her 
human rights duties negatively simply by not supporting institutions that disrespect 
human rights. Put in terms of social and economic rights, it is the responsibility of the 
government (or other relevant institution) to foster for its people secure access to the 
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objects of such rights, for example, the right to work. This it might do by providing 
appropriate education and training. But it is the responsibility of the individual not to 
support  institutions  that  disrespect  human rights,  so  where a  government  or  other 
institution undermines the right to work for some or all of its citizens, perhaps through 
active discriminatory measures against certain minorities  or through failing to take 
action  on  discriminatory  practices  in  the  private  sector,  then  the  human  rights-
respecting individual has a negative duty not to support the institution concerned, in 
this case, the government. 
How is this to be achieved? To return an example cited above, Pogge says that 
in a society that allows slavery, owning no slaves yourself is not enough to fulfil your 
(negative) human rights duties, as it would be under the interactional model, because 
through contributing your  taxes to the government or  your  labour to society,  you 
contribute to the maintenance of a coercively imposed institution that violates human 
rights. Pogge proposes the following possible solutions:
I might honor my negative duty, perhaps, through becoming a hermit or 
an emigrant, but I could honor it more plausibly by working with others 
toward shielding the victims of injustice from the harms I help produce or, 
if  this  is  possible,  toward establishing secure  access [to human rights] 
through institutional reform. (Pogge 2002:66)
This answer raises a number of further questions. Firstly, it is clear that where the 
negative duty not to support institutions that disrespect human rights is difficult or 
impossible to fulfil, then compensatory action of some kind is appropriate. But what 
Pogge does not make clear is how individuals are to decide that the negative duty 
cannot be fulfilled, nor how much or exactly what kind of compensatory action is 
required. Again, there is clearly a subjective element that limits the scope for clarity 
here. 
A more telling problem than this is the range of options for avoiding action 
that would count as upholding an institution that disrespects human rights; becoming 
a hermit or an emigrant. Neither of these options is in fact readily available to the 
overwhelming majority of people – Pogge indirectly affirms this himself in claiming 
that social cooperation is global. If Pogge is right that global social and economic 
interconnectedness is so strong, then it follows that becoming an emigrant would not 
enable  anyone  to  escape  culpability  for  supporting  human  rights  disrespecting 
institutions, since such institutions are not limited to nation-states. On the other hand, 
97
the  prospects  for  becoming a  genuine  hermit  seem equally  dubious.  Even  Henry 
David Thoreau, who is much heralded by some greens as a providing a model of 
modest,  sustainable  living,  and  who  clearly  sought  to  withdraw from nineteenth-
century New England society,  contributed his  commerce  to that society (Thoreau 
1986:ch1;  see  also  de  Geus  1999:73-85).  Cruft  (2005b)  has  argued  that  Pogge’s 
proposed insititutional  model  in  fact  entails  a  number of  duties,  including ‘other-
directed precautionary  duties’,  that  are  likely  to be  resisted by libertarians.47 In  a 
reply,  Pogge  (2005)  claims  that  the  negative  duty  not  to  support  human  rights 
disrespecting institutions generates derivative obligations, which are not duties in the 
strong sense that the initial negative duties are, but rather are derived from the moral 
force of the negative duty, and include only such obligations as are necessary to meet 
the requirements of the negative duty or make suitable compensation. However, given 
the impossibility of observing the negative duty in the contemporary world as Pogge 
sees  it,  it  is  not  clear  that  these more  onerous (in the  sense  of  requiring positive 
action) derivative obligations are in fact avoidable. Therefore it is not clear at all that 
Pogge can regard himself as having avoided the libertarian critique.  
In proposing compensatory action, Pogge has moved from a negative duty not 
to support institutions disrespectful of human rights to a positive obligation to provide 
some form of compensation.48 Pogge has also moved from an institutional approach, 
where human rights are to be claimed against governments or other institutions, to 
something more like an interactional model, where individuals are morally obliged to 
provide compensation  where  they cannot  fulfil  their  negative  duty not  to  support 
institutions  disrespectful  of  human  rights.  So,  as  Besson  observes,  ‘some  of  the 
alleged negative duties individuals have ‘not to support unjust institutions’ in fact hide 
47 These ‘other-directed’ duties might include, such duties as the duty to try to ensure that others respect 
human rights. To fail to recognise these duties, Cruft argues, ‘sits uneasily with Pogge’s commitment 
to the institutional view of human rights’ (Cruft 2005b:33).
48 Precisely what this compensation would be remains unspecified. Patten (2005) worries that Pogge’s 
notion of social cooperation could be interpreted to mean that whenever a rich person is involved in 
some way with a poor person, the rich person can be deemed to be in a coercive relationship with them. 
Pogge (2005) replies that the compensation due as a result of failing to discharge the negative duty 
should only respond to the fundamental rights expressed in the idea of human rights (thus limiting the 
extent of appropriate action), which he claims arise from the interests of all humans in having their 
basic needs met (Pogge 2002:225n91). But needs are a notoriously difficult concept on which to base 
any programmatic guidelines (see, for example, Berry 1999). Pogge (2005) also holds that the degree 
of compensation should be in proportion to the degree of responsibility individuals have for supporting 
a human rights disrespecting institution. This caveat perhaps rightly places greater responsibility for 
human  rights  on  the  shoulders  of  the  powerful,  but  it  does  not  empower  those  who  suffer  the 
underfulfilment of human rights. Rather, the weak continue to be dependent upon the strong taking the 
trouble to care, as Rorty pointed out. For a further discussion of this issue, see previous chapter, or, 
with reference to the idea of ‘post-cosmopolitan citizenship’, see chapter 6. 
98
positive duties’ (Besson 2003:519). Besson concludes that the abstract separation of 
institutional  from  interactional  understanding  of  human  rights  in  practice  fails 
because,
[w]hat  individuals,  who  violate  their  negative  duty  not  to  support 
institutions which do not respect positive duties, are ultimately asked to 
answer for, are violations of positive duties by institutions which represent 
them [in some sense] and therefore cannot be entirely separated morally 
from them. (Besson 2003:518-9)
Pogge himself acknowledges that ‘A commitment to human rights goes along with 
interactional moral commitments; but’, he goes on, ‘this is no reason to identify the 
former with the latter’ (2002:65). As noted above, he is also explicit in regarding the 
appeal of his institutional model as being consistent with (what he calls) the ‘central 
tenet  of  minimalist  libertarianism:  that  human  rights  entail  only  negative  duties’ 
(Pogge  2002:66).  The  institutional  approach  seeks  to  uphold  this  claim,  whilst 
achieving far more than libertarian approaches to human rights can, particularly with 
regard  to  social  and economic rights.  But  I  would  follow Besson  in  arguing that 
Pogge has not entirely succeeded here.
4.3.2 The institutional model and universalism
There  is  another  ambiguity  in  Pogge’s  argument  to  which I  wish  to  draw 
attention. Human rights have an additional purpose in Pogge’s model, in that they 
serve as a standard by which to judge the justice, and thence the legitimacy, of our 
global institutions. The idea of using human rights in this way is not new in itself; as 
noted above, Donnelly moots the proposal that human rights be seen as ‘a standard of 
civilisation’,  whereby  the  cost  of  a  place  at  the  table  of  international  politics  is 
compliance with international human rights regimes. The difficulty here is that, as one 
Malaysian Minister complained, human rights become a matter of ‘realpolitik’, as the 
richer,  more  powerful  countries  set  human  rights  standards  and  effectively  bribe 
poorer countries with trade and aid packages that contain human rights conditions. 
Pogge’s proposal differs from Donnelly’s in that Pogge invites those in the wealthier 
countries  not  to  judge  particular  countries’  human  rights  records,  but  to  use  the 
institutional understanding of human rights to judge the contemporary global order, 
and assess its appropriateness in terms of its likelihood of fostering respect for human 
rights. 
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Thus Pogge sees human rights as a ‘single, universal standard’ (Pogge 2000:67, 
italics in original). In the context of a multicultural world, this may give some pause 
for thought,  though perhaps not typical cosmopolitans. Pogge’s response to this is 
quite uncompromising:
If the Algerians want their society to be organized as a religious state and 
we want ours to be a liberal democracy, we can both have our way. But if 
the Algerians want global institutions to be designed on the basis of the 
Koran and we want them to render secure the objects of human rights for 
all,  then  we  cannot  both  have  our  way.  With  respect  to  our  global 
institutional  order,  one conception  will  necessarily  prevail  –  through 
reason or force. There is no room for accommodation here, and, if we 
really care about human rights, then we must be willing to support the 
global order they favor,  even against  those who,  perhaps by appeal  to 
other values, support an alternative world order in which the objects of 
human rights would be less secure. (Pogge 2000:68)
Two questions spring to mind here. The first concerns how, exactly, one institutional 
order will prevail. Pogge talks here of reason or force, but his discussion of the GRD 
suggests  a  third  option –  economic  encouragement.  As  noted  above,  the  GRD is 
ideally  to  be distributed through governments,  but  where  this  is  not  possible  (for 
example,  where  there  is  no  effective  government,  or  where  there  are  grounds  to 
suspect government corruption) through aid agencies and NGOs, which would then 
require more scrutiny than that to which they are currently subjected (Pogge 2000). 
The  GRD would  thus  create  an  incentive  for  governments  to  tackle  poverty  and 
corruption and foster greater respect for human rights. Where progress is made it may 
be rewarded with a greater share of the GRD. 
Yet this sounds suspiciously like a form of coercion. Certainly, it is vulnerable 
to the charge that respect for human rights will remain a matter of realpolitik. Pogge 
makes repeated reference to the coerced imposition of the contemporary global order 
on the poorer countries. He is, perhaps, correct in this, but it is not clear from his 
argument what an uncoerced global order would be like; nowhere does Pogge provide 
an  explanation.  If  the  coerced  imposition  of  any  order  is  unjust,  then  a  clearer 
understanding of what constitutes coercion is needed in order to assess the legitimacy 
of his GRD proposal. If some coercion is acceptable (indeed, inevitable?) if it is to 
impose the right institutions, then there is a different argument to be made, and one 
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with  which  Pogge  has  not  explicitly  engaged.  This,  I  suspect,  is  Pogge’s  real 
argument,  since  what  he  finds  most  objectionable  about  the  present  global 
institutional order is not that it is coercively imposed, but that it leads to the chronic 
underfulfilment of human rights for so many people. 
In  the  context  of  a  pluralistic  world,  where  people  have  many  different 
conceptions of what constitutes a good life, this latter type of argument risks being as 
divisive  as  it  is  persuasive.  Indeed,  Pogge’s  strong  universalism disclosed  in  his 
unmistakable conviction that human rights are a better guide to the good life than the 
Qur‘ān, which he nonetheless recognises others are deeply committed to as a guide to 
a good life, is illustrative of the problem of pluralism. Insofar as human rights provide 
a non-perfectionist account of the good life, they can be defended as allowing for 
cultural diversity.  But Pogge insists that they are the only appropriate standard by 
which to assess global institutions, and that alternative standards, such as the Qur‘ān, 
should therefore be rejected.  Given that there is no objective way of judging these 
morals, many will be sceptical. Furthermore, the historical record on this issue is not 
encouraging. Enforcing a global standard of human rights is, on the face of it, very 
different from enforcing the ‘standards of civilisation’ that legitimised slavery and 
colonialism,  for  example,  but  there  are  parallels  nevertheless  that  give  cause  for 
disquiet:
The new standard of civilization is defended normatively as the means to 
promote the advancement of the backward. It is not clear, however, why 
human  flourishing  is  better  promoted  by  the  construction  of  an 
identifiable ‘other’, an ‘us’ and ‘them’ from amongst the myriad ways of 
understanding and classifying the world. (Kingsbury 1999:91) 
Both  Booth  and  Rorty,  though  different  in  their  approaches,  see  the  aim  of 
encouraging the  spread of  human rights  as  helping to  make  ‘the  other’  an other, 
thereby redescribing, in Rorty’s language, the sense of difference between peoples, 
and rendering it less threatening (see Booth 1999 and Rorty 1993). The idea of human 
rights as a standard of civilisation, explicit in Donnelly’s work and at the very least 
implicit in Pogge’s, would seem to undermine this endeavour.
The  second  question  I  would  raise  follows  on  from this  last  point.  Quite 
simply, how do we know that human rights provide a better basis than the Qur‘ān, or 
say, the Bible, does? It is unfortunate that Pogge has chosen here to juxtapose the 
Qur‘ān and human rights, not least because a number of Muslim scholars have tried to 
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show ways in  which Islam and human rights  are compatible,  and ways  in which 
support for human rights may be derived from the teachings in the Qur‘ān. But that 
should not detract attention from the substance of Pogge’s point. In making reference 
to ‘other values’ which would render ‘the objects of human rights less secure’, Pogge 
clearly  has  a  substantive  account  of  human rights  in  mind,  one  presumably,  that 
rejects the idea that apostasy is a crime and perhaps favours freedom of religion. But 
if  this is the case, then Pogge undermines his claims for a broader appeal for his 
institutional understanding of human rights based on its focus on conception rather 
than content.  He comes close to saying,  as Rorty does,  that  anyone would prefer 
human rights to the other values, if they understood the benefits that human rights 
would bring. Thus he has a tentative theory of what it is to be human, or at least, of 
what  every  humans’  best  interests  are.  And  while  I  would  concur  with  him  in 
preferring human rights to any alternative way of regulating social relations, I cannot 
prove that I am right to do so, and that the devout follower of a religious doctrine that 
conflicts with human rights, and prefers this way of life, is wrong to do so. 
At this point it might be argued that the majority of people do seem to think 
some notion of human rights to be a good thing, and that, if it could be proved that 
human  rights  were  affirmed  by  the  majority,  there  would  then  be  a  democratic 
mandate that would render illegitimate any dissent from the view Pogge puts forward. 
However, this proposal raises another telling problem with Pogge’s theory. In placing 
responsibility  for the implementation of human rights in the hands of individuals, 
Pogge invites individual judgement about what human rights there should be. On the 
evidence  presented  in  Langlois’  study,  it  is  perfectly  plausible  to  imagine  an 
individual,  Bob, affirming respect  for human rights  in general,  but  finding one or 
more specific rights objectionable.  Acting on his negative duty not to support  the 
underfulfilment of human rights, Bob decides that he shall withdraw his support from 
various institutions, or, where he cannot do so, work to offer compensation. But he 
does not support the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of gender. 
Indeed, he thinks a woman’s place is in the home. So, conscientious though he is in 
honouring his other human rights duties, he continues his support of any institution 
that fosters gender discrimination. It might be that there are a lot of people who agree 
with  Bob  and follow his  example,  thereby  contributing  to  the  underfulfilment  of 
human  rights  for  women,  but  respecting  other  human  rights.  What  this  example 
illustrates is that there are good reasons for not making the protection of rights of 
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disempowered groups the responsibility of the democratic majority, but rather, relying 
on courts to be independent. As noted above, Pogge is not entirely clear cut on the 
question of whether the institutional  model  can be completely dislocated from the 
legal  protection  route  that  An-Na‘im finds  insufficient,  but  I  suggest  that  in  fact 
neither is sufficient on its own. 
That is not to say that Pogge’s institutional model is without merit. Pogge can 
be  commended  for  recognising  that  the  contemporary  international  human  rights 
regime is ill-equipped to deal with the chronic underfulfilment of human rights that is 
endemic in very poor countries. The institutional model he proposes represents a way 
of conceptualising human rights such that  they address this  problem. Clearly,  this 
innovation is of significant interest in view of the current and potential future threats 
environmental  problems  pose  to  human  rights.  If  the  worst  predictions  about 
increasing environmental degradation are proven to have been founded, then the kind 
of  human rights  issues  likely  to  arise  will  be  similar  in  character  to  the  kind of 
problems Pogge particularly wishes to address – the problems of severe poverty such 
as lack of access of sufficient food, clean water, basic shelter and medical care. A 
model of human rights that can offer a means of conceptualising the dynamic between 
individuals,  governments,  corporations  and  global  institutions  that  would  better 
facilitate the fulfilment of human rights has much to recommend it. Furthermore, the 
idea of making individuals instead of, or better, as well as, governments responsible 
for the fulfilment of human rights is appealing, despite the difficulties noted above. It 
also  comports  with  more  active  notions  of  citizenship  proposed  (in  particular)  in 
environmental political theory which are discussed below in chapter 6. 
Pogge is guilty of optimistically assuming an ideal human rights-respecting 
individual, who, on learning that he has in fact been violating his negative duty not to 
contribute to the underfulfilment of human rights, will be moved to act in support of 
human rights. The foregoing discussion also demonstrates that Pogge’s model is not 
immune to some of the important criticisms that can be levelled at the contemporary 
international human rights regime. On the other hand, Pogge’s institutional approach, 
in obliging individuals to resist supporting human rights-disrespecting institutions, is 
a potential corrective to Donnelly’s tendency to reify markets and states, and suggests 
the possibility of change. The existence of institutions that threaten human rights is 
neither natural nor inevitable, and is as susceptible to change as the prevalence of 
environmentally unsustainable patterns of living. 
103
4.4 Conclusion
A  number  of  criticisms  have  been  advanced  against  the  contemporary 
international human rights regime, including the charges that the consensus on human 
rights is in part coerced, that some of the rights contained in the International Bill of 
Rights  are  not  universally  endorsed,  and  that  human  rights  are  ambivalent  with 
respect to power. One consequence of this is that, just as human rights can be used as 
tools to protect the interests of the weak, they can also be used to impede change. This 
point  was  illustrated  in  the  state-centrism of  human  rights,  which  is  problematic 
because of the need to recognise other threats to human dignity,  such as corporate 
power. However, the emerging norm of corporate social responsibility indicates that 
conceptions of human rights need not be fixed, rather, the way that human rights are 
institutionalised can evolve to respond to changes in the threats to human security.
This conclusion suggests that when assessing whether human rights provide an 
adequate framework for  responding to the challenges of globalisation,  particularly 
increasing  environmental  problems,  scholars  must  consider  both  the  human rights 
regime as it  is and possible innovations. The problem of state-centrism and a pre-
disposition to the legal protection of human rights, rather than an orientation towards 
the chronic underfulfilment of human rights associated with extremely poor countries, 
was also criticised. Pogge’s institutional model of human rights presents a potential 
solution to these issues, and is therefore of considerable interest to those theorising 
ways  of  addressing  the  kind  of  problems  identified  in  chapter  2  in  terms  of 
environmental threats to human security. The idea of making individuals rather than 
states responsible  for  human rights  by recognising a  negative duty not  to support 
institutions  that  contribute  to  the  underfulfilment  of  human  rights  could  have  a 
significant impact, particularly if the content of human rights could extended to take 
account of environmental threats, an issue I address in chapter 7. 
On the other hand, Pogge, like Donnelly, affirms something like a ‘standard of 
civilisation’, which divides peoples and asserts the superiority of some over others. 
Though perhaps not Pogge’s intention, this aspect of Pogge’s institutional model may 
limit its appeal in the context of a plural world. Historically, such devices have been 
met with resistance, and there is a suspicion amongst some environmentalists in poor 
countries of the concept of sustainable development being used in the same way. The 
next topic to deal with here, then, is how the concept of environmental sustainability 
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can  or  should  be  understood,  hence  the  next  chapter  looks  at  ways  of  defining 
environmental sustainability.
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Chapter 5: Defining environmental sustainability
The aim of  this  chapter  is  to  explore  what  is  meant  when  ‘environmental 
sustainability’  is  discussed,  and  to  cut  a  path  through  some  of  the  confusion 
surrounding attempts  to define environmentally sustainable patterns of living.  One 
route into this debate is to consider different ideas as to what causes environmental 
problems, or, more specifically, what factors legitimate and sustain the prevalence of 
environmentally  unsustainable  patterns  of  living.  Green  theorists  have  studied  a 
variety of possible causes, ranging from human spiritual and cultural attitudes towards 
nature, to patterns of social and political organisation, through to models of economic 
organisation. I think it likely that these all play a causal role and therefore I do not 
propose to isolate any single explanatory variable. Nor do I exclude there being other 
possible or actual causes. 
However,  I  do  want  to  suggest  that  some  approaches  to  environmental 
sustainability are more helpful than others. To that end, my first task in this chapter is 
to  challenge  the  view  that  genuine  theories  of  environmental  sustainability  are 
necessarily  ecocentric.  Justifications  for  policies  aimed  at  realising  environmental 
sustainability can be phrased in a number of ways, including in terms of the rights of 
future generations of humans,  the rights  of  non-human nature,  or,  rejecting rights 
language, because environmental sustainability is virtuous in the Aristotelian sense 
and thus something that should be pursued, or because of moral duties owed to non-
human nature or to future generations. Definitional problems are further complicated 
by  the  distinction  drawn  by  some  between  environmental sustainability  (broadly 
speaking, the continuation of an environment habitable for humans), and ecological 
sustainability  (the  continuation  of  the  biosphere  as  healthy  living  planet).49 Often 
these distinctions are thought to correspond to a spectrum of ‘shallow’, ‘weak’, or 
‘reformist’  environmentalism  through  to  ‘deep’,  ‘strong’,  or  ‘radical’ 
environmentalism, and are linked to ecocentric versus anthropocentric approaches. I 
argue, on the contrary, that a plausible argument for a robust model of sustainability 
can be advanced in anthropocentric terms. 
Thereafter  I  look at  the distinction that  is  often drawn between needs and 
wants in environmental discourse, typically implying a critique of the indulgence of 
present generation wants at the expense of future generations’ needs. I argue that this 
49 I tend to use the term ‘environmental sustainability’, but this is not intended to imply a shallow or 
weak or merely reformist attitude. 
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distinction does little to advance our understanding of environmental sustainability. 
Finally, in section 5.3 I return in more detail to some of the issues raised in chapter 2 
in  relation to  the  environmental  impact  of  economic  globalisation,  and propose  a 
framework  for  evaluating  three  alternative  models  of  economic  organisation  to 
contemporary market economies. The discussion of the conditions for environmental 
sustainability continues in chapter 6,  with analysis  of the political institutions that 
might underpin an alternative economic model.  
5.1 Ecocentrism, anthropocentrism, and environmental sustainability
It  was  argued  in  chapter  2  that  environmental  sustainability  is  inevitably 
threatened in the context of a global market economy. Given the focus of this thesis 
on whether human rights, as a globalising discourse, is an adequate and appropriate 
framework  in  which  to  address  the  environmental  problems  associated  with 
globalisation, the concentration on economic globalisation as a significant cause of 
environmental unsustainability is warranted. But broader debates about the causes of 
environmental  problems  are  also  relevant  to  the  present  inquiry  for  a  number  of 
reasons. As argued in chapter 2, the prevalence of a particular model of economic 
organisation is not an arbitrary or immutable fact, it is the product of human policy 
choices, and policy choices are themselves a reflection of values and of ideas about 
how  people  should  live.  The  ecocentric  argument  is  that  a  wholesale  change  in 
Western spiritual and cultural attitudes to non-human nature is required in order to 
reverse currently damaging trends.50 Ecocentrists have argued that an anthropocentric 
approach is not able to achieve this wholesale change. Since the object is to overcome 
what Tim Hayward (1998) calls ‘human chauvinism’, an ethical approach based on 
concern first for human well-being seems an unlikely candidate for generating the 
hoped  for  paradigm shift.  One  question  to  be  addressed  in  this  chapter,  then,  is 
whether ecocentrists are correct in arguing that anthropocentrism is an obstacle to 
environmental sustainability.  If so, this would have significant implications for the 
idea that human rights, by their nature anthropocentric, could be an appropriate tool in 
addressing the environmental problems associated with globalisation.
50 Ecocentrism here is taken also to encompass biocentrism, which accords value to all living creatures, 
whereas ecocentrism is sometimes interpreted as according value to ecosystems rather than individual 
organisms. For a range of ecocentric perspectives, see Eckersley (1992), Attfield (2003), Naess (1973), 
Leopold (2002), Salleh (1992), Mathews (1987).
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5.1.1 Ecocentrism, anthropocentrism, and intrinsic value
There  are  a  variety  of  proponents  of  what  is  broadly  termed ecocentrism, 
defending a number of different positions with regard to both ethics and politics. To 
reduce this plurality to a few key tenets inevitably sacrifices nuance and detail, but it 
is  nonetheless useful,  for the purposes of defining environmental  sustainability,  to 
highlight some salient points that are recognisably ecocentric. Ecocentrists regard the 
environmental crisis as an ethical crisis as well as a political and economic one, which 
is to say that the prevalence of environmentally unsustainable patterns of living is a 
failure of ethics rather than exclusively of politics or economics.51 It follows from this 
that the remedy to environmental problems lies not (only or primarily) in articulating 
and  advocating  different  policies,  but  rather,  in  defining  and  promoting  different 
values. Central to this argument is the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic 
value. Anthropocentrists, it is claimed, value non-human nature only instrumentally, 
as a resource to be used or consumed to achieve particular ends, whereas ecocentrists 
argue that nature has intrinsic value – value independent of the uses it can or does 
have  for  humans  (Attfield  1999).  The  anthropocentric  attitude  of  instrumental 
valuation  is  explained  variously  as  the  product  of  the  dominance  of  economic 
rationality  (Hancock  2003);  the  modernist  disenchantment  of  the  natural  world, 
proceeding from the insights of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, and culminating in 
the industrial revolution (Marshall 1995); or the continuation of patriarchy beyond the 
social  sphere and into human – non-human relations (Salleh 1997).  Whatever  the 
causal root of this attitude, the resultant human chauvinism facilitates a lack of care 
for the environment that has paved the way for the policy choices that have brought 
on the environmental problems now faced (outlined in chapter 2).
The solutions proposed by ecocentrists to these problems vary in detail, but 
some broad themes are discernible. Most importantly, nature is to be recognised as 
having  intrinsic  value.  The  consequence  of  this  would  be  that  there  would  be  a 
presumption  in  favour  of  preserving  a  given  feature  of  nature,  rather  than  a 
presumption  in  favour of  human use  of  the  environment  being acceptable  (Naess 
2003). Secondly,  humans are to be recognised as necessarily a part of, rather than 
apart from, non-human nature. The community of moral concern is therefore radically 
altered and expanded to include animals, plants, ecosystems, rocks and sands. In this 
respect ecocentrists present a challenge to what might be thought of as the typical 
51 Though ecocentrists are not unique in doing so; some anthropocentrists also take this view. 
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position of liberal democratic politics, and certainly to the proponent of human rights; 
the individual human is not to be construed as an autonomous, rational agent, and the 
centre of moral  value.  Instead,  because humans can only exist  if  embedded in an 
ecological context, the self is to be understood as ‘relational’, rather than independent 
of the rest of nature.  An example of this type of thinking can be found in Robyn 
Eckersley’s development of ‘transpersonal ecology’ (based on Warwick Fox’s work), 
whereby the individual is constituted by both social and environmental relations:
According  to  this  model,  we  are  neither  completely  passive  and 
determined beings (as crude behaviourists would have it) nor completely 
autonomous and self-determining beings (as some existentialists  would 
have  it).  Rather,  we  are  relatively autonomous  beings  who,  by  our 
purposive  thought and action,  help to constitute the very relations that 
determine who we are. (Eckersley 1992:53)
Another  influential  proposal  is  Aldo  Leopold’s  ‘land  ethic’,  which,  ‘enlarges  the 
boundaries  of  the  community  to  include  soils,  waters,  plants,  and  animals,  or 
collectively: the land’ (Leopold 2002:39). 
The proposal that nature has intrinsic value is, I argue, a distinctly ecocentric 
claim. Anthropocentrism is, by definition, grounded in the claim that humans have 
value,52 and the value that is ascribed to non-human nature is typically justified in 
terms of  the  more  or  less  abstract  use  that  it  has  for  humans.53 Some prominent 
anthropocentrists have explicitly attempted to disprove the coherence of the intrinsic 
value position.54 However, I doubt that the debate over whether nature has intrinsic or 
52 Though why is usually not specified (see the debate in chapter 3 re Perry et al). 
53 Abstract because the uses identified can include the ‘aesthetic’ or ‘contemplative’ value of knowing 
that  environmental  ‘resources’,  such as  wildernesses  or  ladybirds  or  pond algae,  exist  without  the 
valuing human ever directly ‘using’ the resource. See O’Neill (1993) and Wissenburg (1998) on the 
range of reasons for which individuals might value non-human nature.
54 Often a counter to this position is framed in terms of the ‘last man’ (or, in Keekok Lee’s (1993) 
politically correct version, ‘last person’) argument, whereby a hypothetical thought experiment is said 
to reveal that most people do intuitively believe that nature has intrinsic value. While this is to an 
extent persuasive, I suggest that such arguments lead to something of a theoretical cul-de-sac, rather 
than  serving  to  guide  debate  on  policies  that  might  or  might  not  help  societies  shift  towards 
environmentally sustainable patterns of living. The last man argument runs thus: if the last man on 
earth cut down the last tree, would he have done something morally wrong? If yes, then there has to be 
intrinsic value in non-human nature,  since there is  neither valuer left  nor human subject to derive 
instrumental value from the erstwhile healthy tree. But this position can be opposed by including in the 
definition of instrumental value aesthetic value, or spiritual value. The debate therefore spills into a 
discussion of what, precisely, counts as intrinsic value, and what is only instrumental value. As O’Neill 
(1993:9) points out, this eventually leads to a reductio ad absurdum type argument, since instrumental 
valuations cannot go on indefinitely. Hayward (1998:25) also points out that moral argument derived 
from the purported intrinsic value of X is tautologous, since the argument runs; ‘X has intrinsic value, 
therefore X should be protected, because X has intrinsic value’.
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only  instrumental  value  is  especially  important  in  defining  environmental 
sustainability,  and  identifying  relevant  policy-guiding  norms,  in  the  context  of 
globalisation. Insisting on the intrinsic value of the natural world is unlikely to be 
persuasive  to  the  broad spectrum of  political  opinion  in  what  ecocentrists  rightly 
characterise as a largely disenchanted world. Certainly, opinions can be changed, and 
ecocentrists such as Eckersley (1992) have highlighted the role that government might 
play  in  promoting  the  idea  of  nature  having  intrinsic  value  in  environmental 
citizenship  education  in  schools.  But,  as  Alan  Carter  (2000)  argues,  there  is  no 
necessary  link  between  the  ethical  motivation  behind  a  particular  policy  and  the 
outcome of the policy:
[S]ome poor people need to burn far more wood than they would need to 
if they possessed wood-burning stoves. Hence, if one wants to stop them 
denuding  the  ground  of  tree  cover  and  hastening  the  process  of 
desertification, then one needs to aid their society in attaining a certain 
level of development. One might feel one needs to go even further and 
provide  not  wood-burning  stoves  but  biogas  generators,  say.  And one 
might want to do so simply because one wishes to stop those living in that 
un-developed  or  underdeveloped  society  from  destroying  their  natural 
environment.  And  the  motivation  for  that  could  be  purely  biocentric. 
(Carter 2000:451)
Conversely, anthropocentrically motivated policies can (and do) have outcomes that 
ecocentrists would welcome. The reason for this is clear when the ecocentric way of 
understanding  humans  as  necessarily  ecologically  embedded  beings  is  taken  into 
account – any attempt to preserve or maintain the integrity of the environment for 
humans inevitably does so for non-human nature also. This position is also affirmed 
by anthropocentrists, from liberals, such as Wissenburg (1998), to communitarians, 
such  as  de-Shalit  (2000).  So,  it  is  possible  to  accept  the  ecocentric  claim  that 
environmental  problems require  a  broader  engagement  than  a  focus  on  economic 
policy would provide, whilst bypassing the debate over the intrinsic value of non-
human  nature.  It  is  enough,  for  the  present  purpose,  to  note  that  humans  are 
ecologically embedded, and therefore argue that, whether on account of the intrinsic 
value of nature,  or  because of  the profound importance the  natural  world has for 
humans, finding environmentally sustainable ways of living is vital.
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Carter’s target in the above passage is Andrew Dobson’s (1998) typology of 
theories  of  sustainability  that  run  along  an  axis  of  deep  green  to  shallow  green, 
corresponding more or less to ecocentric through to anthropocentric positions. Carter 
rejects the view, formally stated by Naess in his 1973 article ‘The Shallow and the 
Deep,  Long-Range Ecology Movement’,  and since  repeated by many ecocentrists 
(including  Dobson),  that  an  anthropocentric  position  equates  to  a  shallow  and 
reformist approach, whereas the ecocentric position is deep and radical. Ecocentrists 
might respond that an anthropocentric ethic that puts human welfare first is unlikely 
to secure the degree of environmental protection that respect for the intrinsic value of 
nature would ensure. But there is no prior reason why this must be the case. Bryan 
Norton proposes the ecological value of ‘integrity’ as a standard by which to assess 
models of sustainability, whereby the most desirable policies are those that protect the 
integrity of ecosystems (see Norton 1999 and 2002).55 The justification for this policy 
preference is presented in anthropocentric terms, specifically, preserving the integrity 
of global and local ecosystems is held to be good because doing so preserves the 
greatest possible number of options and opportunities for future generations. This is a 
desirable  strategy,  and  a  just  strategy,  because  the  actions  of  present  generation 
humans will affect the options available to future generations, but it is not possible to 
predict accurately precisely what the needs and wants of future generations will be.56 
Therefore, since humans are ecologically embedded beings, the best approach to take 
is to bequeath to future generations the healthiest possible ecosystem, and let future 
generations make their inevitable selective judgments about which particular aspects 
of  the  environment  to  value  for  which  purposes.  This  approach,  I  argue,  has  the 
benefit  of  being  politically  intelligible  to  a  broad  audience,  and  is  capable  of 
grounding a robust model of environmental sustainability that would deliver the aims 
of ecocentrists and anthropocentrists alike, without relying on ethical commitments 
that are not widely shared.
 
55 For a more detailed discussion of ‘integrity’ as a benchmark for sustainability see chapter 6.
56 This is in part because environmental resources that have been useless to one generation may, with 
technological development or other changes, come to be important for a future generation. An oft-cited 
example here is uranium (see Holland 1999:61), but other examples include changing attitudes to areas 
of natural wilderness, such as the Scottish highlands, once seen as dangerous and forbidding places, 
now valued as places for recreation and as having aesthetic value (see O’Neill 2007). Hence de-Shalit 
(2000)  is  correct  in  arguing  that  nature,  or  more  precisely  what  is  identified  as  ‘nature’  by each 
generation, is socially constructed. Nevertheless, the biophysical fact of humanity being ecologically 
embedded means that constructing nature as something separate from human activity is misleading.
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5.1.2 Social and ecological embeddedness
Turning to the second important theme of ecocentric theory identified above, I 
argue that the ecocentric proposal that the self should be understood to be ‘relational’, 
that is, ‘always already’ embedded within an ecological as well as a social context, is 
only distinctive by a matter of degree. Eckersley describes green politics as ‘post-
liberal’  in  part  because of  what  she  sees  as  the  paucity  of  the  liberal  account  of 
individual autonomy: 
From the perspective of  the ecological model  of internal  relations,  the 
liberal  idea  of  autonomy  as  independence  from  (or  “freedom  from”) 
others  is  seen  as  philosophically  misguided.  (To  the  extent  that 
interconnectedness  with  others  is  acknowledged  under  this  particular 
liberal  interpretation,  it  is  likely  to  be  experienced  as  threatening,  as 
causing a loss of self.) (Eckersley 1992:54)
The claim here is that humans are neither completely independent from nature nor 
from  other  humans.  Social  and  ecological  embeddedness  should  not  be  seen  as 
threatening,  or causing a  loss  of self,  since it  is  the ecological context  that  gives 
humans life, and the social context that teaches humans how to live. Recognition of 
this fact is held to be emancipatory in that it facilitates a changed relationship between 
humans and non-human nature that delegitimises the modernist discourse of human 
dominance and mastery over nature,  in favour of a  new set of relations based on 
justice and the recognition of the right of non-human nature to flourish. 
The implicit claim that liberalism does not recognise the social embeddedness 
of humans seems to me to be misguided. Liberal theorists of rights typically note that 
rights are not absolute, but rather entitle the right-holder to whatever good is specified 
only insofar  as  that  entitlement  does  not  interfere  with  the  equal  rights  of  others 
(Jones 1994:138-142). Thus the right to free speech does not extend to the right to 
incite  violence  against  minorities.  Moreover,  liberal  theory  is  no  more  a  unified 
perspective  than is  green theory.  Whilst  liberals  such as  Robert  Nozick and John 
Locke can be said to be anti-ecological (de Geus 2001), the liberal theory of John 
Stuart Mill is quite different. Millian ideas that can readily appeal to greens include 
his later support for a steady-state economy, his foreboding over the indiscriminate 
exploitation of natural  resources during the industrial  revolution,  and his humility 
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about the fallibility of human knowledge (de Geus 2001; Stephens 2001).57 Nor is it 
clear  that  all  liberals  would  recognise  themselves  as  advocating  a  view of  social 
relations  that  constrain  autonomy as  necessarily  involving  a  ‘loss  of  self’.  Mill’s 
defence  of  freedom  of  speech,  specifically  his  argument  that  confronting  views 
contrary to one’s own helps to avoid subscribing to a position only as lifeless dogma, 
suggests a positive dimension to social embeddedness. Mill’s influence is admittedly 
weaker than it once was, but the point to be made is that while Eckersley’s criticisms 
might be accurate with respect to Locke and Nozick, they are not true of all liberals. 
The relevance of this for the present discussion is that ecocentric resistance to the 
individualism of the human rights discourse can be said to be attacking a straw man – 
the human rights framework does not necessarily posit a disconnected autonomous 
individual. As discussed in the previous chapter, human rights are invoked to protect 
individuals  from oppression,  they need not,  however,  imply a  view of humans as 
completely atomistic, autonomous beings.    
On the other hand, neither  the contemporary human rights regime,  nor the 
liberal  tradition  from  which  it  emerged,  sufficiently  recognises  the  ecological 
embeddedness of human life; in this respect Eckersley’s criticism is valid. But, as 
already indicated,  this  perspective need not  be grounded in ecocentrism.  Norton’s 
anthropocentric model of sustainability understood in terms of the value of ecological 
integrity clearly affirms not only that humans are ecologically embedded, but that this 
has significant implications for policy choices. Similarly, Hayward’s (1998) theory of 
‘enlightened  anthropocentrism’  recognises  the  inevitability  of  an  ecological 
dimension to human life. The clearest difference between the two perspectives is the 
claim  about  value;  ecocentrists  claim  that  nature  has  intrinsic  value,  whereas 
anthropocentrists  see  instrumental  value  in  nature.  But,  as  already  indicated, 
instrumental value can be broadly interpreted. The more telling point, however, is the 
ontological  claim that  humans  are  ecologically  embedded beings,  but  this  can be 
sustained from either perspective. There is arguably only a semantic difference in the 
57 That said, Mill was clearly interested in the idea of progress, which some greens have been critical of 
because of the implicit teleological approach that is said to underpin ideas of the unquestioned value of 
technological  development and economic growth, and which is  said to be contrary to the cyclical 
nature of the natural world (Dobson 2000:62-105). On the other hand, Barry (1999:249-251) argues 
that the task of green theory is not to reject the idea of progress but rather to reinterpret progress such 
that it is concerned with human rather than economic development. A complementary line is taken by 
Nigel Dower, who argues that, ‘economic growth […] is justified, when it is justified, by the fact that it 
enables people to achieve a better quality of life, better that is in terms of criteria of well-being other 
than more wealth’ (Dower 2000:40-41).
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consequent  motivation  for  acting  prescribed  by  weak  anthropocentrism  and 
ecocentrism  –  one  acts  either  out  of  ‘enlightened  self-interest’  (Hayward  1998), 
enlightened in the sense of understanding and affirming the ontological claim that 
humans  are ecologically  embedded and realising that  it  is  therefore  in one’s  own 
interest to protect the environment; or out of an identification with the natural world 
where the self is ‘relational’ (Mathews 1991), in the sense of encompassing a broader 
identity that recognises the self as ecologically embedded, realising that to harm the 
environment is ultimately to harm oneself.58   
The reason that  all  this  matters  for  the  present  discussion  was highlighted 
above.  Taking  their  cue  from  Naess  (1973),  a  number  of  green  thinkers  have 
perpetuated a distinction between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ green theories that equates to 
ecocentric  and  anthropocentric  accounts  of  environmental  ethics,  and  informs  a 
radical  versus  reformist  politics.  On  this  basis,  it  is  argued  that  ecocentrism is  a 
precondition of environmental sustainability. On the contrary, what is demonstrated 
here is that an anthropocentric approach is equally capable of grounding a persuasive 
model of environmental sustainability. It also has the appeal of being more intelligible 
to the majority of people who do not, at present, share ecocentric values. This is not to 
deny that what might be called strong anthropocentrism, or, more specifically,  the 
assumption  that  humans  can  continue  to  consume  environmental  resources 
indiscriminately,  is  deeply  flawed  and  misguided.  But  what  I  have  tried  to 
demonstrate is that the most problematic aspect of such an approach is not the value it 
places on the environment, but rather the empirical error of assuming that humans are 
not  dependent  on  their  environment.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  therefore 
devoted  to  defining  environmental  sustainability  from  a  ‘weak’  or  ‘enlightened’ 
anthropocentric perspective.
5.2 Needs and wants and future generations
Perhaps the most widely cited definition of sustainability is the ‘Brundtland 
definition’, put forward in the Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1987, which declares that ‘[h]umanity has the ability to make 
development  sustainable  to  ensure  that  it  meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without 
compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet  their  own  needs’ (WCED 
58 Both approaches share a tendency to postulate a ‘transformative’ experience that will  inspire in 
environmental citizens the understanding of themselves as ecologically embedded beings. For further 
discussion of this point see chapter 6.
114
1987:24). While a number of greens have been critical of the (qualified) endorsement 
Brundtland  gives  to  continued economic  growth,  the  themes  of  prioritising needs 
rather than wants, and showing concern for future generations, appear repeatedly in 
green  theories  of  sustainability.  One  oft-discussed  response  to  the  problem  of 
providing for the needs of future generations has been the idea of ‘maintaining natural 
capital’, or sometimes only ‘critical natural capital’, that is, the ecological resources 
necessary for human survival (see,  for example, Turner 1992; Goodland and Daly 
1996). 
However,  Alan Holland (1999)  has criticised  the idea of  natural  capital  as 
being an appropriate  device for measuring sustainability.  Following the economist 
Herman Daly, Holland points out that ‘the economic notion of ‘natural capital’ is an 
essentially relational concept: it makes no sense to ask how much natural capital is 
represented by a grain of sand or lump of coal ‘in itself’’ (Holland 1999:59, italics in 
original). For that reason Daly is persuasive in his argument that one can only feasibly 
speak of the complementarity of natural and human-made capital – that is, the coal as 
well as the knowledge of how to mine it and how to convert it into heat or electricity – 
rather  than substitutability  between natural  and  human-made capital.  But  Holland 
goes further than this in his critique of the substitutability debate, because, as noted 
above, it is not easy to know what will be useful to future generations:
Thus it turns out that, amongst other complications, the concept of natural 
capital  contains  an  epistemological  variable:  changes  in  the  level  of 
natural capital are contingent, not only upon changes in the natural world, 
nor simply on its actual utility, but upon changes in assumptions about its 
utility. […] Referring back to the example of uranium, this century would 
seem to reckon it a considerable addition to the store of natural capital. If 
the  next  century  judges  the  nuclear  experiment  to  have  been  an 
unmitigated  disaster,  judgements  as  to  the  state  of  our  current  natural 
assets would need to be seriously revised. (Holland 1999:61)
The only way of making sense of the idea of natural capital in a way that assists us in 
deliberating  strategies  for  environmental  sustainability,  is  what  Holland  calls  the 
‘physical  stock’  approach  (Holland  1999:63-65)  or  what  Norton  refers  to  as  the 
‘Listing  Stuff’  approach  (Norton  1999:119).  This  is  the  idea  of  furnishing  future 
generations with the opportunity to make of the natural capital available what they 
will with the human capital they inherit and develop themselves. Since what future 
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generations will need/want cannot be predicted with certainty, the fairest thing to do is 
to leave them everything possible.59 Of course, bequeathing everything, complete with 
an  accurate  inventory,  is  a  rather  Sisyphean  task,  so  the  most  viable  way  of 
operationalising this strategy, according to Holland, is to use ‘indicator species’, a 
well-known approach in ecology of testing the health of an ecosystem by looking for 
particular species that will only thrive in unpolluted environments (Holland 1999:65). 
This  fits  well  with  Norton’s  (2002)  idea  that  what  should  be  preserved  is  the 
‘integrity’ of the environment. 
This  is  a  rather  different  approach  than  that  immediately  apparent  in 
Brundtland’s  recommendations  and  in  many  other  strategies  for  sustaining  the 
environment  for  future  generations.  The  most  prominent  complaint  with  the 
Brundtland interpretation is that it endorses as legitimate continued economic growth: 
The concept of sustainable development does imply limits – not absolute 
limits  but  limitations  imposed  by  the  present  state  of  technology  and 
social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the 
biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But technology and 
social organization can be both managed and improved to make way for a 
new era of economic growth. (WCED 1987:24)
However, the report also clearly states that economic growth is a legitimate aim of 
developing nations insofar as it alleviates the material deprivation of the very poor, 
whereas  wealthier  populations  are  enjoined  to  ensure  equity  of  access  to  ‘the 
resources  required  to  sustain  that  growth’  (WCED  1987:24)  (which  presumably 
includes human as well as natural capital), and are further required to alter their ways 
of living such that they do not exceed the capacity of ecological resources. 
John S. Dryzek (1997) is rightly sceptical of what he calls the ‘Promethean 
response’,  whereby it  is  believed that  technological  innovation will,  in the future, 
solve current environmental problems, disputing the need to change environmentally 
damaging  practices.  But  there  is  some  middle  ground  between  relying  on 
technological  innovation  to  facilitate  endless  economic  growth,  and  rejecting 
59 Robin Attfield (1998:211) argues that we can predict ‘some of the basic needs of future people’, 
which seems intuitively  true  – surely  all  future  generations  will  need  breathable  air,  clean water, 
sustainable soils for growing crops. But, as I argue below, ‘needs’ is a term that confuses more than it 
clarifies. Moreover, restricting concern to what are seen to be ‘basic needs’ is likely to yield a weaker 
account of sustainability than might be desired, certainly than would be possible if the integrity of the 
ecosystem were taken to be the appropriate measure, since, as Wissenburg (1998:211-212) argues, it is 
conceivable that basic needs could be met whilst living in a ‘global Manhattan’. 
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technology,  or  growth,  as  having  any  part  to  play  in  overcoming  environmental 
problems.  Both  Carter  (1999:ch1)  and  Goodland  (1995)  point  to  the  increased 
environmental destruction that is attendant upon the extreme poverty of many people 
in developing countries, where resources are overused by people in order to survive. 
The pressures of rapid population growth are also a relevant issue here, but not less so 
than  the  vast  inequality  in  consumption  of  environmental  resources  that  exists 
between the global rich and poor. What all  this points to is the error of rejecting 
outright  the  legitimacy  of  continued  economic  growth  on  the  part  of  the  poor  – 
inequality within the present generation is as much a part of environmental ethics as is 
inequality between generations. Economic growth pursued on conventional models 
across  the  world  is  likely  to  be  ecologically  disastrous  (NEF  2006),  but  it  may 
nonetheless  be  a  limited  part  of  the  solution  to  environmental  problems.  Green 
scepticism  about  both  technological  innovation  and  economic  growth  is  entirely 
justified if they are taken to be unquestioned goods, but equally, greens are naïve if 
they take either to be unquestioned harms. 
5.2.1 The problem of needs and wants
However, there is a notable ambiguity in all of this, and curiously enough one 
that afflicts both the Brundtland definition and many alternative ways of approaching 
the  question  of  intergenerational  justice,  which  is  the  normative  implications  of 
differentiating  needs from wants.  It  is  easy enough to agree that  the needs  of  all 
should be satisfied before the wants of any, but it is not immediately clear how wants, 
rather  than needs,  can be  objectively  determined.  Andrew Dobson indicates  some 
awareness of this problem but retreats from it:
If the needs/wants problem seems presently intractable, it is enough for 
our  purposes  –  that  of  identifying  the  principal  features  of  the  radical 
green sustainable  society – that  the emphasis  on reduced consumption 
brings up the question sooner or later, and that therefore the distinction 
between needs and wants is one of the intellectual features of the various 
pictures of such a society. (Dobson 2000:80)
Even those who have attempted to sketch in more detail the features of ‘a radical 
green  sustainable  society’  have  studiously  avoided  the  question.  Arne  Naess,  in 
outlining eight principles of deep ecology, lists as the third principle: ‘Humans have 
no right to reduce this richness and diversity [of life forms] except to satisfy vital 
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needs’ (Naess 2003:264). In an explanatory note, he goes on to say, ‘[t]he term “vital 
need”  is  deliberately  left  vague  to  allow  for  considerable  latitude  in  judgement. 
Differences in climate and related factors, together with differences in the structures 
of societies as they now exist, need to be taken into consideration.’ (Naess 2003:265). 
Also looking at the question of needs and wants, Ted Benton suggests that the 
idea of  needs may be most  intelligible  in the context  of  emergencies,  where it  is 
obvious that people need food, shelter, water, sanitation and health care. But such a 
minimalist  conception  of  needs  is  not  adequate  for  a  long  term  theory  of 
sustainability: 
To meet needs in a way which is proper, or appropriate to humanity is to 
meet them in ways which satisfy normative, cultural requirements. So, for 
humans to meet their need for food is not solely a matter of consuming a 
certain  necessary  bundle  of  nutrients,  but  it  is  a  matter  of  collecting, 
preparing, and socially consuming what are culturally recognized as foods 
according to the customs and standards of the people involved. (Benton 
1999:205)
It should be added that these customs and standards are neither fixed nor given, but 
rather are learned and adapted over time and across communities. It follows that there 
is  no  objective  standard  of  needs  that  can  be  determined  for  the  purposes  of 
environmental  sustainability,  presumably  a  conclusion  with  which  Naess  would 
concur. An additional variable is the level of technological development. Greens are 
often  fans  of  Rousseau,  finding  in  his  critique  of  the  increasing  reliance  on 
technology, and the attendant increasing distance from the ideal (idealised) state of 
nature,  a  parable  for  modern  dependence  on  technology  that  is  damaging  to  the 
environment,  and  ultimately  to  human  well-being  (Dobson  2000:111-112).  An 
example here is nuclear technology and the problem that nuclear waste remains toxic 
for many thousands of years. The decision to use nuclear technology places on this 
generation,  as  well  as  many  future  generations  who had no  part  in  the  decision-
making process, the obligation to accommodate nuclear waste as safely as possible. 
But nuclear technology is used in medicinal contexts as well as for creating energy 
and weapons. It would be a particularly misanthropic environmentalist  who would 
suggest that medicinal benefits of environmentally damaging technology are a luxury, 
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not a necessity, and so should be forsaken, without at least a debate about whether the 
benefits are worth the risk.60 
Hayward (1998:ch5) suggests that, in view of the difficulty of judging whether 
something is a necessity or a luxury, standards of needs must be intersubjectively 
determined. Hayward uses the language of preferences and interests, but rejects the 
idea, accepted in neoclassical economics, that preferences are fixed, and argues that, 
through intersubjective engagement, preferences can be ‘interrogated’ and potentially 
educated, to arrive at ‘genuine’ interests. There are a number of problems with this. 
Firstly, it is patronising and potentially oppressive to deny that what a person believes 
their interest to be is in fact their interest. Secondly, if the principle of intersubjective 
agreement on standards of needs or genuine interests is accepted, this weakens the 
normative  force  of  the concept  of  needs.  Needs,  on this  model,  are whatever  the 
democratic  body  agrees  them  to  be.  A  self-interested  demos  therefore  presents 
problems to the rest of the world and to future generations. 
This is a problem of democratic politics, which will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. The point to note here, however, is that Norton’s idea of environmental 
sustainability  understood  in  terms  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  ecosystems 
circumvents the needs/wants problem. It does, however, depend on humans caring 
about the fate of future generations. Concern for future generations is a virtue that 
green  theorists  of  citizenship  have  suggested  ways  of  inculcating,  but  it  is  not 
necessarily a spontaneous attribute of all  humans (see chapter 6).  What these last 
points demonstrate is that neither economic nor political solutions to the problem of 
environmental sustainability will be sufficient independently, they must be developed 
in tandem. The remainder of this chapter assesses three proposed economic solutions; 
the following chapter considers what political strategies might support and foster such 
change. 
5.3 Two problems and three solutions
The need for sustainability comes from the fact that ‘[t]he global ecosystem 
does three things that the human economy cannot do without, or do for itself’ (Prugh 
et  al  1999:15).  These  are,  firstly,  provide  resources,  secondly,  assimilate  waste 
products; and finally, perform ‘environmental services’, for example, biodiversity, the 
60 The idea of weighing up the benefits versus the risk of a particular path of development, or policy 
option, is a theme identified by Ulrich Beck (1997) in his idea of a ‘risk society’ which he argues 
characterises contemporary life. For further discussion, see chapter 6. 
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regulation of climate, or ‘amenities for consumption’ (Jacobs 1991:3-5). The structure 
of the global economy causes (at least) two significant problems which threaten these 
essential functions: firstly, what is called the ‘tragedy of the commons’, and secondly, 
the practice of ‘discounting’, or, the result of discounting, ‘externalities’. 
As stated in chapter 2, by ‘global economy’ I mean an economy organised 
around  neoliberal  economic  principles,  promoting  growth-led  development,  and 
fostering globalised networks of production and consumption. To be clear, the neo-
liberal  emphasis  on  export-led  growth  is  not  necessarily  characteristic  of  market 
economies. Indeed, the market is valued not only for its potential to promote growth 
but  also  because  of  its  capacity  to  foster  innovation  and  as  a  mechanism  for 
coordination. I argue below that neo-liberal policies emphasising export-led growth at 
fairly robust rates are environmentally problematic, but this might not hold true for 
market  economies  in  general.  However,  in  the  section  on  free  market 
environmentalism, I further argue that coordination by market prices to the exclusion 
of government oversight, is also problematic from and environmental point of view.
Neoliberal  economics  encourages  increasing  economic  globalisation  and 
endorses economically rational behaviour. The tragedy of the commons61 occurs when 
economically  rational  agents  use  a  commonly  owned (or  non-owned)  resource  in 
economically rational ways. To take a simple example, suppose that fishing boats A, 
B, and C fish a public lake for their livelihood. The skipper of boat A decides to buy a 
bigger net with which to catch more fish, and thereby increase his share of the market. 
This is economically rational because he exclusively benefits from the investment in 
the bigger net (more fish to sell, so more profit), while the cost in ecological terms 
(fewer fish to catch tomorrow) is spread equally amongst him and his competitors. So 
the next week the skipper of boat B decides that he should also buy a bigger net, so as 
to maintain his share of the market relative to boats A and C, and in this he also 
behaves  rationally,  and  the  process  continues  as  each  economic  agent  seeks  a 
comparative advantage in the market. 
This ‘ratcheting’ effect that markets tend to have undermines the sustainability 
of  the  resource;  unchecked  increasing  demand  will  eventually  exhaust  the 
regenerative capacity of the lake. That said, it should be noted that growth per se is 
not necessarily the problem (Jacobs 1991:26). Growth in the rate of extraction of a 
61 The tragedy of the commons was famously highlighted in an article of that title by Garrett Hardin, 
published in 1968, the ‘commons’ originally having referred to common grazing land in pre-industrial 
Europe, which Hardin used as an analogy for commonly used environmental resources today.
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resource might mean 100 fish being caught in year 1, 103 in year 2, 107 in year 3, and 
so on. A steady rate of 100 fish being caught per year would represent zero growth. 
But this too would be unsustainable if the fish stocks were only replenished at a rate 
of 80 fish a year.  This problem illustrates why simply switching to a zero-growth 
economy, as some greens have suggested, is not enough. Indeed, the real question is 
not simply the rate of growth in the economy, but the extent to which an economic 
model takes account of rates of ecological regeneration.62 Thus the problem of climate 
change,  a  typical  tragedy of  the  commons  issue,  would  not  be  solved  simply  by 
halting  carbon  emissions  at  today’s  levels,  as  those  levels  are  themselves 
unsustainable. The climate change issue also draws our attention to the problem of 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Carbon emissions for the most part come 
from burning fossil fuels, the depletion of which is a source of considerable concern, 
as they are non-renewable in human time-frames and industrialised economies are 
heavily dependent on them. Yet the pollution from burning fossil fuels is threatening 
the sustainability of renewable resources, such as breathable air and fertile soil, and 
the  depletion  of  renewable  resources,  though it  has  received  less  attention in  the 
popular media, is of even greater concern than the depletion of non-renewables. Many 
of the world’s renewable resources are not privately owned and so are subject to the 
logic of the tragedy of the commons.  
Discounting also represents economically rational behaviour. It is the practice 
of placing less value on costs or benefits that occur at a distance from us. To take, 
again, a simple example, if I am offered £100 today or in ten years time, I would 
rather have it today. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, I may be dead ten years 
from now. If I am alive, £100 buys more today than it would in the future. Even if the 
£100 were adjusted for inflation, I may reasonably expect to be wealthier in ten years 
than I am now, and £100 means more to me, makes more of a difference to my life, 
when  I  am  poorer.  For  all  these  reasons  I  quite  rationally  ‘discount’  the  future. 
62 Dobson (2000:62) describes the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, based on the research of the Club of Rome 
in the 1970s, as ‘an article of faith’ amongst greens. The conclusion of the report by Meadows et al was 
that there are ecological limits to possible levels of economic growth, and that, eventually,  indeed, 
within 100 years, ecological systems would collapse if the pursuit of economic growth continued. In 
response to this, a number of greens endorsed the idea of a zero-growth economy. However, as Carter 
(1999:ch1) notes, a zero-growth economy can also be environmentally destructive. What matters, then, 
is not the level of economic growth, but the rate of consumption of ecological resources relative to the 
natural absorption/rejuvenation rate. It should also be noted that endless recycling does not solve the 
problem of the increasing consumption of resources that is attendant upon economic growth, since the 
recycling of goods itself requires energy because of the typically high entropic value of post-consumer 
waste (Jacobs 1991:13-15; Dobson 2000:67-68). 
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Economic agents discount across both time and space. To take an example discussed 
by Jacobs (1991:27-28), if a chemical company is able to release effluent into a river 
that then poisons fish, and people use the river for drinking water downstream, then 
the chemical company does not bear the full (social and ecological) cost of producing 
the chemicals. Further, unless the company is fined for such discharges or is by law 
made to clean up the river, the market price of the chemicals will not include the full 
cost of producing the chemicals, and so the transaction between the customer buying 
chemicals and the chemicals company produces ‘externalities’, that is, negative costs 
which fall on agents external to the transaction (Jacobs 1991:28-29). According to 
Joan Martinez-Alier,  ‘one can see externalities  not as market  failures but  as cost-
shifting successes’ (Martinez-Alier 2002:257). In this case, externalities fall on people 
poisoned by the drinking water in terms of loss of health, on fishermen in terms of 
depleted  fish  stocks,  and  unless  and  until  the  river  is  cleaned  up,  on  future 
generations, as well as plants and animals, now and in the future. Externalities can 
take the form of pollutants and/or loss of environmental resources, either renewable or 
non-renewable. Insofar as lower prices are preferred in the marketplace, there is no 
economic incentive for companies to internalise externalities. 
These two problems, the tragedy of the commons and discounting, are widely 
agreed on facets of market economies. What to do about them is much debated of 
course,  as  will  be  discussed  below.  But  first  it  is  useful  to  rehearse  briefly  the 
discussion in chapter 2 of why all this matters. The globalisation of the economy is 
clearly linked to environmental degradation, which in turn threatens human security, 
thereby contributing to the underfulfilment of human rights of the present generation, 
particularly the poor. The poorest of this generation are feeling the impact now. It is 
mostly poor people who live on lands subject to flooding, and it is in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa that soils are drying out at alarming rates, made worse by drought. The 
IPCC  holds  human  caused  global  warming  to  be  responsible  for  both  increased 
flooding and increased desertification, as well as stronger and more frequent extreme 
weather events such as hurricane Katrina (Page 2006:38-40). But, as noted above, it is 
also future generation humans that will bear these costs, in terms of reduced options 
and a greater burden of risk compared to those facing previous generations. These two 
constituencies,  present  generation  poor  and  future  generations,  are  inevitably 
excluded from market  transactions,  thus do not  have the opportunity  to  influence 
economic  activity,  and  the  environmental  impacts  they  experience  are  (quite 
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rationally)  discounted  by  those  who  do.  What  this  means  is  that  there  is  an 
information gap in the market. Externalities are the consequence of this information 
gap. 
It  is  now  possible  to  outline  the  problem  facing  those  trying  to  define 
environmental sustainability specifically in the context of globalisation: The market-
driven  nature  of  the  global  economy  has  two  features  which  foster  ecological 
degradation – the tragedy of the commons and the problem of discounting. To make 
the economy sustainable,  it  is  necessary to find ways of making economic agents 
appreciate the full ecological costs of production and consumption. Firstly, a model of 
sustainability has to have a solution to the tragedy of the commons; economic actors 
must not be able to pollute or extract materials from common resources such as air, 
water, grazing lands, etc., without somehow being made to recognise and internalise 
the ecological costs of doing so. Secondly, with respect to the problem of discounting, 
both in terms of pollution and the depletion of resources, insofar as economic agents 
care about the fate of their children or grandchildren, mechanisms must be developed 
to close the information gap that exists with regard to externalities. Thus one question 
for a model of sustainability to address is how can the demands of intergenerational 
justice be integrated into an economic model? 
But  economic  agents  also  discount  across  space  as  well  as  time.  As  an 
economically rational agent, if cheaper goods are available from countries with lower 
regulatory standards than my own, then I  will  prefer  the imported goods to those 
produced  domestically,  thereby contributing  to  environmental  damage abroad  and 
global damage from the ecological impact of transport costs. A full account of what 
future generations are owed might deal with this problem; if all externalities could be 
fully internalised for the sake of future generations, the present generation would also 
presumably  benefit.  But  the  fact  of  massive  economic  inequality  makes  the 
displacement of environmental costs easier, because the poor who lack the economic 
resources to register their preferences in the market also typically lack the political 
power to call attention to the injustice of disproportionately suffering the problems of 
externalities  (Shiva  2003).  The  displacement  of  environmental  costs  onto  poorer 
communities  is  therefore  more  likely  in  the  short  term,  which  serves  to  deepen 
environmental problems in the long term. 
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The  poor  often  live  on  cheaper  land  that  is  cheap  precisely  because  it  is 
environmentally  insecure,  either  because  subject  to  ‘natural’  problems  such  as 
flooding (though exacerbated, in recent years, by human-induced climate change), or 
because polluted by toxic waste (Rosen 1994; Shiva 2003). Poor people therefore 
often  experience  environmental  problems  from  which  richer  communities  are  at 
present  relatively  insulated.  There  is  a  scientific  consensus,  though,  that  these 
problems will become more widespread (Page 2006). Green theorists can be said to be 
misguided if they focus on intergenerational justice as the measure of sustainability, 
since  looking  at  intragenerational  justice  offers  a  better  chance  for  the  early 
identification of problematic patterns of economic behaviour. As Goodland observes, 
‘[i]f  the  world  cannot  move  toward  intragenerational  sustainability  during  this 
generation,  it  will  be  that  much  more  difficult  to  achieve  intergenerational 
sustainability  somewhere  in  the  future’  (Goodland  1995:6).  Moreover,  insofar  as 
environmental threats to human security are recognised as undermining human rights, 
it is appropriate, in a global order that affirms the value of human rights, that the 
economic  problems  producing  these  environmental  harms  be  resolved.  There  is 
therefore a third important question for environmental sustainability to address; the 
issue of intragenerational justice. A model for sustainability should look to decrease 
inequality between and within nations, and at the very least should not entrench or 
perpetuate existing inequalities. This is not a sufficient condition for environmental 
sustainability, since, for example, increases in population over time could be to the 
detriment of future generations, but it is, I argue, a necessary condition. 
In  summary,  I  have  identified  a  three-question  framework  for  analysing 
models of sustainability: 1. How is the tragedy of the commons addressed? 2. How 
are the demands of intergenerational justice recognised? 3. How are the demands of 
intragenerational justice recognised? In the remainder of this chapter, I use these three 
questions to consider the relative merits of three competing models of environmental 
sustainability;  free  market  environmentalism,  ecological  modernisation,  and 
ecological economics. This study does not exhaust the possible range of models of 
sustainability, rather, it evaluates three positions on a scale of increasing interference 
in the global market economy. Whereas previous comparative studies have assessed 
sustainability models in terms of their adherence to green principles (Dobson 1998), 
or in terms of their compatibility with liberal democracy (Labaras 2001), the aim of 
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this study is to identify which of these approaches is most promising in addressing the 
environmental problems specifically associated with globalisation.
5.3.1 Free market environmentalism
Free  market  environmentalists,  such  as  Terry  Anderson  and  Donald  Leal 
(1991; 2005), contend that the environmental problems the market engenders are a 
consequence  of  political  interference  in  the  market,  and the  fact  that  markets  are 
incomplete. If the market was allowed to operate fully and freely, Anderson and Leal 
claim,  then  the  ecological  costs  of  production  would  be  fully  internalised  in  the 
market  price  of  goods,  and environmental  quality  would  improve.  Indeed,  in  this 
analysis, the complex spontaneous order created by the market is said to be a mirror 
of the complex spontaneous order of ecosystems. Thus, the solution to the tragedy of 
the  commons  is  to  eliminate  the  commons;  that  is,  privatise  public  or  common 
goods.63 
This argument boils down to the idea that better care is taken of any given 
resource  if  it  is  owned  by  someone  who  has  a  direct  interest  in  that  resource’s 
continued cultivation, than if it is owned by the public, or not owned at all. So, if 
rivers were privatised, chemical companies would be charged a price for releasing 
effluent into the river, as would swimmers for recreational use, fishermen for fishing 
rights (presumably with quotas), and so on. The owner of the river would set the price 
to be paid for each activity, the price being determined by the prices being offered by 
competitors, and the relative costs of each type of activity to the resource. As the 
owner of the river would presumably want to maximise his income from the resource, 
he has an interest in pricing polluting activity highly, thereby maintaining the quality 
of the river. 
Privatising environmental common or public goods is particularly attractive, 
free  market  environmentalists  claim,  because  it  eliminates  the  danger  of  special 
interest groups influencing the political process that would otherwise determine the 
fate of these goods. In short, the free market is held to be less corruptible than politics. 
Anderson and Leal also argue (2005) that  the market is  a better,  faster  and more 
63 Public goods are technically things like the security provided by police forces. Common goods are 
things like fresh air – they exist anyway, with or without a government. I take them to be the same 
class of goods here in that they share certain features – they benefit everyone, even those who choose 
not  to  pay  for  them,  and  indeed  it  is  practically  impossible  to  exclude  people  from the  services 
provided by public or common goods.
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efficient  communicator  of  values  than  the  political  process  is.  Market-based 
transactions are more responsive to consumer demand than politicians are to voters’ 
demands, particularly as voters typically express their opinion effectively only once 
every few years  at  election time.  Moreover,  voters decide for whom to cast  their 
ballots  on  a  range of  issues.  On the  other  hand,  the  market  allows consumers to 
disaggregate their values, and use their economic power to indicate precisely their 
preferences,  to  which  producers  must  respond  in  order  to  maximise  profits  and 
maintain or increase their share of the market relative to their competitors.
The only practical difficulty here, then, is how to restrict access to the river, or 
clean air, or any other common resource, so as to prevent its use by people who have 
not paid for the service. Indeed, Michael Jacobs rejects free market environmentalism 
on the grounds that it  is practically impossible as a solution to the tragedy of the 
commons, because the type of goods that suffer from the tragedy of the commons do 
so precisely because they cannot be ‘captured, commodified, and bought and sold’ 
(Jacobs 1995:16). While this is not strictly true of lakes, it is clearly true of a stable 
climate and breathable air. But free market environmentalists argue that where there is 
a demand for technology that limits access to a public good or a common good, then 
the technology will be developed. After all, this is how markets work, they provide 
incentives for innovation. It might seem far-fetched to imagine that there might one 
day be a way of restricting access to clean air only to those who had paid for it, but it 
is worth noting that the WTO has speculative plans for trade rules should water be 
fully privatised globally  (Manger  2003).  Moreover,  biodiversity,  one would think, 
could not be privately owned, but the TRIPS agreement, one of the outcomes of the 
Doha round of WTO trade talks, allows, among other things, the patenting of plants 
(see chapter 2). So we can see that there are reasons to take seriously the arguments of 
free market environmentalists. Indeed, if the technology to make private air workable 
should become available,  then it  is  conceivable that the privatisation of air would 
solve the tragedy of the commons. 
But privatising public or common goods raises important  ethical questions. 
Discussing public goods, Andrew Light argues that ‘publicly provided goods have the 
normative status of publicly recognised needs’ (Light 2000:214). Certainly, it cannot 
be denied that we all need clean water and breathable air. It may be argued, then, that 
we should not have to pay for them, that it  would be unethical to privatise them, 
particularly on a global scale. Yet we already have to pay for food, which we also 
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need.64 The onus, then, is on opponents of free market environmentalism, to show 
why other goods that we need, such as water and air, should not also be commodified. 
To this it might be replied that the commodification of food has not been a stunning 
success, that the pressure a global economy puts on farmers in developing countries to 
switch from subsistence to cash crops makes neither social nor ecological sense, and 
that  the  evidence  on  increased  inequalities  resulting  from intensified  global  trade 
suggests  that  the  benefits  from  privatising  the  commons  would  not  be  evenly 
distributed (see Shiva 1999; Woods 2000). 
Increasing  inequalities,  both  within  and  between countries,  raise  again  the 
problem  of  discounting  –  poor  communities  are  much  more  vulnerable  to  both 
environmental exploitation, as they have limited resources with which to pursue a 
comparative  advantage in the  global  economy,  and environmental  degradation,  as 
they have fewer resources with which to protect their populations from the effects of 
climate change and toxic pollution. Free market environmentalists rely on economic 
growth to raise the economic wealth of all, but by accepting inequalities, also accept 
limits on the poor communities’ abilities to be active in and influence the market. 
Note that it is relative, rather than absolute, poverty that makes a difference to this – 
certainly the absolutely poor cannot participate in the market,  but relative poverty 
means that market outcomes are skewed in favour of those with greater economic 
power. Thus the demands of intragenerational justice receive very little recognition in 
free market environmentalism. 
It  should also be  noted that  free market  environmentalism rests  on certain 
assumptions  with  which  many  greens  are  uncomfortable.  Free  market 
environmentalism takes preferences as indicated in the market as given.65 That is, it 
assumes that people’s preferences are sovereign, and so, if someone wants to spend 
their money on a 4x4, then there is nothing more to be said about it. The market will 
price  such  commodities  highly  if  the  ecological  costs  are  fully  included,  but  the 
individual is free to pay that price if he so desires. As argued above, it is certainly 
problematic to suggest that people do not know what is in their own long term best 
interests, and that their liberty should therefore be restricted, but it is also problematic 
64 There  is  also  the  problem,  discussed  above,  that  needs  and  wants  are  difficult  to  determine 
objectively.
65 Another important assumption free market environmentalists make is that the environment only has 
value insofar as it contributes to human welfare. This view is anathema to many greens, in particular 
ecocentrists, but one need not take an ecocentric perspective to be unpersuaded by the argument of free 
market environmentalists.
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to  accept  environmentally  damaging  behaviour  without  criticism or  comment.  By 
taking  consumer  preferences  as  sovereign,  free  market  environmentalists  do  not 
necessarily indicate any concern for,  or interest  in,  future generations. Indeed, the 
problem of discounting continues in the context of free market environmentalism. If I 
would rationally prefer £100 now rather than in ten years  time, then I might well 
rationally prefer to strip my woodland of timber for a profit and not worry about the 
next generation. The next generation, meanwhile,  does not have an opportunity to 
express their preferences in the market  place, they simply inherit the sum total of 
preferences our generation has expressed, the balance of which will also reflect the 
balance of the present generation’s spending power. In short, the most wealthy will 
get  to  decide  what  environmental  resources we bequeath to  the  future.  Thus  free 
market environmentalism offers at best an ambiguous, and an undemocratic, response 
to the demands of intergenerational justice. 
In  summary,  free  market  environmentalism  does  not  provide  convincing 
answers to the three questions that form my evaluative framework. The free market 
response to the tragedy of the commons would perhaps be effective if the technology 
became  available,  but  it  raises  serious  ethical  questions.  Free  market 
environmentalism has nothing to offer in terms of intragenerational justice, it accepts 
Adam Smith’s promise that a rising tide lifts all boats, despite the fact that Smith did 
not envisage the degree of capital mobility witnessed today (Mander 2003:113), and 
despite the fact that inequality has been increasing both within and between nations 
for the past decade (Woods 2000; Shiva 2003). And given that future generations are 
necessarily excluded from market transactions, and the market is to be the sole agent 
for  resolving  environmental  problems,  intergenerational  justice  is  also  poorly 
accommodated in free market environmentalism. 
5.3.2 Ecological modernisation
Ecological  modernisation  shares  some  features  with  free  market 
environmentalism,  in  that  it  seeks  to  harness  market  forces  to  make  progress  on 
environmental issues, but it also sees a role for government action. In this respect it 
may be thought of as a middle way,  or perhaps ‘third way’,  between free market 
environmentalism and the much more interventionist ecological economics approach. 
Ecological modernisation is particularly attractive to politicians as it essentially denies 
the purported zero-sum relationship between environmental protection and economic 
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growth, and instead emphasises the economic opportunities created by the demand for 
new  environmentally  friendly  technology.  Thus  the  ecological  modernisation 
approach  to  sustainability  promises  to  benefit  everyone  –  the  environment,  the 
economy,  and,  again  because  of  the  trickle-down  effects  of  continued  economic 
growth, people too. 
A central  claim of ecological modernisation theorists,  such as Mol (2002), 
Barry  (2003;  2006b),  is  that  environmental  sustainability  is  a  precondition  for 
economic  growth  in  the  twenty-first  century.  The  key  strategies  to  achieve 
sustainability  are  a  supply-side  focus  to  environmental  regulation,  because  post-
production solutions are held to be both inadequate and unwieldy, and to integrate 
environmental  aims  into  all  sectors  of  public  policy  (Labaras  2001:93-4).  The 
relationship  between  government  and  the  market  is  constructed  as  one  between 
problem-setter  and  problem-solver.  The  government  defines  the  goals  of 
environmental policy and the encourages the market to find ways of achieving these 
goals. So, for example, the ‘polluter pays’ principle, applied by governments, creates 
in the market an incentive for companies to find clean production methods. Acting on 
this  incentive  will  allow  companies  to  pursue  a  comparative  advantage  in  the 
marketplace,  both  domestically  and  on  a  global  scale,  as  consumers  increasingly 
demand environmentally friendly goods.
With respect  to  the tragedy of  the commons,  the benefits  of  an ecological 
modernisation  approach  are  uncertain.  There  is  nothing  intrinsic  to  ecological 
modernisation that encourages a global focus, indeed, even advocates of ecological 
modernisation have acknowledged as much:
Neither  does  ecological  modernisation  take  into  account  the  global 
dimensions of the environmental crisis, nor the need for global political 
co-operation to deal with global environmental problems. On this issue, 
ecological  modernisation  is  limited  to  being  a  domestic  approach  to 
environmental problems. (Barry 2005:316)
The  domestic  preoccupation  fits,  of  course,  with  the  political  desire  to  secure  a 
comparative  advantage in the  global  economy –  politicians  are  answerable  to  the 
present  generation  of  constituents  in  their  own  country  only,  and  voters  have  a 
justifiable concern with economic stability. But the domestic preoccupation fails to 
recognise the extent to which the global economy itself contributes to environmental 
problems. 
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Ecological  modernisation  does  not,  then,  offer  specific  answers  on  the 
question of how to avoid the tragedy of the commons. But it is clear that, where the 
political  will  to achieve an international consensus is  there,  then the principles  of 
ecological modernisation could be applied globally, to address commons type issues, 
such as climate change. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol can be studied as an example of the 
ecological modernisation approach in action – governments have agreed targets on 
carbon emissions, and have created a mechanism (tradable emissions permits) for the 
market to do what the market does best – find the most cost-effective way of meeting 
the  targets.  This  should  provide  incentives  for  the  development  of  new,  cleaner 
technology.  Setting  aside  the  problems  associated  with  the  exclusion  of  major 
polluters like the US, India and China from the agreement,66 and also setting aside 
concerns  raised  by  many  environmental  scientists  that  the  targets  are  not  nearly 
ambitious enough, there are further concerns that the trading scheme does not work as 
it was hoped. 
Trade  in  emissions  permits  within  a  country  does  not  disrupt  overall  the 
amount of emissions that the country produces. But trade in emissions rights between 
countries may well result in country A producing more emissions than country B. 
While  this  may  be  advantageous  to  country  B,  it  is  not  straightforwardly 
advantageous to the planet, for a couple of reasons. Firstly,  it does not necessarily 
promote  the  technological  innovation  hoped  for.  The  most  cost-effective  way  of 
reducing  emissions  need  not  involve  investment  in  new,  cleaner  technologies  if 
increased polluting rights can be purchased with the profits from polluting activity. 
Secondly, it does not even guarantee environmental protection. If country A has oil 
reserves in an ecologically sensitive natural wilderness, and country B has natural 
features  that  make  hydropower  a  cheap  and  viable  energy  source,  then  allowing 
country A to purchase  emissions  credits  from country B may give  country A an 
incentive to exploit its oil reserves, thereby disrupting a sensitive ecosystem. Clearly, 
in this example, the environment has not gained. Note that the deficiency is not in the 
market. The market is efficient precisely because it does not require an ‘overseer’ of 
some kind to coordinate action. The free market environmentalist is quite correct in 
arguing  that  political  or  technical  overseers  are  less  efficient  at  communicating 
information  with  different  actors  than  uncoordinated  market  prices  are.  Yet 
66 It looks likely that these countries may well be participants in the yet to be negotiated successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol (Bhat et al 2007).
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coordinated action  is  precisely  what  is  needed  to  achieve  environmental 
sustainability. 
There is also a question of ethics lurking in the background here. Suppose the 
initial allocation of trading permits across a scheme involving four countries gives an 
equal number and value of permits to each country as shown in table 1.67 At T1 each 
country has an equal right to pollute up to a certain level, which overall represents a 
reduction in the level of emissions, as shown below in table 1.68 A year on, at T2, 
trade between permit holders has altered the rights to pollute held by each country, 
such  that  some now emit  more  than  what  might  be  thought  their  ‘fair  share’  of 
pollutants.
Table 1 
Country T1 Allocation T2 Allocation
A 25 35
B 25 15
C 25 10
D 25 40
Total 100 100
Now suppose  that  the  distribution  of  initial  allocations  is  in  fact  determined,  not 
equally, nor by population size, but by a measure of the capacity that the territory of 
the country has to absorb pollutants, that is, the ecological capacity, which, in the case 
of carbon emissions, we might crudely measure in terms of the amount of land in that 
country that is covered by trees. The figures at T1 and T2 would then be as shown in 
table 2. What this means is that countries B and D use more ecological resources than 
are available within their  own territories.  They run at  an ecological deficit,  while 
countries A and C have a surplus (shown in table 2). As long as the surpluses balance 
or  outweigh  the  deficits,  then  there  is  a  sustainable  equilibrium.  The  ecological 
modernisation  approach  accepts  this.  Precisely  because  it  takes  a  supply-side 
approach, it has nothing to say about the distribution of the consumption of ecological 
resources  (Barry  2005:311).  Hence,  David  Pepper  argues  that  ecological 
modernisation  ‘is  likely  to  foster  continued  attempts  at  displacement  and 
externalisation of both environmental and social costs’ (Pepper 1998:1).
Table 2
Country Eco-capacity T1 Allocation T2 Allocation Surplus/Deficit
67 In the case of Kyoto this was not the case, but this is supposed for the sake of a simple illustration.
68 Creating a ‘right’ to pollute is itself problematic, but again, let us set this issue to one side.
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A 25 25 15 +10
B 5 5 10 -5
C 30 30 20 +10
D 40 40 55 -15
Total 100 100 100 0
Turning to the question of intragenerational justice, though, this is a matter of 
concern.  Ecological  modernisation  relies  on  the  idea  of  being  able  to  pursue  a 
comparative advantage in the global economy to make progress on environmental 
issues. That presupposes inequality. Inequality per se may not be a bad thing, indeed, 
natural inequality is inescapable – nature has distributed some ecological resources 
unevenly. But it was claimed above that substantial economic inequality is a factor in 
the unequal distribution of environmental  harms. Insofar as this  claim is justified, 
ecological  modernisation  may  further  contribute  to,  rather  than  eliminate,  the 
displacement of environmental harms to poorer countries, especially where ecological 
modernisation policy maintains a domestic focus. Moreover, by accepting inequality 
in terms of the amount of ecological resources that can be consumed, tied to relative 
economic power,  the ecological  modernisation approach accepts,  indeed,  endorses, 
considerable injustice within the present generation. In effect, the poor still have very 
limited opportunities to express their preferences in the market. 
On  the  question  of  intergenerational  justice,  the  results  are  more  positive. 
Advocates of ecological modernisation typically give enthusiastic endorsement to the 
precautionary principle, which requires proof that a given product is safe before that 
product can be made available on the market. Where the evidence is disputed, the 
product cannot legitimately be made available. Thus, even though future generations 
cannot express a preference in the market, the acceptance of this element of political 
interference in the market allows the interests of future generations to be safeguarded, 
provided the political will is there. This acceptance of limited political interference in 
the  market  indicates  a  key  difference  between  ecological  modernisation  and  free 
market  environmentalism.  That  said,  where  the  solution  to  the  tragedy  of  the 
commons  proposed  by  free  market  environmentalists  was  clear,  the  ecological 
modernisation  approach  to this  problem was  less  certain.  Thus  there  is  cause  for 
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concern as to whether an ecological modernisation approach could guarantee future 
generations the ecological inheritance they might wish for. 
In  summary,  the ecological  modernisation approach also cannot adequately 
answer the three questions that form my evaluative framework. The benefits of the 
hybrid  strategy  of  government-set  market-achieved  goals  to  protect  the  global 
commons looked uncertain. While there was a clear commitment to intergenerational 
justice, the question of intragenerational justice was largely ignored in the ecological 
modernisation  model.  Moreover,  like  free  market  environmentalism,  ecological 
modernisation implicitly accepts the ‘right’ (if it may be called that) of some countries 
to run an ecological deficit, which clearly must be at the expense of other countries. 
Finally, ecological modernisation does not challenge, but rather embraces, the export-
led growth model of development that neoliberal economics encourages, and which 
has to date has led consistently to the increased consumption of ecological resources. 
This, it seems to me, is not a robust understanding of environmental sustainability.
5.3.3 Ecological economics
Ecological economics is by far the most radical (in terms of most strikingly 
different from currently prevalent  ideas about economic organisation)  of the three 
approaches considered here. While both free market environmentalists and ecological 
modernisation advocates accept some of the key principles of neoliberal economics, 
for example, that growth is good for the economy, that growth should be measured in 
terms of total economic activity, and that growth is potentially limitless (given the 
right  technology),  ecological  economists,  such as  Martinez-Alier  and Schlupmann 
(1991), Gowdy (2000; 2003), take a very different approach. They question growth as 
the central goal of economic policy, reject undifferentiated growth as a measure of 
well-being, and recognise limits to growth insofar as countries are enjoined to live 
within their ecological capacity. If there is to be growth in the economy it must be 
separated from physical growth (Goodland 1995). This is also an aim of ecological 
modernisation, but whereas ecological modernisation expects the market to find ways 
of  growing  the  economy  without  increasing  the  material  throughput,69 ecological 
economics proposes the setting of a ‘sustainability boundary’, to be determined by the 
ecological capacity of the country. The economy must not then be allowed to surpass 
69 The amount of material resources extracted from the environment, converted into products, and then 
into post-consumer waste.
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that  boundary.  Thus one of the key prisms of analysis  is  the ecological ‘carrying 
capacity’ of either the earth as a whole, or a particular state.
Practically,  Goodland  and  Daly  (1996:1004-1005)  propose  that  economic 
management  focus  on  maintaining  natural  capital  for  future  generations,  but,  as 
discussed above, a more robust account of sustainability would focus on the integrity 
of the ecosystem. This can be achieved by ‘using key environmental indicators to 
define the level of environmental capacity’ (Jacobs 1991:95),70 and then, through a 
mixture  of  regulation and tax  incentives  ‘constraining the  economic  behaviour  of 
firms and households’  such that  the boundary is  not  breached (Labaras  2001:90). 
Jacobs, refers to this two-stage process as ‘sustainability planning’. The political level 
at which sustainability planning takes place depends on the impact that a particular 
issue  has  (Jacobs  1991:97).  To  return  to  a  couple  of  earlier  examples,  carbon 
emissions have a global rather than a local impact, so global planning is necessary. 
The problem of over-fishing in a particular river, on the other hand, can be resolved 
by local planning. This flexibility as to the political level at which decisions are made 
is described by E.F. Schumacher as ‘appropriateness’ (Dobson 2000:106), and has 
significant implications for political institutional arrangements, as will be discussed in 
chapter 6. A reflexive approach to policy is also mandated, since the integrity of the 
ecosystem must be continually monitored,  and the sustainability boundary revised, 
where necessary, to sustain the environment as technological innovation, population 
levels,  and  other  variables,  fluctuate.  Like  ecological  modernisation  advocates, 
proponents of ecological economics endorse the precautionary principle, but unlike 
those  in  favour  of  ecological  modernisation,  ecological  economists  also  engage 
directly with questions of consumer demand, and in particular the scale of economic 
activity relative to ecological capacity (Daly 2006). Thus while it is recognised that a 
great  deal  can  be  achieved  by  improving  the  efficiency  of  energy-consuming 
products,  such as  cars,  and finding new and more efficient  ways  to recycle  post-
consumer  waste,  not  using  a  car  and  avoiding  waste  altogether  is  considered 
preferable to efficiency improvements or recycling. 
Looking at our three question framework, the solution to the tragedy of the 
commons is clear – sustainability planning can feasibly be expected to protect the 
70 The scientific  capability  is  for  the  most  part  there  for  this.  Ecologists  use  the  presence of  key 
‘indicator species’ to determine the health of a river. At the global level, the IPCC, a global consortium 
of scientists producing peer-reviewed studies,  could provide the kind of information that would be 
needed to set a sustainability boundary.
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commons. This also serves intergenerational justice well, which is further enhanced 
by ensuring that the present generation does not live beyond its ecological means. 
With  respect  to  intragenerational  justice,  ecological  economics  also  has  much  to 
recommend it in that it pays detailed attention to the distribution of both consumption 
of environmental resources and environmental wastes. Thus we would not expect to 
find poorer communities disproportionately suffering from environmental degradation 
as we do now. 
That said, there are also a number of questions unanswered. In particular, it is 
unclear  what  level  of  welfare  poorer  countries  could  expect  within  an  ecological 
economics  framework.  Although  ecological  economics  does  not  exclude  growth, 
markets are to be severely restricted; growth is only permissible when achieved in 
ways that do not increase material throughput, and annual growth rates are expected 
to be much less than the 3% that is conventionally thought to be quite healthy. This 
closes  one  door  to  economic  development  for  much  of  the  Third  World.  The 
alternative, perhaps, is redistribution of wealth, or at the very least welfare, in terms of 
technology  transfer,  education,  and  almost  certainly  a  relaxation  of  patents  of 
medicines and agricultural products. That may be more realistic as a means to ending 
poverty – a recent New Economic Foundation (NEF) study (2006) suggested that 
poverty-reduction  pursued  through  conventional  economic  growth  is  likely  to  be 
ecologically disastrous over the long term – but there is limited political will for such 
action in Europe and even less in the USA, and in developing countries there may be 
justifiable suspicion at having welfare defined by others on their behalf.  A further 
problem is that sustainability planning, a central strategy of ecological economics, 
may lack political appeal in view of the Soviet experience of planned economies. The 
planning implied here is closer to management of human-environment relations than 
the setting of production (and consumption) targets practised in the former Soviet 
bloc. Ecological economics does not eschew markets  per se, but the market is to be 
heavily regulated, and the ecological limits of permissible material growth are clearly 
defined. This would be likely to have the effect of eliminating a considerable amount 
of  global  trade,  for  example,  in  products  that  can  be  made  domestically,  and  in 
agriculture,  the  transport  costs  of  importing  food  stuffs  out  of  season  would  be 
substantial. 
These latter points highlight a further problem. Sustainability planning would 
depend on public and political support for its effectiveness to a far greater extent than 
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either free market environmentalism or ecological modernisation. The transition from 
growth-led economies to sustainability planning as the organising principle of both 
domestic and international economies would be extraordinarily difficult, and would 
mean overturning the fundamental principles that underpin both national economic 
policies in Europe, and the policies of international financial institutions such as the 
IMF and the WTO. At present there is neither the political will nor public appetite for 
such radical and far-reaching change. It is also difficult to see how one country or 
even a small coalition of countries could move towards sustainability planning on 
their own, without facing economic collapse. In short, ecological economics demands 
a strong, and global or near global consensus on the necessity of working towards a 
strong  model  of  sustainability  that,  at  present,  is  conspicuously  absent.  For  this 
reason, Labaras (2001:92) describes ecological economics as ‘incomplete’, providing, 
as it does, a near utopian vision, without any clues as to how it might be achieved.
In summary, then, ecological economics provides a convincing model  of a 
sustainable economy that can protect the global commons and meet the demands of 
intergenerational justice as well as at least some of the demands of intragenerational 
justice.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  less  politically  viable,  at  present,  than  the 
alternatives studied here.  Contrary to Labaras’  conclusion, this seems to me to be 
reason  for  further  research,  rather  than  abandoning  the  idea.  Detailed  economic 
analysis of a transition to an economy organised around the principles of ecological 
economics  is  beyond  the  scope of  this  thesis.  But  green theorists  have suggested 
innovations in political institutions that could orchestrate a growth in public support 
for such a transition. These potential political strategies are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
5.4 Conclusion
The features of a definition of environmental sustainability as identified here 
can  be  summarised  as  follows:  Firstly,  environmental  sustainability  requires  an 
ontological perspective in which humans are understood to be ecologically embedded 
beings. On the other hand, it does not necessarily require a commitment to the belief 
that nature has intrinsic value. Thus, environmental sustainability can be adequately 
theorised from an anthropocentric perspective. Secondly, neither a clear, nor a robust 
definition  of  sustainability  emerges  from  differentiating  needs  and  wants,  and 
prioritising the needs of future generations over the wants of the present.  A more 
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useful approach, in the sense of being clearly intelligible and translatable into policy 
goals, is Norton’s idea of the integrity of the ecosystem as a standard by which to 
assess models of environmental sustainability. 
Of course,  the integrity  of  the ecosystem will  in  part  be a  function of  the 
stresses to which it  is  exposed, hence the third area studied here was the specific 
problems associated with a global market economy. These were analysed to yield a 
three-question framework for analysing three models of sustainability;  free market 
environmentalism,  ecological  modernisation,  and  ecological  economics.  Given  its 
focus on the scale of the economy and the ecological capacity of the environment, 
ecological economics was found to offer the most persuasive answers to the issues of 
addressing the tragedy of the commons and the problem of discounting, the demands 
of intergenerational justice, and intragenerational justice. 
The political  implications  of  adopting ecological  economics  as  a  model  of 
sustainability  included  affirming  the  principle  of  ‘appropriateness’  in  deciding  at 
which political level decisions are to be made, and reflexiveness as standard attitude 
to  policy  decisions.  It  is  clear  that  the  ecological  economics  approach  mandates 
substantial changes to living patterns and economic organisation, as well as political 
institutions, and the transitional path from a global market economy organised around 
neoliberal  principles  to  an  economy  organised  on  the  principles  of  ecological 
economics remains unspecified. This, I argued, suggests the need for further research, 
rather than to abandon the idea. But I also suggested there is little evidence at present 
for public or political appetite for such fundamental change, therefore one of the tasks 
of theorists of environmental sustainability is to explore the ways in which political 
institutions might be reformed in order to foster support for such a robust model of 
sustainability.  The focus of  the next  chapter,  therefore,  is  green interpretations  of 
citizenship, democracy, and justice. 
137
Chapter 6: The politics of environmental sustainability: 
Citizenship, democracy, and justice
In  the previous chapter  I  argued that  an ecological economics approach to 
sustainability was in principle the most persuasive one. Ecological economists argue 
that there are physical limits to the material throughput that the planet can sustain, and 
that patterns of production and consumption need to be modified so as to be brought 
within these limits. It is important to note that such limits are not fixed, however. 
They are variable in relation to the size of the human population, the level of welfare 
that the population expects or requires, and the level of technological development. 
Nevertheless,  ecological  economists  stress  that  a  vision  of  human  development 
predicated on ever-continuing economic growth is fundamentally misguided. Thus, 
changes in our economic relations are both necessary and inevitable – if we do not 
make such changes voluntarily, it is feared that increasing environmental degradation 
will precipitate ecological conditions that will significantly disrupt current patterns of 
living (see chapter 2). 
Two questions, then, seem to be in need of an answer: Firstly, what political 
arrangements would adequately ground a sustainable society? Secondly, how do we 
get  there  from  here?  Pursuing  answers  to  these  two  questions  has  caused  green 
theorists some difficulties. Many utopian visions of a sustainable future characterised 
by harmonious relations between nature and humans, and humans and humans, have 
been published and debated within green theory (de Geus 1999;  Bookchin 1987). 
They have also been attacked for their very utopianism (see Pepper 2005). On the 
other  hand,  those  taking  an  incremental  approach  to  realising  environmental 
sustainability (by proposing policies that would reform our current institutions) have 
been  rejected  because  they  risk  co-optation  and  arguably  advocate  a  shallow 
reformism that is inadequate to the challenge posed (Hancock 2003). 
Given  this  quagmire  of  debate,  what  I  present  here  is  a  discussion  of  the 
principles of  citizenship, democracy, and justice, as they have been (re-)interpreted in 
green theory.  The aim is to  critically  engage currently  dominant political models, 
principally liberal democracy, as well as appraise green conceptions of the political 
conditions for environmental sustainability. That is not to say that there is a unified 
green vision of what are the appropriate models of citizenship, democracy, and justice 
for sustainability. The present chapter explores a selection of recent proposals for new 
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ways of understanding the enduring concepts of citizenship, democracy, and justice, 
that have long been seen as corner stones of political institutions. The deliberative 
democrat is held to be more likely to advocate environmentally sustainable decisions, 
while  the  debates  in  the  literature  over  how citizenship  is  best  understood  point 
towards a desire on the part of green theorists to link environmental duties with the 
ecological footprint. Rights, however, are not emphasised, which, I argue, undermines 
claims  that  environmental  politics  can  foster  social  justice.  Thus  theories  of 
citizenship also have implications for green theories of justice, which are the subject 
of the final section of this chapter. 
6.1 Greening Citizenship
Green  interpretations  of  citizenship  are  many  and  varied.  In  addition  to 
competing accounts of the duties and virtues of green citizenship, distinctions are also 
drawn between weaker and stronger versions, characterised as ‘environmental’ versus 
‘ecological’  citizenship  by  Andrew  Dobson  (2003),  or  ‘environmental’  versus 
‘sustainability’  citizenship  by  John  Barry  (2006a),  ‘passive’  versus  ‘active’  by 
Graham Smith (2004). Although there are differences between the three contrasts, 
broadly speaking, the former category in each case is seen as a model of citizenship 
that  does  not  engage critically  with prevailing norms or  institutions,  but  modifies 
behaviour in response to either economic incentives or legal restrictions. The latter 
category entails a more wholesale change, not only in behaviour but also in values. It 
is  this  latter  model  of  citizenship  that  is  generally  seen  to  be  connected  with 
deliberative democracy. While behaviour might be changed by fiscal policies such as 
a tax on plastic bags, it is impossible to tell whether the change in behaviour has been 
accompanied  by  a  change  in  values,  or,  if  the  tax  were  withdrawn,  the 
environmentally sustainable behaviour (not using a new plastic bag for each visit to 
the  shops)  would also discontinue  (Dobson and Bell  2006:3).  On the  other hand, 
advocates of deliberative democracy (and citizenship education71) regard part of its 
appeal  as  being  the  capacity  to  change  values,  with  changes  in  behaviour 
spontaneously following. Whereas the passive citizen responds to ‘altered incentive 
structures’  to  consume  less  and  recycle  more;  the  active  citizen  participates  in 
71 Citizenship education, mostly directed at school children, has been the subject of considerable debate 
among green scholars in recent years. I touch on this debate only tangentially in what follows, leaving 
it to others to consider the desirable scope and content of citizenship education, and its relationship to 
the (green) state. For a discussion of these issues, see Bell (2004).
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political decision-making, either through deliberative forums, or through collective 
action to effect institutional change (Smith 2004:144). Barry (2006a:33) adds that it is 
not just a right, but a duty, of sustainability citizens, to engage in the latter type of 
activities. 
Some  feminists  have  at  this  point  raised  doubts  about  the  literature  on 
environmental  citizenship.  As  well  as  speaking  in  rather  hackneyed  terms  of 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ virtues, where the masculine virtue is ‘wildness’ and the 
feminine virtue is ‘caring’,72 greens have also been guilty of failing to take note of 
earlier  feminist  criticism  of  republican,  and  particularly  Aristotelian,  notions  of 
citizenship,  from  which  John  O’Neill  (1993)  and  James  Connelly  (2006)  draw 
inspiration. Sherilyn MacGregor complains of green citizenship theorists in general:
They  assume  a  gender-neutral  citizen  and  a  gender-neutral  model  of 
citizenship  practice  that  mask  the  realities  and  specificities  of  gender 
inequality while depending on a division of labour that frees autonomous 
citizens to participate in the public domain. (MacGregor 2006:106)
An example of this tendency is evident in the duty to respond ‘passively’ to altered 
incentive structures in the economy (that would tend towards a re-intensification of 
labour processes, especially in the domestic sphere), whilst simultaneously ‘actively’ 
participating  in  time-consuming  deliberative  forums  for  decision-making.  This 
conundrum leads some to wonder ‘who will be minding the kids?’, in Mary O’Brien’s 
phrase (quoted in MacGregor 2006:110). There is also an invidious tendency among 
some  environmentalists  to  regard  the  problem  of  overpopulation  as  a  problem 
concerning  only  women  (Wissenburg  1998:84).  But  what  is  of  most  concern  to 
feminist commentators is not the chauvinism of a male-dominated discipline (irksome 
though that is), but rather, that green theorists of citizenship have been blind to the 
structural inequalities that the emphasis on citizenship responsibilities may come to 
mask and re-entrench. Moreover, the focus on duties rather than rights devalues the 
rights-based mechanisms that  have been developed (and fought for)  to underwrite 
equality in society. As will be discussed below, it cannot be assumed that deliberative 
democracy will be blind to inequalities in society. Therefore, strong rights to equal 
72 I  grant  that  some  ecofeminists  have  also  emphasised  so-called  feminine  virtues  of  caring  and 
compassion, and have argued on this basis that women are better at being environmentally friendly 
than men. I agree with Eckersley (1992) that this argument is misguided. MacGregor (2006) stresses 
the oft-made point that the idea of women as caring mistakes a socialised disposition for a natural 
predisposition.
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treatment  would  seem  to  be  an  important  mechanism  for  ensuring  an  equitable 
distribution of duties. 
Duty does indeed loom large in green theories of citizenship. Connelly claims 
that ‘[e]cological citizenship is not characterised by rights but by the self-imposed 
duties of the citizen’ (Connelly 2006:63). This contrast between rights and duties is 
frequently held to be one of the defining features of green citizenship as opposed to 
liberal democratic citizenship. The liberal democratic citizen is characterised as one 
whose relationship to the community is determined by the possession of certain rights, 
and who enters the community in order to further his own privately determined ends, 
with regard to which the state (or government of the community) is neutral (de-Shalit 
2000:104).  In the republican tradition in citizenship, on the other hand,  there is  a 
‘focus on deeper reciprocity between rights and duties’ (Connelly 2006:63). In other 
words,  the entitlement  to the rights  afforded by the community is  to  some extent 
dependent upon the performance of certain duties. This relationship is constitutive of 
the  republican  community  insofar  as  it  is  conceived  as  a  communal  enterprise, 
whereas  the  liberal  democratic  ‘community’  affords  opportunities  for  individual 
enterprise and is indifferent to the goals of each of its members, unless those goals 
threaten the ability of others to pursue their ends. Thus in liberal democracies there is 
a reciprocal tolerance, and the emphasis is on rights rather than duties. Some sceptics 
of the idea of environmental human rights base their criticism on the egotism of a 
rights-based culture, which, so the argument goes, leads to a disregard of our impacts 
on  others  (people  and  non-human  beings),  and  absolves  us  of  our  reciprocal 
responsibilities (see chapter 7).
6.1.1 Stewardship
Terence Ball (2001) proposes the green virtue of what he calls ‘punctuated 
reciprocity’,  whereby duties  to  others  do  not  depend  upon  standing  in  reciprocal 
relations  with  them.  Instead,  we have a  duty  as  members  of  an  intergenerational 
community  to  provide  for  future  generations,  just  as  we  would  wish  that  future 
generations had provided for us. Such a norm, if widely fostered, would serve as a 
corrective to the practice of discounting the future, discussed in chapter 5. Punctuated 
reciprocity  also  invokes  a  particular  model  of  community  that  again  stands  in 
opposition or contradiction to the liberal democratic one. Ball sees the community in 
something approaching Burkean terms (although the communitarianism of Burke is 
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not necessarily implied),  as an ongoing enterprise across generations that  stand in 
‘asymmetrical’ relations to each other with regard to the duties and rights each can 
exercise. The idea of the community as ‘stewards’ rather than ‘sovereigns’ has also 
been proposed by Robin Attfield (1998), which again has implications for the practice 
of  discounting.  Whereas  a  sovereign  authority  may  choose  not  to  discount  the 
interests,  or  ‘rights’  if  there  be  any,  of  future  generations,  the  steward  is  not  so 
entitled. The relationship between the steward and its heirs is not, and could not be, 
reciprocal, but there is nevertheless a duty on the part of the steward not to discount 
the  heirs’  interests  or  rights.73 A  further  endorsement  of  stewardship  comes from 
Barry (2002) who proposes ‘ecological stewardship’ as a virtue-based approach to 
green citizenship, which, he argues, should be understood as a reflexive practice for 
coping with the ongoing task of managing human-environment relations in a way that 
necessarily links present activities to future generations.
There is, as Edward Page (2006:115-117) notes, a ‘motivational assumption’ 
present in all of these accounts of environmental stewardship, which is that people 
have  a  sentimental  concern  for  and  interest  in  future  generations,  often,  but  not 
exclusively, of their own families. What this means for citizens is that they are not 
free to pursue their own interests without regard to the interests of others, rather, they 
have a duty, for the sake of their grandchildren, not to be the self-interested rational 
egotist of neoliberal economic theory, but instead to act to preserve the integrity of the 
environment. I argue below, in section 6.3, that this is an important alternative to self-
interest, which is insufficient as a motivational force for maintaining environmental 
integrity when generations do not overlap, but the stewardship argument is vulnerable 
to the charge that people do not, in fact, care about future generations.
A further problem with the stewardship model is whether citizens can be said 
to have duties in virtue of benefits they receive non-voluntarily (Page 2006:123). For 
example, if I inherit a cat from a friend, though I did not ask to receive this cat, and in 
fact dislike cats, then it is not self-evident that I ought to keep the cat and look after it, 
simply because I was given this ‘benefit’. However, it may be possible to overcome 
the non-voluntary benefit problem if, adapting Thomas Pogge’s approach to human 
rights (see chapter 4), the duty to act as an environmental steward is cast in terms of 
negative  rather  than positive duties.  A full  elaboration of  this  proposal  is  not  the 
73 I leave open here the question of whether future generations can have rights. For a discussion of this 
question, see Attfield (1998). I also discuss the issue briefly in chapter 7.
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subject of this thesis, however, a brief sketch can be given of the type of citizenship 
duties involved.  A negative duty not  to diminish the integrity  of  the environment 
would  be  less  onerous  than  positive  duties  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the 
environment,  since  it  would  require  only that  environmental  citizens  refrain  from 
engaging  in  environmentally  destructive  behaviour.74 A  positive  duty  to  act  as 
stewards, on the other hand, would require citizens to act in particular ways, such as 
participate in deliberative forums or engage in community sustainability work, and so 
on. 
The  positive/negative  distinction  does  not  follow  the  same  lines  as  the 
distinctions noted above between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ models of citizenship, since 
the citizen as steward is not passively responding to altered incentive structures, but 
rather,  is  actively  pursuing  a  particular  way  of  living  that  avoids  contributing  to 
environmental  degradation.  Should  individual  citizens  find  that  they  cannot  avoid 
failing to honour their negative duty not to diminish the integrity of the environment, 
then  derivative  compensatory  obligations  might  follow,  such  that,  in  practice, 
environmental  citizens  might  find  that  they  are  after  all  obliged  to  engage  in 
deliberative forums or sustainability work. But unlike Pogge’s negative duty not to 
contribute to the underfulfilment of human rights, it is not impossible to honour one’s 
negative duty as environmental steward. This might be achieved by living sustainably, 
for example, buying locally grown organic produce, living in carbon neutral homes, 
using  public  transport,  etc.,  or  perhaps  by  living  in  an  eco-anarchist  community, 
though, as I argue below, it is not, in my view, desirable, that this latter option be the 
only way of discharging one’s citizenship duties. 
In any case, the stewardship model of citizenship is capable of being endorsed 
from a  variety  of  perspectives  and being  adapted  to  different  models  of  political 
organisation.  On  the  other  hand,  both  communitarian  citizenship  and  post-
cosmopolitan  citizenship  imply  particular  models  of  community  that  depart 
substantially from contemporary norms.
74 However, positive action to improve a relatively poor environmental inheritance would fall beyond 
this obligation, hence it might not yield a strong model of sustainability if the starting position were 
poor. 
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6.1.2 Communitarian citizenship
Avner de-Shalit endorses Michael Jacobs’ observation that ‘[l]iberalism […] 
fails to explain to people the relationship between social goods and their own well-
being’ (de-Shalit 2000:93); de-Shalit therefore rejects liberal democracy in favour of 
communitarian socialism, inspired in part by the Rousseauian model of small rural 
communities mentioned above, and in part by the experience of work collectives such 
as the Israeli kibbutz. ‘Socialism’, he explains, ‘is a theory of community as collective 
action, with citizenship being attuned to this collective action’ (de-Shalit 2000:199). 
Thus part of being a citizen is working for the common good of the community.75 
Community is defined here as ‘a process of collective reflection on ideas and identity’ 
(de-Shalit 2000:110). So citizenship also involves engagement with, and renegotiation 
of, notions of the identity of the community, as well as reflection on and collective 
deliberation about how the community should live. 
It is this process of reflection and deliberation, that, according to de-Shalit, 
saves his model of communitarian socialism from some of the standard criticisms of 
communitarianism.  Communitarian  societies  have  often  been  thought  insular  and 
potentially oppressive to anyone who does not embrace the majority vision of the 
common good. Marcel Wissenburg warns that:
Green communitarianism would be the nightmare of Utopia come true. It 
would be a world of fear – fear for new techniques, developments and 
ideas, fear for environmental risks and dangers, fear for one’s neighbours. 
To ensure that  a communitarian society would conform to a particular 
ideal  of  the  environmentally  friendly  sustainable  society,  important 
liberties  would  have  to  be  curtailed.  […]At  any  rate,  the  freedom  to 
transform  society  away  from  the  ideal  would  be  gone.  (Wissenburg 
1998:224-225) 
De-Shalit  disagrees.  By putting collective reflection at  the centre of  his model  of 
community, he argues that the community is constituted by an openness to debate and 
ideas and therefore will not become oppressive. Ideas or beliefs are subjected to the 
critical evaluation of citizens, and citizens only ‘rationally endorse’ the ideas of the 
community if they are seen to be rational. Reasoned commitment to shared ideals is 
75 Page (2006:120) suggests that the environmental credentials of communitarianism are weaker than 
de-Shalit believes since it is the survival of the community that matters, which may impede cooperation 
across communities that affirm different values, which of course is crucial to resolving global issues 
such as climate change.
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the test of membership of the community, thus de-Shalit’s communitarianism escapes 
also the ‘harsh partiality’ of communities where belonging is based on ethnicity, race, 
or some other historical connection.
Therefore, it can be said that this is not a model of community vulnerable 
to the liberal critique of communitarianism, i.e. that it treats the ‘other’  or 
some  minorities  as  not  equal.  Not  only  are  the  institutions  open  to 
procedures that allow minorities to express themselves, but minorities are 
encouraged to do so, since the majority needs its beliefs to be questioned 
in order to maintain their vitality. (de-Shalit 2000:111)
This  last  claim – that  the  majority  needs its  beliefs  to  be  questioned in order  to 
maintain their vitality – is surely a proposition John Stuart Mill could readily endorse, 
being, as it is, entirely consistent with his defence of free speech. Thus it would seem 
that liberalism is not so morally bankrupt after all. But it is difficult to believe that the 
majority  would  benevolently  insist  on  having  their  beliefs  questioned  so  as  to 
maintain vitality without recourse to a rights-based mechanism to defend the minority 
if they questioned beliefs more vigorously than the majority cared for. Or perhaps 
Wissenburg (above) is being too sceptical; it may be that, were a committed group of 
communitarian socialists to form a community,  it  would turn out to be a positive 
Utopia that not only tolerated but encouraged difference. The empirical evidence is 
limited; some small eco-anarchist communities do exist, but it is not clear from this 
how  plural  societies  could  easily  organise  themselves  in  this  way.  Alan  Carter 
(1999:255-272) points to anthropological studies of tribal societies to argue that a 
society  of  eco-anarchist  communities  would  readily  accommodate  difference  by 
periodically changing composition; those who found they were not accepted by the 
majority  in one community could simply move to another.  This  is  not  a solution 
likely to persuade liberals such as Wissenburg. 
6.1.3 Post-cosmopolitan citizenship
Dobson’s work on citizenship has another take on the debate about the nature 
of the political community, which takes another view of the motivation to discharge 
one’s environmental duties. He argues that a special feature of globalisation is that 
many of the decisions we make impact on the lives of other people who we may not 
think of as members of our community, and of whom we may not even be aware 
(Dobson 2003:ch.1). As discussed in chapter 2, globalisation is an unequal process of 
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interactions:  the power that  some people in wealthier  countries have to influence, 
however  unwittingly,  the  lives  of  others  in  poorer  countries,  is  generally  not 
reciprocated. The most common medium through which such power is expressed is 
market  transactions.  In  view  of  the  impact  that  market  externalities  have  on  the 
environment,  and that  environmental  degradation has  on  the  global  poor,  Dobson 
argues that ‘we’ are ‘always already’ in relationships of justice with the poor, in virtue 
of the harm inflicted on them by markets and the global institutions that support them. 
Put  simply,  ‘the  ecological  footprint  produces  political  relations  by  producing 
circumstances of justice’ (Dobson 2006a:448). 
Dobson (2006b) is clearly sympathetic to Pogge’s account of the demands of 
justice  to  the  global  poor,  but  rather  than  constructing  a  more  onerous  model  of 
human rights,  as  Pogge  does  (see  chapter  4),  Dobson  grounds  his  proposals  for 
achieving justice in the duties of a new type of citizenship – post-cosmopolitan. The 
post-cosmopolitan community is created by the patterns of harm that globalisation 
weaves:
post-cosmopolitan citizenship’s ‘community’ is created by the ‘historical’ 
or  (better)  ‘always  already’  obligations  of  globalization.  This  differs 
markedly from the ideal and discursive boundaries of cosmopolitanism in 
its (post-cosmopolitanism’s) rooting of the space of citizenship in ‘global 
actualities rather than transcendent principles’. (Dobson 2003:81)
For  Dobson,  this  account  of  citizenship  represents  an  improvement  over 
cosmopolitanism because it rests on a stronger motivation for action. Cosmopolitan 
obligations are generated by our shared humanity. The duty to take action to assist 
those in distress is therefore the duty of the good Samaritan – in short, cosmopolitans 
say one should help others because individuals have equal moral standing and because 
one  is  able  to  help.  In  post-cosmopolitanism,  on  the  other  hand,  obligations  are 
generated  by  a  prior  action  that  has  caused  harm.  So,  whereas  cosmopolitanism 
implies obligations to all mankind,
[p]ost-cosmopolitanism’s  rootedness  in  identifiable  relations  of  actual 
harm, in contrast, limits obligations to those implicit  in these relations. 
These  may still  be  extensive  and demanding,  as  in the  case  of  global 
warming. But this very example makes clear that obligations are not those 
of ‘all humankind’ since not all humankind contributes unsustainably to 
global warming. (Dobson 2003:81) 
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The burden of responsibility for action to counter global warming falls most 
heavily on those who have contributed to it. The model post-cosmopolitan citizen is 
not, then, the good Samaritan, but rather, the perpetrator of an injustice who readily 
seeks  to  redress  the  harm done.  Dobson  (2006b)  characterises  this  motivation  as 
‘political’  rather  than  ‘moral’  because  it  is  a  relationship  of  justice,  rather  than 
benevolence. While benevolence requires us to be humanitarians and respond to need, 
justice requires us to take account of the extent to which the need we encounter is our 
fault.  More  importantly,  the  individual  has  a  choice  about  whether  or  not  to  be 
benevolent,  but  cannot  legitimately  choose  to  be  unjust.  However,  recognising 
someone as a ‘recipient of justice’ (in Dobson’s phrase) is itself a moral issue, resting 
on moral claims about what it is to be a human. To claim that humans are ‘always 
already’ in relationships of justice is also implicitly to claim that all humans are equal 
and that one owes justice to those who are one’s equals. The argument of those who 
reject cosmopolitanism is that non-citizens are not the moral equals of citizens of a 
particular  community.  Indeed,  some  claim  that,  while  all  humans  are  entitled  to 
certain basic goods, our duties to fellow citizens are stronger than our duties to non-
citizens, thus, discounting the interests of outsiders is legitimate, because the interests 
of those within the community take precedence. For Dobson, on the contrary,  the 
relevant  political  relationship  is  not  shared  membership  of  a  political  community 
defined in terms of nations or states, but rather, the relationship between perpetrator 
and victim of harm.
I  want  to  suggest  the  possibility  of  unreciprocated and unilateral 
citizenship obligations, and to claim that this type of obligation is both 
definitive  of  ‘post-cosmopolitan  citizenship’,  as  well  as  that  which 
distinguishes  it  most  obviously  from  liberal  citizenship  and  from  the 
reciprocity of civic republican citizenship. (Dobson 2003:47)
The possibility of unreciprocated and unilateral obligations has some attractions, not 
least those indicated above when discussing Ball’s idea of ‘punctuated reciprocity’. 
But  linking  these  obligations  to  past  harms,  rather  than  encouraging  them 
independently, raises some problems. 
Firstly, Hayward suggests that if citizenship is restricted to those who have 
caused  harms,  then  the  victims  of  ecological  harms  are  non-citizens.  Dobson 
(2006a:449) responds that this apparent inequality is only a problem if you regard 
citizenship as ‘status’ rather than as ‘practice’. Citizenship as practice is Dobson’s 
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concern, the status of being a post-cosmopolitan ecological citizen indicates that you 
have caused harm, it is not, therefore, a ‘status’ people would ordinarily covet. Not 
everyone will have citizenship duties, or not all the time, nor equally, because some 
are  more  responsible  for  environmental  problems  than  others.  The  burdens  of 
environmental citizenship fall most heavily on those most (historically) responsible. 
Hayward rightly points out that ‘we do need to know how ecological citizens are to be 
identified’ (Hayward 2006:439), and on this matter Dobson is unclear. Dobson claims 
that anyone who has been complicit in causing ecological harm has an obligation to 
engage in citizenship practices. But what if people refuse? Their peers might try to 
shame them into action, but this will not succeed if the prevalent opinion in society 
permits  one to shun one’s  ecological  duties,  a  situation not  beyond the realms of 
possibility.  Dobson  (2006a)  explicitly  regards  citizenship  as  a  horizontal,  not  a 
vertical, relationship which implies an absence of an authority common to all citizens 
that could compel recalcitrant citizens to undertake their duties. A further question is 
what duties might fall on the descendants of people who do not fulfil their citizenship 
obligations.  Dobson  speaks  of  a  ‘historical  community  of  obligation’  (Dobson 
2003:81). Applied beyond the realm of environmental issues, this might be taken to 
imply, for example, that the present descendants of former slave owners should pay 
reparations to the descendants of slaves. Whether or not that should be the case is not 
a question I wish to pursue here. Rather, my point is that Dobson’s argument leaves 
unclear who precisely will be environmental citizens. 
Secondly, if citizenship practices are unilaterally undertaken, then the role of 
the victim continues to be passive,  indeed, cannot be otherwise. Put differently, if 
someone crashed into my car, I would want him to pay for the repairs. But I would be 
thought naïve if I trusted the reckless driver to diligently attend to the repairs himself. 
I would want to be able to press my legitimate claim against him. In short, I would 
want to be able to exercise rights.  Dobson speculates briefly on the possibility of 
extending existing notions of human rights to include environmental rights (2003:90-
93), but he characterises citizenship practices as duties rather than rights, and does not 
seem to recognise a specific need for victims of ecological injustice to be able to press 
rights claims on those responsible for ecological harm. This deficiency leads to a third 
problem. Dobson (2003:34-35) claims that his citizenship proposals are informed by a 
feminist ideology. I take this to indicate that he is conscious of the way that power 
structures in society can serve to disenfranchise people who are theoretical equals. It 
148
is  all  the more surprising then that he is  not alert  to the extent to which his own 
proposals  may  be  disenfranchising.  Though  he  would  certainly  not  support  the 
‘winners’ of globalisation having any more power over the fate of the ‘losers’, by 
placing responsibility for addressing ecological injustice in the hands of those who 
caused it, he re-entrenches their power over the lives of those who have been harmed. 
Furthermore, by emphasising the unilateral duties of the powerful whilst apparently 
undervaluing the rights of the weak, he denies the weak the tools they need to reclaim 
power over their own lives and define for themselves what justice demands. If the 
extent  to  which  redress  is  justly  required  is  determined  by  those  responsible  for 
injustice, it would be naïve to think that justice would really be done. But this is the 
trap into which Dobson seems to have fallen. He builds a model of citizenship on 
‘global actualities’ whilst ignoring the actualities of human fallibility. 
That is not to say that the model of citizenship Dobson proposes is redundant. 
On the contrary, it demonstrates that citizenship is intimately connected with justice, 
and provides one of the clearest formulations of a widespread desire among greens to 
link  political  obligation  to  the  ecological  footprint.  Yet  it  appears  that  separating 
justice from rights raises difficulties. One of the unresolved issues of environmental 
citizenship, whether construed as a stewardship role, or post-cosmopolitan citizenship, 
is the motivation to act in green ways, to discharge one’s environmental citizenship 
duties. The stewardship approach assumes that people are motivated by concern for 
their immediate heirs, but some environmental problems will concern people who will 
live  many  generations  from now.  In  Ball’s  notion  of  punctuated  reciprocity  as  a 
stewardship model, the obligation to future generations is more generalised, but there 
is nonetheless a motivational gap to be addressed, a problem I return to in relation to 
justice and future generations in section 6.3. Dobson’s post-cosmopolitan citizenship 
has a clear position on motivation but one that looks backwards rather than forwards, 
which I argue makes it less appealing than he suggests. Given the kibbutz model, de-
Shalit’s  communitarian citizenship  could provide an explanation for  motivation in 
terms of community solidarity and an environmental  work ethic as constitutive of 
individual  identity.  But,  as noted above,  his defence of plurality and difference is 
unpersuasive in the absence of explicit  recognition for minority  rights. Although I 
concede that the empirical evidence is not there to authoritatively disprove de-Shalit’s 
claims, I am inclined to side with Wissenburg in fearing the potential for oppression 
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in  communitarian  citizenship.  A  tentative  conclusion  can  be  offered,  then,  that 
citizenship shorn of rights seems unpromising, and though greens have bemoaned the 
selfishness  and  individualism  attendant  upon  the  emphasis  on  rights  in  liberal 
democracy, the value of rights should not be neglected if the poor and minorities are 
not to be made more vulnerable. In the next chapter I therefore return to the theme of 
environmental  human  rights.  In  the  meantime,  it  is  appropriate  to  return  to  the 
question of  what  should  be  sustained and why.  In  chapter  5  I  suggested  that  the 
integrity of the environment was the most appropriate benchmark of sustainability, 
and  stated  that  ‘reflexiveness’  and  ‘appropriateness’  were  key  to  environmental 
decision-making. Greens have frequently endorsed deliberative democracy, both as a 
way of building these values into political institutions, and as an improvement on 
liberal democracy, which is attacked by greens as being inhospitable to environmental 
values.  Deliberative  democracy  is  also  often  said  to  be  linked  to  environmental 
citizenship  in  that  deliberation  is  held  to  foster  an  environmental  ethic  that  will 
underwrite  citizenship  practices.  In  the  next  section,  I  assess  the  promise  of 
deliberative democracy for environmental sustainability. 
6.2 Liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, green democracy
There is  no necessary connection between environmental  sustainability and 
democracy  (Achterberg  2001b).  It  is  possible  to  argue  that  sustainability  is  a 
necessary precondition of democracy, in that life itself, democratic or otherwise, is 
threatened if we pursue unsustainable ways of living, but the reverse does not hold. 
Democracy is only good (or necessary) for sustainability if it achieves ecologically 
good outcomes, and these cannot be  guaranteed by democratic procedures in a free 
society. Given the freedom to choose, people may not choose to adopt sustainable 
practices.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  also  no  necessary  connection  between 
environmental  sustainability  and  authoritarian  regimes.  While  Humphrey  (2004) 
justifiably argues that the true empirical test of a green authoritarianism would require 
the existence of a green autocracy dedicated to environmental sustainability, there are 
non-empirical reasons to be sceptical of the merits of a ‘green Leviathan’. For non-
environmental  reasons,  in  the  absence  of  an  Aristotelian  ‘best  man’  to  rule, 
democracy  does  seem to  many  if  not  most  people  to  be  the  ‘least  bad’  form of 
government available. It  may,  therefore, be advocated as a route to environmental 
sustainability  if  it  is  better  able  to  facilitate  a  peaceful  transition  to  an  economy 
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consistent with the principles of ecological economics, or if it is better able to deliver 
social  justice,  which  ecologists  might  value  for  both  instrumental  and  non-
instrumental  reasons. In particular,  Joan Martinez-Alier’s (2002) work on what he 
calls  the  ‘environmentalism  of  the  poor’  indicates  an  urgent  need  to  instigate 
democratic  procedures  to  negotiate  the  distribution  of  environmental  harms  and 
benefits. In light of these considerations, and given both the general popular appeal of 
democracy  and the recent  preference for  democratic  government  evident  in green 
theory,76 my interest here is in democratic forms of government.
Greens have been deeply critical of the quality of existing democratic norms 
and procedures.  Two primary concerns are raised – firstly, that  liberal democratic 
states have become principally ‘administrative’ states (Dryzek 1992; Conca 2000), 
and secondly, that the norm of political equality is undermined by the prevalence of 
what  is  called  ‘interest  group  liberalism’  (Anderson  and  Leal  2005;   Baber  and 
Bartlett 2005). The administrative state is held to be symptomatic of globalisation, the 
pressures of which oblige the government of any given state to function as a facilitator 
for  capitalist  enterprise.  Government  policy is  therefore focused on maintaining  a 
competitive  advantage  in  the  global  market-place.  In  such  circumstances,  it  is 
claimed,  business  interests  inevitably  trump environmental  interests  (Conca  2000; 
Mander  2003).  This  antagonistic  relationship  arises  because  of  the  government’s 
reliance on tax revenues to fund public programmes, which are in turn crucial to the 
government’s legitimacy. As discussed in chapter 5, ecological modernisation seeks 
to render benign this antagonistic relationship between the environment and business 
by diminishing the extent to which economic growth necessarily entails ecological 
destruction. 
Ecological economists, though, are sceptical of the viability of this strategy in 
view of  the need for  ever-increasing economic growth in a  global,  market-driven 
economy (again, see chapter 5). Taking into account the problems of entropy and of 
fairly static natural rates of ecological regeneration, combined with an exponential 
increase  in  population,  ecological  economists  argue  that  even  an  ecologically 
modernised economy cannot sustain growth at currently desired levels (Jacobs 1991; 
Goodland 1995; NEF 2006). Although most greens would acknowledge that ‘nature’ 
is to some degree constructed and that humans’ capacities to use the Earth’s resources 
76 Several  volumes  taking  a  positive  perspective  on  the  relationship  between  environmental 
sustainability  and  democracy  have  been  published  in  recent  years  –  see,  for  example,  Barry  and 
Wissenburg (eds) (2001), Doherty and de Geus (eds) (1996), and Minteer and Taylor (eds) (2002).
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to provide food and energy are a function of the level of technological development, it 
is nevertheless the case that increasing technological development cannot be relied 
upon  to  square  the  circle.  Indeed,  many  argue  that  it  is  the  relentless  pursuit  of 
technological  development  that  has  fuelled  profligate  consumption  of  ecological 
resources,  consequently  narrowing  options  whilst  perpetuating  the  environmental 
problems that are the central concern of the green movement.
The  problematic  relationship  between  politics  and  business  is  said  to  be 
compounded by the incidence of ‘interest-group liberalism’, whereby well-organised 
and  well-funded  interest  groups  dominate  the  political  agenda  at  the  expense  of 
democratic equality (Baber and Bartlett 2005). Although citizens have equal rights to 
vote,  they  do  not  have  equal  capacities  to  influence  the  media  and  the  political 
agenda.  Particularly  disadvantaged  in  this  scenario  are  poorer  constituencies,  or 
constituencies that are not represented at all in the political process, such as future 
generations of humans and non-human nature. The interests of such constituencies are 
said to be marginalised by political  parties that  depend on donations from private 
enterprises to fund campaigns, and that are more likely to be influenced by corporatist 
interest groups than by the concerns and claims of weaker groups in society. Thus the 
position of those already marginalised by poverty tends to be further compounded by 
the political process. 
Another  problem of  exclusion  is  highlighted  in  Robyn  Eckersley’s  (2005) 
critique of ‘exclusive sovereignty’. Though undermined somewhat by globalisation in 
the experience of some countries (see chapter 2), the norm of sovereign autonomy 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations nevertheless continues to be asserted 
when states seek to resist pressure from neighbours over environmentally damaging 
practices. It has become almost a cliché to note that pollution does not respect state 
boundaries, and that environmental impacts therefore affect people who have no role 
in  authorising  them.  Finally,  contemporary  liberal  democracy  is  also  accused  of 
fostering  ‘short-termism’,  whereby  regular  elections,  purported  to  ensure  the 
accountability of politicians, discourage bold initiatives and long-term planning (and 
thinking), and again make politicians captive to powerful interest groups that may 
particularly focus their  energies at  election-time.  None of this  is  conducive to the 
project of ‘sustainability planning’ discussed in chapter 5, which may reasonably be 
expected to require a collaborative effort between countries and generations. On the 
other  hand,  deliberative  democracy  builds  into  political  decision-making  the 
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reflexiveness  that  was  said  to  be  an essential  feature  of  maintaining  an economy 
organised around the principles of ecological economics.
6.2.1 Democracy and the politics of risk
The limits of liberal democracy are particularly apparent, it is argued, in the 
new situation in which citizens presently  find themselves,  characterised by Ulrich 
Beck  as  a  ‘risk  society’  (Beck  1997).  The  politics  of  risk,  Beck  argues,  are  a 
consequence  of  the  production  of  increasingly  hazardous  materials  in  industrial 
processes. As technological development continues, these risks ‘are no longer limited 
in  scale,  neither  geographically  nor  in  time  nor  socially;  by the  same token they 
cannot  be  covered  by  any  insurance’  (Achterberg  2001a:103).  Examples  include 
nuclear  waste,  which  remains  toxic  for  thousands  of  years,  affects  all  people 
irrespective  of  age,  wealth,  gender,  etc.,  and may  cause  toxic  rains  to  fall  many 
thousands  of  miles  from  the  site  of  initial  contamination.  The  ecological  risks 
associated  with  global  warming  and  the  potential  risks  of  the  use  of  genetically 
modified organisms are further examples. The presence of such risks in society forces 
citizens to reflect on the values and choices that have given rise to these risks. Thus, 
in Beck’s view, the late-industrial age has gone from being a period of ‘autonomous’ 
modernisation, in the context of which the development of technology was widely 
seen to be unqualified good, to ‘reflexive modernisation’, wherein citizens critically 
evaluate the costs incurred and the benefits gained from industrial activity. Wouter 
Achterberg (2001a:109) argues that bequeathing such risks to future generations (who 
had no input in creating these risks) constitutes a violation of their human rights, and 
that the defence of such initiatives as nuclear power on the basis that they increase the 
total stock of capital available to future generations is thus invalidated. However, the 
short-term  focus  of  liberal  democracy  inhibits  development  of  the  long-term 
perspective that is crucial to a comprehensive understanding and evaluation of the 
risks of late-industrial society. 
The conclusion of Achterberg and others who have drawn on Beck’s analysis 
is that the appropriate democratic model for risk society is a deliberative one. The 
‘problem-solving’ approach of the liberal democratic state is inhospitable to the more 
critical and evaluative questions that citizens confront with regard to public policy in 
the context of a risk society. Jan Hancock and Tony Evans (1998) argue that this 
‘problem solving’ approach is also characteristic of the apparatus of the international 
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human rights  regime.  What  is  needed,  they  claim,  is  a  critical  approach  oriented 
towards  evaluating  conflicting  goals,  rather  than  seeking  compromise.  Eckersley, 
whose theory of ‘critical  political ecology’,  inspired by critical theory, might be a 
suitable candidate, argues that the ties of community in the context of risk society are 
‘no longer nationality, ethnicity, religion, or language but rather a common exposure 
to actual or potential ecological harm’ (Eckersley 2005:176). As a consequence, the 
appropriate model of sovereignty for the risk society is ‘inclusive sovereignty’. She 
argues that ‘citizenship type rights should be conferred on people outside a political 
community  but  likely  to  be  affected  by  ‘proposed  developments’’  (Eckersley 
2005:176). 
Clearly,  then,  the  politics  of  risk  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  green 
understanding of both the scope and character of democracy – deliberation is vital, 
and participation is to be the right of all  those likely to be affected by any given 
decision. This approach to democratic politics complements the ecological economics 
perspective discussed in the previous chapter where the level of political decision-
making is determined by E.F. Schumacher’s principle of ‘appropriateness’ – whether 
a decision is made by local, national, or international agents is determined by how 
localised  are  the  implications  of  the  proposed  development.  The  traditional 
sovereignty of liberal democratic states is therefore compromised on two fronts; green 
democracy  is  variable  as  to  the  level  at  which  decisions  are  made  and as  to  the 
relevant constituents.
It  is  also  apparent  that  green  conceptions  of  democracy  are  tied  up  with 
citizenship.  A  key  feature  of  the  distinction  drawn  between  the  representative 
democracy  typical  of  Western  liberal  democratic  states  and  the  deliberative 
democracy  proposed  in  green  theory  relates  to  the  way  in  which  the  citizen  is 
conceptualised.  Russell  Keat  (1994)  has  pointed  out  that  people  are  able  to  act 
differently in different settings, so that while it may be true that in the market citizens 
typically act as consumers (that is, as rational egotists with individual  preferences, 
privately and independently formed, which they seek to satisfy), in political forums 
people can, and often do, act as citizens (that is, as members of a community with a 
notion  of  what  is  in  the  public  interest).  The  argument  that  follows  from  this 
observation is that, while liberal democracy treats citizens as consumers, or,  rational 
egotists with privately formed preferences, deliberative democracy implies an active 
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model of citizenship among people with a shared or sharable conception of the public 
good. 
In  reality,  the  distinction  between  liberal  democracy  and  deliberative 
democracy  is  probably  less  clear  than  theoretical  abstractions  suggest.  Firstly,  as 
Attfield has observed, actually existing liberal democracies do disclose some notions 
of a public good. For instance, marriage is incentivised, and cohabitation discouraged, 
in the British tax system (Attfield 2001:152). Secondly, an oft-proposed first step in 
greening liberal democracies is to make democratic procedures more participatory, 
which  would  somewhat  blur  the  lines  between  traditional  representative  liberal 
democracies  and  deliberative  democracies  (see,  for  example,  Wissenburg  1998; 
Humphrey 2004). Finally, deliberative democratic procedures may themselves adopt 
representative mechanisms for decision-making, which raise a number of questions 
regarding  legitimacy  and  authenticity  (see  below and  O’Neill  2002;  Smith  2003; 
2004).  But  among  these  similarities  is  a  fundamental  difference.  Deliberative 
democracy is for the most part favoured by greens because it affords an opportunity 
largely  absent  in  liberal  democracy  to  initiate  and engage  in  public  debate  about 
environmental sustainability as a common good.
6.2.2 Deliberative democracy as a solution to the problem of needs and wants?
One point of entry into this debate was raised in the previous chapter. Green 
theorists and activists have long been preoccupied with the distinction that it is said 
can be drawn between needs and wants. I have already indicated that I do not find this 
a  particularly  useful  way  of  conceptualising  sustainability.  But  even  though  the 
needs/wants distinction is of little use in defining environmental sustainability, it is 
nonetheless clear that some people, particularly in the West, are going to be asked, 
indeed are already being asked, to lessen the environmental impact of their lifestyles. 
On the other hand, poor people in developing countries may argue that they have to 
damage the integrity of their local environments in order to satisfy basic needs, which 
may be said to have the status of human rights (Shue 1980). It is therefore likely that 
some degree of public debate about needs and wants is on the cards. Although few 
people would deny that the average Westerner consumes more than they strictly need 
to, it is extremely difficult to determine in the abstract exactly what a person needs. 
Dobson  asks,  rhetorically,  ‘do  we  need  kiwi  fruits?  but,  then,  do  we  need  tea?’ 
(Dobson 2000:90). However, he also notes that ‘the option of doing without things’ 
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has  been  omitted  from  UK  Green  Party  campaign  materials  (Dobson  2000:86), 
presumably because it is thought to be unlikely to appeal to a society of profligate 
consumers.  Wissenburg  (1998:207)  argues  that  we  have  unconditional  rights  to 
‘goods of  the  needs  category’  but  only conditional  rights  to  ‘goods of  the  wants 
category’,  but,  being  a  committed  liberal,  he  is  reluctant  to  acknowledge  an 
objectively verifiable set of goods that would meet human needs because doing so 
would  arguably  deny  individuals  the  right  to  determine  for  themselves  what 
constitutes a good life. Remarkably, given their positions at almost opposite ends of 
the green spectrum, Arne Naess takes an almost identical line (see previous chapter). 
Deliberative democracy is seen by many as a potential resource for resolving 
some of the difficulties of challenging people to want less whilst respecting people’s 
right to determine for themselves what they need. Hayward, as noted above, casts this 
debate  in  terms of  ‘preferences’  and ‘interests’,  rather  than needs and wants,  and 
argues  that,  whereas  ‘preferences  carry  no  automatic  weight  in  decision-making 
processes […] interests have a necessary claim to be recognized but not necessarily 
satisfied’  (Hayward  1998:108-109).  What  this  suggests  is  that,  in  the  context  of 
deliberative democracy, all people have a right to  claim certain interests, but their 
position may legitimately be questioned by others engaged in the deliberative process. 
It is hoped that in the process of debating and seeking justification for propositions, 
unreasonable claims will be defeated. As Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett (2005:165-
184)  note,  the  standard  of  what  counts  as  ‘unreasonable’  is,  of  course,  open  to 
interpretation,77 but  one  of  the  aims  of  deliberative  politics  is  to  come  to  what 
Hayward describes as ‘intersubjective agreement’ on such matters. 
6.2.3 Deliberative democracy and the environmental citizen
While deliberative processes cannot guarantee a green outcome, it is argued 
that  a  general  commitment  to  environmental  sustainability  is  more  likely  in  the 
context  of  deliberative  institutions.  In  short,  deliberative  institutions  can  help  to 
‘green’ citizens. De-Shalit (2000:178) offers some small-scale empirical evidence in 
support of this, and claims that frequently the obstacle to ecological awareness among 
the general public is not lack of sympathy for the green agenda, but rather, lack of 
77 Baber and Bartlett consider three models of deliberation, ‘Habermasian’, ‘full liberalism’ (drawing 
on  Amy  Gutmann  and  James  Bohman),  and  ‘Rawlsian’,  that  offer  different  ways  of  assessing 
reasonableness,  as well as nuanced discussions of the character of deliberation. The detail of these 
debates is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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knowledge.  One attraction of deliberative  democracy is  that  it  ‘rests  on improved 
information flows’, and, 
it  is  argued  that  democratic  deliberation  provides  motivation  and 
encouragement  to  articulate  preferences  and  justifications  which  are 
oriented toward the  common good – the reciprocal  requirement  to put 
forward reasons and to respond to challenges makes it difficult to sustain 
preferences held on purely self-interested grounds. (Smith 2004:145)
There may be grounds, then, to think Wissenburg too sceptical when he says that 
‘there is no reason to believe that after a process of dialogue and deliberation, any 
random set of flesh-and-blood individuals will make the good decision’ (Wissenburg 
1998:223), but he is justified in observing that rational and environmentally sensitive 
deliberation  in  one  community  could  well  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  ‘good 
decision’ is to dump toxic waste in the territory of another community. Such potential 
outcomes  explain  why  Eckersley  (2005)  and  Dobson  (2003)  have  argued  for  a 
reconceptualisation of sovereignty and citizenship, such that neither is held to be co-
terminous with state borders, but instead should follow the contours of ecological 
impact. But even with this proviso, the inevitability of green outcomes may have been 
oversold. As John O’Neill (2002) points out, proponents of deliberative democracy 
are misguided if they assume that deliberative forums can resolve all disagreements. 
Some  values  may  ultimately  be  incommensurable.  In  that  case,  the  best  that 
deliberative democracy can offer is a harmony in difference. 
Although  advocated  by  a  remarkable  range  of  green  theorists,  from green 
liberals  such  as  Wissenburg  (1998),  through  those  seeking  a  reformed  liberal 
democracy  (Barry  2001),  to  green  communitarians  (de-Shalit  2000)  and  eco-
anarchists  (Bookchin  1987),  there  are  a  number  of  unanswered  questions  in  the 
literature.  One  such  question  relates  to  the  ‘inclusive  sovereignty’  proposed  by 
Eckersley. She holds that the right to participate in democratic deliberation regarding 
environmental  decisions should be  extended to all  those ‘likely to  be  affected by 
‘proposed developments’’ (Eckersley 2005:176). It is unclear, though, what counts as 
‘likely to be affected’. The most obvious definition would be anyone whose material 
interests  could  be  damaged,  were  a  proposed  development  to  go  ahead.  Material 
interests could include health or economic well-being, and at a stretch might cover 
local people who feel that there is some spiritual significance to a given piece of land. 
But  this  would  exclude  from  participation  anyone  who  did  not  have  a  direct 
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connection with the land, but was nonetheless interested and wished to express an 
opinion  about  the  proposed  development.  Such  exclusion  would  surely  not  be 
acceptable to the many green activists who have welcomed concerned individuals 
from  outside  a  given  community  engaging  in  direct  action  to  try  to  conserve  a 
particular  ecological  resource,  as  happened in,  for  example,  the  protests  over  the 
Newbury bypass.78 
However, allowing anyone who feels interested to participate in deliberation 
risks  being  non-democratic  in  the  sense  of  failing  to  respect  rights  to  self-
determination. If a particular community wants to destroy an area of forest (which, 
say,  provides  habitat  for  a  rare  species  of  flower  or  bird)  so  as  to  create  more 
agricultural  land  to  feed  a  burgeoning  population,  it  is  problematic  to  claim that 
people with no connection to the community have a right to involve themselves in 
deliberative forums engaged in reaching a decision about the proposal, particularly if 
a majority is required to carry the decision. This scenario is further complicated if the 
community  in  question live  in  a  developing country and the  outsiders  seeking to 
influence the decision are from developed countries that have already destroyed much 
of their own wilderness (O’Neill 2007:ch8). Martinez-Alier has been deeply critical of 
first  world environmentalists  who propagate what he calls ‘the cult  of  wilderness’ 
(2002:  vii),  that  is,  environmentalists  concerned to preserve what  is  left  of  ‘wild’ 
earth, regardless of the impact this may have on poorer communities who live in or 
around  such  ‘resources’.  But  to  deny  the  legitimacy  of  intervention  to  prevent 
environmental destruction abroad would undermine the capacity of green activists to 
criticise  environmentally  destructive activities  outwith their  communities  and their 
immediate  environs.  Clearly,  then,  there  is  a  potential  tension  between ‘inclusive 
sovereignty’ and self-determination.
A final problem related to questions of power in deliberative democracy is 
raised within deliberative forums: 
It is simply assumed that face-to-face participation is more democratic. 
However, studies of face-to-face assemblies have shown that they are not 
78 Similarly, the principle of ‘appropriateness’ as a guide to the level of government at which decisions 
are  made  may  be  problematic  if,  for  example,  different  levels  were  to  claim  jurisdiction  over  a 
particular  issue.  This  could  perhaps  be  rectified  if  an  independent  panel  were  appointed  to  settle 
disputes, but such a panel would only be successful is accepted by all parties, and may be seen to lack 
democratic accountability.
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necessarily democratic panaceas and are easily manipulated by powerful 
and experienced citizens. (Smith 2004:147)
Moreover, even if deliberative forums increase the likelihood of participants being 
informed about environmental problems, there remains the difficulty that they may 
not  fully  understand the  complexities  involved.  This  is  not  to  cast  doubt  on  the 
intelligence  of  citizens,  but  rather  to  acknowledge  the  degree  of  specialisation 
involved in some areas of environmental research. The role of experts who advise or 
present evidence to deliberative forums is therefore potentially an extremely powerful 
one,  which  again  may  undermine  the  democratic  credentials  of  deliberative 
democracy (Baber and Bartlett 2005:ch10).
A further  issue is  how decision-making forums are structured.  Deliberative 
democracy  can be  practised  in  a  variety  of  ways,  such as,  through focus groups, 
citizens’ juries, or in councils either comprising or representing the entire community. 
As already noted, small anarchist communities are championed by a number of greens 
(see,  inter  alia,  Bookchin  1987,  Carter  1999).  Among  the  attractions  of  such 
communities are the fact that they can be more democratic than larger associations 
that find it practically impossible to include everyone in decision-making processes 
and therefore rely on some degree of representation. But the more recent trend has 
been to reject eco-anarchism in favour of larger, pluralist states, not least because of 
worries  raised  above  that  small  communities  can  be  uncomfortably  insular  and 
intolerant of difference, and because ‘the local level is not always the most suitable 
for dealing with the scale and complexity of many environmental problems’ (Smith 
2004:147).  But  if  a  larger  community  is  assumed,  we  encounter  the  problem  of 
representation. O’Neill (2002) refers to Borges’ story of the perfect map in order to 
illustrate  the difficulties posed in seeking to find legitimate representatives of any 
given community. The perfect map would be one that perfectly replicates the real 
world  on  a  1:1  scale.  But  it  would  be  impractical  –  that  is  why  we  favour 
representation,  both  in  maps  and  in  democratic  institutions.  However,  randomly 
selected participants on citizens’ juries or in focus groups may fail to express the will 
of the majority of those they are taken to represent, even if they take it to be their duty 
to do so. 
Even  more  difficult  than  ensuring the  legitimate  representation  of  actually 
existing citizens is the question of how, if at all, to represent the interests of future 
generations of humans, and of non-human nature. The use of proxies representing 
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both constituencies has been proposed (Dobson 2000:122-123), but this would seem 
to be undemocratic, as presumably those suitable to be proxies for future generations 
would be ecologically-minded citizens, and so the deck would be stacked in favour of 
the green agenda. Perhaps this is acceptable if the purpose of adopting deliberative 
mechanisms  is  to  reach  greener  outcomes.  Indeed,  the  express  desire  of  many 
proponents of environmental citizenship education is to teach people to think and act 
with  the interests  of  non-human nature and future generations in  mind.  However, 
Humphrey’s point, above, remains. Democratic outcomes are not, and cannot be, pre-
determined. To fail to grasp this fact is to fail to value democracy. Green outcomes 
presumably could be reached through authoritarian means given the right application 
of coercive power, but this route has been rejected by the majority of contemporary 
scholars  of  environmental  politics.  Therefore,  green  theorists  can  be  presumed to 
value both democracy  and environmental  sustainability.  That  being the  case,  it  is 
incumbent upon them to respect both values when appraising models of deliberative 
democracy.
Greens  have  endorsed  deliberative  democracy  because  it  is  thought  to 
overcome the features of liberal democracy that make the latter particularly ill-suited 
to  fostering  environmental  sustainability,  such  as  short-termism  and  exclusivity. 
Public  deliberation  as  a  political  model  also  has  the  appeal  of  instituting  the 
reflexiveness which was said in the previous chapter to be a necessary feature of 
environmental  sustainability.  Moreover,  green theorists  have proposed a  model  of 
deliberative  democracy  that  transcends  the  borders  of  the  ecologically-arbitrary 
nation-state, and instead includes in its constituency all those exposed to ecological 
risk by a given policy.  However, there remain unanswered questions as to how to 
balance  inclusive  sovereignty  and the  right  to  self-determination.  More  generally, 
advocates of deliberative democracy have sometimes appeared to oversell its potential 
benefits. It is also argued that deliberative democracy can help to ‘green’ citizens, but 
the  evidence  on  this  point  was  mixed.  A  further  unresolved  question  was  what 
resources  deliberative  democracy  can  offer  with  respect  to  the  problem of  future 
generations. However, in the discussion of citizenship, I suggested that a stewardship 
approach might best protect the interests of future citizens. In the final section of this 
chapter,  I  return  to  the  question  of  future  generations  to  consider  what  goods  or 
resources future generations might be said to be owed as a matter of justice.
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6.3 Justice and future generations
There are a number of possible ways of construing justice in green politics. It 
could  refer  to  relations  between  present  generations  of  humans,  or  to  relations 
between  present  generations  of  humans  and  non-human  nature,  or  to  relations 
between present and future generations of humans. In the limited space available here, 
I restrict myself to the last of these three questions – intergenerational justice – having 
dealt  briefly  with  intragenerational  justice  in  chapter  5.  Wissenburg  argues  that 
sustainability and justice are not intrinsically related:
the first concerns the question of  how much of which resources should 
exist or be made to exist over time, the second concerns the question of 
what to do with whatever exists at one particular moment. (Wissenburg 
2007:3)
But  to argue for  a  relationship  between sustainability  and justice  is  not  arbitrary. 
Unsustainable patterns of life constrain the amount and quality of ecological resources 
available for distribution, now and in the future. Put simply, a situation is unjust if 
greater  opportunities  for  A are  bought  from common resources at  the  expense  of 
fewer opportunities for B, without B’s consent. In a finite ecosystem this applies both 
between and within generations: as discussed in the previous chapter, neither present 
generation  poor  nor  future  generations  have  the  opportunity  to  express  their 
preferences,  or  ‘give  their  consent’,  in  the  market  transactions  that  are  currently 
determining  the  range  and  quality  of  ecological  resources  available  to  them. 
Intergenerational  justice  has  long  preoccupied  green  theorists.  Advances  in 
technology,  particularly  in  the  fields  of  agriculture  and  industry,  have  massively 
increased  the  resources  available  today  relative  to  those  available  to  previous 
generations. But scarcity has not been eliminated. On the contrary, rapid population 
growth, from one billion persons worldwide at the turn of the twentieth century to six 
billion world wide at the turn of the twenty-first, has created unprecedented stress on 
natural resources, not only to provide adequate food, water, and shelter, but also to 
provide raw materials for industrial processes and to assimilate wastes. Given that 
present generations have the capacity to influence considerably the resources that will 
be available to future generations, the question arises, what, if anything, do present 
generations owe to posterity? 
The answer that the ideal-type proponent of liberal democracy might give to 
such  a  question  is  complicated  by  the  commitment  liberals  typically  hold  to  the 
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neutrality of government with respect to the good.79 In a plural society, government 
should not favour one conception of what constitutes a good life over another, instead, 
it should foster the widest possible availability of the means for individuals to pursue 
their own privately determined conception of the good, interfering only to prevent any 
individual from pursuing a vision of the good life that inhibits the capacity of others 
to achieve a good life.  Intergenerational  justice,  it  is  argued, is  incompatible with 
liberal neutrality, because to be just to future generations requires that people choose 
now on behalf of future generations what environmental goods they would want to be 
preserved. It is also probable that some sacrifice on the part of present generations 
will  be  required  in  order  to  maintain  a  particular  environmental  good  for  future 
generations. It is with these sorts of conflicts in mind that Michael Hannis (2005:578) 
argues  that  ‘we  can  have  neutrality  or ecological  sustainability,  not  both’. A 
hypothetical  example  may  help  to  clarify  these  issues.  Suppose  the  government 
prohibits  development  on  a  particular  area  of  land  that  provides  habitat  for  an 
endangered  species  because  it  is  thought  to  be  a  good  thing  that  biodiversity  be 
maintained for future generations. This prohibition thwarts the pursuit of a particular 
conception of  the good,  in  this  case the  one held  by the developers.  In  choosing 
posterity over the developers, the government has given up its neutrality. On the other 
hand, siding with the developers would not have been entirely neutral either, if there 
had been people currently alive who had reason to value the forest to the extent that 
its preservation was crucial to their idea of the good without reference to posterity.  
There  are two relevant  issues  here.  The first  is  that  the  capacity  of  future 
generations to pursue their particular conception(s) of the good may be constrained or 
undermined by actions taken now. To an extent this has always been the case – the 
capacity  of  future  generations to travel  to  another  solar  system is  to some extent 
constrained by the failure of generations up until now to develop the technological 
capacity to do so. Future generations may wish that their forefathers had invested 
more in space technology. But it is within the power of future generations to change 
investment priorities and do their best to get to Pluto. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
kind  of  environmental  problems  that  arise  from  unsustainable  development  and 
growth  strategies  are  not  so  easily  reversible.  Indeed,  both  the  scale  and  the 
irreversibility  of  environmental  problems  have  the  potential  to  pose  tremendous 
79 There is a considerable literature on liberal neutrality which I do not directly engage with in the 
limited space available here. I subscribe to the view that sustainability, as a precondition for the pursuit 
of other goals, is not an issue there can be neutrality about.
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problems for future generations. If, for instance, the polar caps melt sufficiently to 
alter  the  Atlantic  Gulf  Stream, a  number  of  choices  (for  example,  to  grow crops 
suitable to a temperate climate) that were available to this generation will be closed to 
future  generations.  There  are  two  reasons  to  reject  the  idea  that  technological 
innovation will solve these problems. One is that it is an awfully big risk to take to 
assume that the technological means would be forthcoming, and that, in the old adage, 
prevention is better than cure. The second is that those who had other reasons for 
valuing the forest might not find the idea of breathing through an iron lung terribly 
appealing. Put another way, people alive today have no business presuming that future 
generations would not have preferred just to inherit a temperate climate without the 
need for technological innovation to make the alternative palatable.  
The  second  point  that  can  be  explicated  with  reference  to  the  forest 
development example is that neutrality with respect to the good among the present 
generation may not,  in  fact,  be  possible.  Individual  conceptions of  the good may 
conflict, and it may fall to a public authority to choose which one should be allowed 
to  advance  in  a  particular  case.  Moreover,  completely  neutral  societies,  Attfield 
argues, would be unsustainable, ‘as they would have to tolerate (and indefinitely at 
that) unsustainable practices’ (Attfield 2001:152). What liberal neutrality refers to, 
then, is neutrality with regard to a plurality of conceptions of the good, limited by 
crucial liberal values such as tolerance. Sustainability is also arguably coming to be 
among the core values held by liberal democratic states, at the very least rhetorically, 
in that the government of most states that would be considered liberal and democratic 
(and many states that would not) have in recent years made some public commitment 
to some notion of sustainability, most often sustainable development (Barry 2006a). 
But how sustainability is interpreted has considerable implications for the range of 
choices  open  to  future  generations.  In  the  following  discussion  I  consider  two 
possibilities, Wissenburg’s restraint principle, and Norton’s idea of integrity. 
6.3.1 The restraint principle
Wissenburg, a proponent of green liberalism, has devised what he calls the 
‘restraint principle’, derived from Rawls’ just savings principle, as a norm that could 
provide  rules  to  facilitate  environmental  sustainability.  The  savings  principle,  if 
adopted,  will  ensure  that  each  generation  will  not  be  ‘worse  off  relative  to  any 
previous  generation’ (Wissenburg 1999:176).  This  is  also the aim of  the restraint 
163
principle, but the restraint principle has been developed by Wissenburg specifically 
with the special problems of environmental resources in mind. It holds that:
no  goods  shall  be  destroyed  unless  unavoidable  and  unless  they  are 
replaced by perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they 
should be replaced by equivalent goods resembling the original as closely 
as possible; and if that is also impossible, a proper compensation should 
be provided. (Wissenburg 1998:123)
Clearly, a community adopting the restraint principle is likely to incur considerable 
costs that they might not otherwise do. This is a problem that also exists for Rawls’ 
savings principle. But Wissenburg (1999:180) argues that it is nonetheless rational to 
adopt the savings principle because it is in the interests of generation 1 to invest in the 
future of generation 2, given that generation 2 will one day have a role (to a greater or 
lesser extent) in ensuring that generation 1 does not suffer in old age, and the same 
argument applies to the restraint principle. In short, investing in the future creates and 
sustains bonds of trust between generations that co-exist. The motivation is therefore 
self-interest – generation 1 has an interest in creating a bond of trust between itself 
and  generation  2.  Justice  to  future  generations  is  not  achieved,  on  Wissenburg’s 
argument,  by pondering the needs or interests of people generations hence, nor of 
introducing proxy votes for future people in democratic forums, rather, it is achieved 
by  maintaining  a  compact  built  on  trust  and  self-interest  between  overlapping 
generations.
There is, however, reason for concern as to how robust the restraint principle 
is. In explaining the principle Wissenburg says substituting a particular resource for 
either an identical item, or appropriate compensation, is only acceptable when it is 
impossible to do otherwise: ‘no part of nature should be destroyed unless necessary, 
in  which  case  it  should  be  renewed,  replaced  or  substituted  by  an  adequate 
compensation’ (Wissenburg 1998:207). The move from ‘only when it is impossible 
not to take X action’ to ‘only when it is necessary to take X action’ is more than 
semantic, given that Wissenburg assiduously ‘dodge[s] the debate about the difficulty 
of distinguishing basic and non-basic needs’, as Eckersley rightly complains he does 
(Eckersley 1999:262). Wissenburg specifies that ‘rights to needs goods can as a rule 
support only user rights, not ownership rights: that is, the right to destroy an object 
can only be part of a person’s set of rights if destruction is a necessary condition for 
its  being used’  (Wissenburg 1998:207).  But what  constitutes  ‘needs goods’  is  not 
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explained. As already noted, though he endorses deliberative democracy, Wissenburg 
is typically liberal in being committed to the idea that preferences are sovereign.80 
What emerges from this complicated picture is an account of sustainability that allows 
for, if necessary, the potentially irreversible destruction of ecological resources, and 
only a subjective basis on which to judge what is necessary. As noted in chapter 5, 
Wissenburg candidly acknowledges that his green liberalism might well produce a 
‘global  Manhattan’  if  followed as  a  model  of  sustainability.  A global  Manhattan 
would  limit  the  choices  of  future  generations substantially  relative  to  the  choices 
available to the present generation. On this reading, it would be difficult to view the 
restraint principle as offering justice to future generations. In view of Wissenburg’s 
apparent acceptance of a global Manhattan as plausible and sustainable, Eckersley 
(1999:262) bemoans the lack of ‘ecological guarantees’ in green liberalism. 
6.3.2 Justice and integrity
It was noted above that there are no guarantees in politics of any shade, and 
that to seek them is a fool’s errand. Nevertheless, one might reasonably hope for a 
more robust understanding of justice to future generations than the restraint principle 
provides.  Part  of  the  problem is  derived  from the  way in  which  sustainability  is 
conceived. In chapter 5 I proposed Norton’s model of interpreting sustainability in 
terms of the integrity of the ecosystem, rather than explicating the conditions under 
which goods may legitimately be substituted for equivalent goods or compensation. 
Here  justice  to  future  generations  is  assessed  in  terms  of  the  ‘options  and 
opportunities’  available  to  them  (Norton  1999:131-137).81 Injustice  is  therefore 
understood to be the unequal distribution of harms and benefits across generations – 
an opportunity today should not be pursued if it can only be exercised by harming a 
future  person’s  interests  by  narrowing  his  opportunities  to  live  a  life  of  his  own 
choosing.  Inheriting a  sustainable  environment  maintains  the  range of  options  for 
future generations. 
80 Wissenburg correctly argues that liberals do not accept any preference as valid – a preference for 
attacking people,  for  instance,  is  not  tolerated within  liberalism.  But  he  argues that  while  certain 
preferences  can  be  labelled  environmentally  harmful,  they  cannot  legitimately  be  ‘disqualified’ 
(Wissenburg 1998:220-221).
81 Norton draws a distinction between options and opportunities – a simple reading of which might 
characterise  options as  choices  but  opportunities  as  the capacity to exercise  them, thus the one is 
dependent upon the other. The detail of Norton’s argument is not crucial to the point being made here. 
Henceforth I shall refer only to opportunities, but I accept Norton’s argument on this point.
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At this point it might be suggested that the opportunities of future generations 
would  be  enhanced  if  present  generations  bequeathed  to  their  heirs  more 
development, rather than less. It might be argued that, on current trends of dwindling 
oil supplies, increasing energy demand, and insufficient capacity in alternative fuels 
to cater for the whole or even most of the energy market  in the UK, it  would be 
irresponsible of the government not to invest in new nuclear power stations, because 
nuclear power is the only reliable method currently known to be able to service the 
energy needs anticipated in the short-  to mid-range future. Not to do so would, it 
could be argued, decrease the opportunities available to future generations relative to 
those available today,  because future generations would not have sufficient energy 
resources to meet their needs. Clearly, if a pristine forest were destroyed to make way 
for  a  nuclear  power station,  then the  opportunities  available  to  future  generations 
would have been narrowed, relative to the present generation.82 But if a brown-field 
site were used for the nuclear plant, then the charge of narrowed opportunities is more 
difficult  to  sustain.  However,  if  increased  risk,  as  discussed  by  Beck  (above),  is 
considered to be a threat to opportunities, then there may yet be grounds for regarding 
the  nuclear  development  to  be  an  injustice  to  future  generations.  Given  that  the 
present generation has not found a safe method for storing nuclear waste indefinitely, 
the risk posed to future generations of significantly reduced opportunities consequent 
upon  radiation  leaks  makes  the  choice  of  nuclear  power  an  injustice  to  future 
generations.  Norton’s  idea  of  ecological  integrity  as  the  guiding  principle  of 
sustainability  could  prove  an  appropriate  norm  where  the  economy  is  organised 
according  to  the  principles  of  ecological  economics  –  that  is,  where  ecological 
capacities are not outstripped – but if it is to protect fully the opportunities available 
to future generations then threats to opportunities posed by development must also be 
taken into account. 
It  is  precisely these sorts  of considerations that  Beck regards as  the  moral 
questions characteristic of ‘risk society’. In comparison to the restraint principle, the 
synthesis of Norton’s and Beck’s position described here has the benefit of not being 
undermined  by  reference  to  unspecified  needs.  However,  like  any account  of  the 
82 Note,  however,  that  the  relative  position  of  future  generations  to  the  present  one  is  not  an 
uncomplicated starting point. Justice to future generations might be better served by aiming to restore 
either a local environment to its condition at some point in history. For instance, many moor lands in 
the UK that currently support various species of grasses and birds were previously dense forests. How 
integrity should be interpreted at a local level is therefore an issue to be decided in deliberative forums.
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dynamic  between intergenerational  justice  and  sustainability,  it  cannot  deliver  the 
guaranteed sustainable outcomes some greens have hoped for. Ecosystem integrity 
can  only  be  maintained  by ‘flesh  and blood’  environmental  citizens,  who,  in  the 
context of democratic deliberation, are free to choose their own ends over those of 
future persons. Maintaining the integrity of the ecosystem is preferable to the restraint 
principle because it is more sensitive to long-term problems, such as climate change 
or  nuclear  power,  that  need  not  affect  behaviour  on  a  model  of  sustainability 
concerned with the relative well-being of overlapping generations, since the effects of 
climate change are gradual and incremental. But over the long-term, these effects will 
be  felt  several  generations hence.  On the  integrity  model,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
benchmark for sustainability is set higher – protecting the integrity of the ecosystem 
for one generation also has the effect of protecting it for generations beyond those 
with whom generation 1 overlaps. However, if one generation inherits a poor quality 
ecosystem, there is no immediate motivation to improve the ecosystem to the extent 
being discussed here – to make the radical changes to global economic organisation as 
well as political institutions envisaged in pursuing the ecological economics approach 
to  sustainability.  As  a  matter  of  self-interest,  generation  1  has  a  motivation  to 
maintain the quality of the ecosystem for generation 2. But the integrity model may 
require some generations to take action to improve the integrity of the ecosystem, and 
it is plausible that the benefits will take some time, perhaps a generation or more, to 
filter through. At the same time, the costs may well be thought likely to fall upon 
more than one generation. The motivation, then, cannot be self-interest. Instead, the 
motivational assumption already highlighted in the stewardship model is implicit in 
the integrity approach: it is assumed that people have a sentimental concern with the 
fate  of  future  generations.  Indeed,  integrity  as  a  standard of  sustainability  can be 
thought  of  as  a  strong version of  the  stewardship account  of  our  duties  to future 
generations. 
At this point in the debate it is necessary to return to questions of citizenship. 
For what generation 1 owes to future generations as a matter of justice now seems to 
depend  upon  what  model  of  citizenship  is  affirmed.  Dobson’s  proposed  post-
cosmopolitan  citizenship  has  the  potential  to  produce  a  rather  unhelpfully 
parsimonious account of justice between generations: focusing on those who have 
caused problem X may inhibit  co-operative action to address  it,  which,  given the 
threats to human security that environmental problems can pose, is surely the more 
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urgent issue. Taking an intergenerational view, demanding that the direct descendants 
of  polluters  accept  a  greater  degree  of  responsibility  for  the  costs  of  realising 
environmental  sustainability  or  human  rights  may  undermine  the  mutual  trust 
Wissenburg hopes the actions of generation 1 will inspire. Yet it is also apparent that 
the unequal distribution of ecological harms and goods constitutes an injustice that 
people might legitimately seek redress for, and it  is clear that developed countries 
have played a far greater role in creating these. What all this suggests is that a more 
careful explanation of the implications of a historical account of justice is required. A 
generalised acceptance of there being ‘always already’ relationships of justice among 
people  whose  lives  interact,  consciously  or  otherwise,  might  be  part  of  being  an 
environmental  citizen.  If  narrowing  a  person’s  opportunities  can  be  construed  as 
harming them – and I would argue that it can83 – then both tackling ecological debt 
and caring for  future generations may be motivated  by a  desire to prevent future 
injustice, rather than to rectify past injustice. In short, if we are ‘always already’ in 
relationships of justice then our attention should be directed forwards, not backwards. 
But this presumes that generation 1 will look on future generations as their 
moral equals, rather than discounting their interests, and it also entails the claim that 
preventing future injustice is a moral priority. Wissenburg’s restraint principle can 
affirm that this is the case with regard to overlapping generations, but over the longer 
term,  the  picture  becomes  less  clear.  Turning  to  Dobson’s  account  of  post-
cosmopolitanism,  the  motivation  for  honouring ‘duties’  to  future  generations  is,  I 
argue,  assumed,  rather  than explicated.  Thus ultimately  the  stewardship  model  of 
citizenship  is  at  least  as  persuasive  as  Dobson’s  model,  given  the  motivational 
assumption implicit in both. But the stewardship model also encounters difficulties 
specifying duties of justice. Attractive though Ball’s notion of punctuated reciprocity 
is, he is clear that it is a virtue to be taught and cultivated, not an abstract account of 
duties of justice, a point also made by Barry in his account of ecological stewardship. 
Furthermore, in view of the non-voluntary benefit problem raised above in relation to 
the fact that ecosystem integrity bequeathed over several generations cannot be said to 
have  been  voluntarily  received,  the  most  persuasive  argument  for  a  stewardship 
83 Of course, it could be the case that narrowing someone’s opportunities would in fact benefit them. 
For example, an alcoholic who is deprived of the opportunity to get drunk may reasonably be said to 
have been benefited by this  restriction.  What  is  at  issue here is  the restriction of  opportunities  to 
flourish, or to pursue a reasonable conception of the good, which, I argue, is a plausible consequence of 
continuing environmental degradation. 
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approach  rests  on  the  assumption  that  people  do  care  about  the  fate  of  their 
descendants. This seems to me to be a plausible assumption to make, and it need not 
rest upon a communitarian account of citizenship and identity – stewards could be 
Kantians like the good Samaritan, rather than Burkean in the communitarian sense – 
but it is an assumption. Absent from this assumption, there is a motivational gap in 
the integrity model of sustainability, which cannot be resolved by rationalist appeals 
to  self-interest.  Indeed,  the  only  appeals  that  could  conceivably  be  made  to  the 
unconvinced would  be  of  the  sentimentalist  sort  proposed  by Richard Rorty with 
regard  to  human  rights.  Democratic  deliberation  about  environmental  decision-
making must therefore include discussion of whether and how much environmental 
citizens care about future generations. It may be that they do not.
6.4 Conclusion
Deliberative  democracy,  environmental  citizenship,  and  intergenerational 
justice are interconnected in accounts of environmental sustainability. The extent to 
which  one  model  of  environmental  sustainability  is  preferred  over  another  is 
ultimately determined by democratic deliberation; few green theorists now advocate 
authoritarian routes to a sustainable future. Although deliberative democracy clearly 
represents an advance on liberal democracy from a green perspective, the merits of 
deliberative democracy have at times been oversold. As Wissenburg argues, ‘flesh 
and  blood’  environmental  citizens  may  ultimately  decide  to  continue  to  bequeath 
serious environmental problems to future generations. 
Theorists of environmental citizenship, however, have argued that fostering a 
reconceptualisation of what it means to be a citizen would minimise this risk. For the 
most part, the greening of citizenship entails a more active and engaged approach to 
citizenship  and  to  the  community  than  that  found  in  liberal  democratic  models. 
Citizens are not mutually disinterested, they are stewards, or communitarians, or post-
cosmopolitans, and they are concerned with duties rather than rights. This aspect of 
environmental  citizenship  I  found  troubling;  protection  for  minorities,  I  have 
suggested, depends on rights being recognised as well as duties. 
Finally, citizenship was also found to be bound up with theories of justice, and 
with the extent to which it  can be assumed that individuals care about the fate of 
future generations. In the abstract I argued that the idea of ecological integrity is a 
better  guide  to  what  present  generations  should  seek  to  maintain  for  future 
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generations,  bypassing,  as  it  does,  the  difficult  question  of  needs  and wants,  and 
overcoming the  difficulty  of long-term environmental  issues not necessarily being 
addressed if one is only concerned with the fate of generations that overlap with one’s 
own. However, this approach was found to rest on a motivational assumption that 
may  not,  in  fact,  prove  valid  in  real  world  democratic  deliberations.  Whereas 
Wissenburg’s restraint principle can be argued to be a rational choice insofar as it is in 
an individual’s self-interest, the restraint principle may not protect distant rather than 
overlapping future generations from environmental harms, and is in any case unlikely 
to  ensure  environmental  sustainability  to  the  standard  advocated  in  the  previous 
chapter. 
This problem illustrates the difficulty of justifying concern for distant rather 
than overlapping future generations in terms of rational self-interest. However, the 
appeal  to  a  sentimental  concern for  future  generations,  which is  presumed in  the 
environmental sustainability as integrity model, is less secure. In chapter 3 I argued 
that Rorty’s proposal for human rights grounded in a sentimental education would 
seem too weak a foundation for many advocates of human rights. It may reasonably 
be  assumed that  advocates  of  environmental  sustainability  might  also  wish  for  a 
stronger  foundation than appeals  to sentiment  seem likely to  provide.  In  the  next 
chapter I consider the plausibility of an alternative foundation: environmental human 
rights.   
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Chapter 7: Rights   or   sustainability, rights  and   sustainability 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  argued  that  questions  of  rights  ghost  issues  of 
citizenship, democracy, and justice in green politics. Yet some green theorists, such as 
William Ophuls (1974) and Garrett Hardin (2005) have taken the view that individual 
rights  are  a  potential  threat  to,  or  might  have to  be sacrificed for,  environmental 
sustainability. On the other hand, Wilfred Beckerman (1999; 2000) has argued that 
protecting human rights should be prioritised over ensuring sustainability, on the basis 
that  the  most  important  thing  that  the  present  generation  can  bequeath  to  future 
generations is not a sustainable environment,  but rather, a fair society.  In the first 
section  of  this  chapter  I  argue  that  both  of  these  positions,  those  proposing 
sustainability  over  rights,  and  those  advocating  rights  over  sustainability,  are 
misguided. The position I defend is that, in view of the environmental impacts on 
human  security  attendant  upon  current  patterns  of  economic  globalisation,  a 
commitment to human rights is interdependent with a commitment to environmental 
sustainability.  Thus,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  chapter,  I  explore  the  plausibility  of 
uniting environmental sustainability and human rights, in the idea of environmental 
human rights.  This  is  a proposal  that  has often been made almost casually in the 
literature on both human rights and environmental sustainability, and which I suggest 
has been somewhat under-theorised. While I defend the view that human rights and 
environmental sustainability are not necessarily mutually exclusive, neither are they 
straightforwardly compatible, particularly if environmental sustainability is simply to 
be added to the list of human rights proclaimed in the contemporary human rights 
regime. Environmental human rights, I conclude, are plausible if and only if attention 
is paid to the problems identified with human rights earlier in the thesis. 
7.1 Human rights or environmental sustainability, not both?
Ophuls,  writing  in  1974,  predicted  ‘the  inevitable  coming  of  scarcity  to 
societies predicated on abundance’, and with this, ‘almost equally inevitable, will be 
the end of political democracy and a drastic reduction in personal liberty’ (Ophuls 
1974:47).  Ophuls  has  often  been  understood  to  imply  that  we  can  either  have 
democracy and individual freedom, or we can have sustainability, but we cannot have 
both. Pursuing both would lead to the destruction of the environment to the degree 
where scarcity caused societal breakdown and a return to authoritarianism as a matter 
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of  necessity.  Taking  a  similarly  apocalyptic  tone,  Hardin,  in  an  article  originally 
published in 1968, laments ‘the tragedy of freedom in a commons’ (Hardin 2005:28). 
The  freedom  he  has  in  mind  is  mostly  economic,  and,  in  particular,  procreative 
freedom. In this regard, he specifically attacks the UDHR right to found a family, 
which is proclaimed in Article 16.1. Writing more than 30 years later, Beckerman 
argued that, rather than trying to predict future environmental demands and protect 
resources  accordingly,  ‘our  most  important  obligation  to  future  generations  is  to 
bequeath to them a ‘decent society’ in which there is respect for basic human rights’ 
(Beckerman 2000:22). 
The detail of the argument put forward by Ophuls and Hardin is not quite the 
apology for environmental authoritarianism which it has sometimes been presented 
as. For example, neither embraces authoritarian government as a good way to live. 
Rather, they both suggest that an absence of individual moral responsibility makes 
authoritarianism necessary. Indeed, Hardin states that, ‘The only kind of coercion I 
recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people 
affected’ (Hardin 2005:34). It is Hardin’s and Ophuls’ pessimism about the possibility 
of encouraging social change towards a morally driven environmental citizenry that 
leads them to conclude authoritarianism is, if not desirable, certainly inevitable. The 
arguments  regarding  democracy  and  citizenship discussed  in  the  previous  chapter 
suggest a greater degree of optimism among more contemporary greens. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering the argument that either environmental 
sustainability or human rights should be prioritised, looking firstly at the idea that 
environmental sustainability should be prioritised over human rights. What this might 
mean in practice is that democratic rights to elect representatives who would have a 
say in deciding environmental policies might be waived, or the right to protest against 
unwanted  policies  might  be  denied  both  in  terms  of  freedom  of  speech  and  of 
association, or perhaps it would become acceptable for governments to detain without 
charge or trial individuals thought likely to impede environmental sustainability in 
some way. Would this deliver environmental sustainability? Perhaps, if governments 
were led by environmental philosopher-kings, but I suspect that few environmental 
activists would feel confident in surrendering the means of holding governments to 
account on environmental policy. 
Just  as  human  rights  can  rest  on  a  consensus  underpinned  by  power  (as 
discussed in chapter 4), so too can a particular model of sustainability reflect power 
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relations, and serve to entrench disparities in power.  Joan Martinez-Alier’s work on 
what he calls ‘the environmentalism of the poor’ suggests that defending the civil and 
political rights of marginalized groups is key to protecting the environment. He argues 
that an important part of the conflict over how sustainability should be conceptualised 
is a conflict over language. The relevant question is therefore, ‘who has the power to 
impose particular languages of valuation?’ (Martinez-Alier 2002: viii). For example, 
an  exclusionary  tendency can  be  seen at  work  in  terms of  a  powerful  consensus 
around the idea of environmental  sustainability as environmental  preservation that 
prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s, and was evident in the creation of wildlife parks, 
which have often justified the exclusion and displacement of indigenous populations 
from their lands, on the grounds that these people did not conform to some externally 
determined notion of environmentally appropriate behaviour (O’Neill 2007: 201-202). 
In these instances, claims to use of the land that do not rest on preserving it as a 
wilderness space are excluded because wilderness preservation has been determined 
to  be  the  appropriate  way  of  valuing  the  land  in  question.  John  O’Neill  (2007) 
identifies  here  a  comparison  with  the  logic  of  colonialism,  also  justified  with 
reference to externally determined standards. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
emphasis  on  inclusiveness  in  the  green  literature  on  deliberative  democracy  and 
citizenship runs counter to this exclusive tendency. But what this example suggests is 
that  human rights  provide important  safeguards against  a  particular  conception of 
environmental sustainability being imposed to the disadvantage of some groups. It can 
be concluded from this discussion that prioritising environmental sustainability over 
human rights is not an attractive strategy.
The  second  option  I  proposed  to  consider  is  that  human  rights  should  be 
prioritised over environmental sustainability. Indeed, Beckerman claims that the focus 
of policy makers now should be on bequeathing to future generations a just society 
rather than a green society.  What this might mean in practice is that governments 
exempt their countries from global environmental regimes, such as the successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol, on the grounds that, in order for their citizens to enjoy human 
rights to economic security, it is necessary to pursue rapid economic growth. Given 
current levels of technological innovation, so the argument would go, it is necessary 
to burn fossil fuels and emit considerable levels of greenhouse gasses, but this is the 
price  to be paid for  economic rights.  Future generations may find their  economic 
rights  harder  to secure as a  consequence of environmental  degradation,  but,  since 
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Beckerman argues  that  future  generations  do  not  have rights,  this  is  not  a  rights 
problem.84 This,  in  view of  my argument  above in chapter  5,  is  not  an  attractive 
proposition.  Pursuing  economic  development  at  the  price  of  bequeathing 
environmental problems to future generations seems likely to undermine the positive 
impact  of  bequeathing  to  future  generations  societies  in  which  human  rights  are 
respected.  The reason for this is  found in Richard Rorty’s  argument,  discussed in 
chapter 3, that sympathy and security go together. Not always, perhaps; some people 
who enjoy personal and economic security today who clearly have little sympathy for 
those whose rights remain chronically underfulfilled. But I contend that this problem 
would be exacerbated if more people faced threats to their human security as a result 
of increasing environmental degradation. This, I argued in chapter 2, is the probable 
outcome of increasing economic globalisation, which the contemporary human rights 
regime  does  not  necessarily  challenge  (see  Evans  and  Hancock  1998;  Stammers 
1999). 
On the other hand, Beckerman’s (2000) concern that people should not live in 
absolute poverty, and his belief that a fairer distribution of goods would follow from 
the more widespread fulfilment of human rights, is to some extent consistent with my 
argument  above  and  is  a  position  that  many  greens  would  endorse.  However,  in 
chapter 4 I noted a number of problems with the contemporary human rights regime. 
Firstly, the ecological embeddedness of human beings is not recognised. Secondly, 
the  contemporary human rights  regime is  notably state-centric,  in  that  individuals 
have rights against the government of a state. The models of inclusive citizenship 
discussed in the previous chapter, whereby individuals are said to have rights that 
follow the contours of risk, or of ecological harm, suggest the possibility of rights 
against  foreign governments.  These rights,  I  noted,  were problematic,  in  that they 
might  compromise  rights  to  self-determination,  which,  in  view  of  the  discussion 
above of the possibility of ‘environmental colonialism’, seem also to be important. 
One possible solution to such conflicts is suggested in the idea of ‘appropriateness’ as 
to the level of political decision-making, as discussed in chapter 5, which suggests a 
further threat to the norm of state sovereignty. Human rights have also been said to 
84 Beckerman (1999) does not in fact agree that future generations will have too many problems coping 
with environmental degradation because he argues that should any resource become seriously in danger 
of being exhausted then feedback mechanisms in society and the market will lead to price increases or 
investment in the development of alternative technologies. For a discussion of why I disagree with 
Beckerman’s position on the market, see chapter 5. 
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represent a challenge to the sovereignty-based international order (Donnelly 2003), 
yet to date states have mostly been unwilling to challenge the sovereign authority of 
governments in the name of humanitarian intervention (see chapter 4). Indeed, Evans 
and Hancock (1998) regard the contemporary international human rights regime as 
being embedded firmly within the sovereignty-based international order. On the other 
hand,  human rights  are  neither  fixed nor  given.  Alternatives  to  the  contemporary 
human  rights  regime  might  better  facilitate  environmental  sustainability.  In  this 
regard, a number of greens have proposed the idea of environmental human rights. If 
Jack Donnelly (2007) is correct in arguing that human rights are tools for protecting 
human dignity, then it seems plausible to suggest that a new model of human rights 
ought to take account of contemporary threats to human dignity. That being the case, 
it  follows  that  if  my  argument  regarding  the  environmental  impact  of  economic 
globalisation is  valid,  then an adequate theory of human rights would be one that 
could  take account  of  the environmental  threats  to human dignity.  In  short,  there 
would seem to be a need for environmental human rights.
7.2 The idea of environmental human rights
A number of scholars  make reference to the idea of environmental  human 
rights.  Within  the  field  of  human  rights,  Stammers  (1999:992)  identifies 
environmental human rights, along with women’s rights, as one of the areas in which 
there is debate about how the international bill of rights should be extended, while 
Anthony J. Langlois (2001) speculates on the possibility of there being a ‘human right 
to  an  adequate  environment’.  Within  green  theory,  Robyn  Eckersley  notes  the 
attractiveness of the rights framework whereby rights ‘trump’ lesser considerations, 
and thus the possibility that environmental rights could guarantee ecological outcomes 
where  interests  compete  (Eckersley  1996:216).  Jan  Hancock  (2003)  and  Tim 
Hayward  (2005a)  have  both  undertaken  book-length  treatments  of  environmental 
human rights, each assuming that the case to prove is that environmental human rights 
are plausible, taking as given the argument that human rights are both plausible and 
enjoy universal or near universal assent. The arguments advanced in chapters 3 and 4 
of  this  thesis  present  a  more  complicated  picture,  and  on  that  basis,  it  seems 
reasonable to suggest that the idea of environmental human rights has been under-
theorised in academic writing to date. In particular, there has been little discussion of 
the implications of adopting the traditionally liberal notion of rights with a view to 
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furthering the project of realising environmental sustainability, which, as noted in the 
previous two chapters, has often been thought to be in tension with liberal democracy.
There are two possible approaches to articulating environmental human rights. 
Either environmental rights may be derived from existing human rights documents, or 
an entirely new bill of environmental human rights may be argued for in the spirit of, 
but  independently  from,  existing  human rights.  Hancock takes  the  first  approach, 
while  Hayward  takes  something  akin  to  the  second,  arguing for  a  newly defined 
environmental human right to be enshrined in national constitutions. These two recent 
works  therefore lend themselves  to  an analysis  of  the  ways in which the  idea of 
environmental  human rights  has  been tackled within  green politics.  The focus on 
green scholars, rather than human rights scholars, is appropriate, since it is incumbent 
upon green scholars to be aware of the environmental implications of adopting the 
language  of  liberal  democracies,  which,  Eckersley  claims  (1996:214-216)  human 
rights clearly embody.
Hancock argues that the full realisation of the rights enumerated in currently 
accepted  human  rights  instruments  such  as  the  UDHR  and  the  two  International 
Covenants  would  require  the  recognition  of  two  environmental  human  rights. 
Although a broader spectrum of environmental human rights might be desirable, ‘to 
guarantee  the  environmental  conditions  required  for  the  enjoyment  of  legally 
stipulated  human  rights,  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  only  two  environmental  human 
rights’ (Hancock 2003:6); specifically, the right to (1) an environment free from toxic 
pollution and (2) ownership of natural resources (Hancock 2003:1). It is Hancock’s 
contention that, given the threats to human health, dignity, security, and well-being 
posed by environmental harms, these two environmental human rights are necessary 
for the full realisation of such rights as the right to ‘life, liberty and security of person’ 
(UDHR,  Article  3),  rights  to  property  (UDHR,  Article  17),  ‘the  right  to  social 
security’ and the right of all to the ‘realization … of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity’ (UDHR, Article 22), and perhaps most obviously, 
the right of all to, 
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of  his  family,  including  food,  clothing,  housing,  medical  care  and 
necessary  social  services,  and  the  right  to  security  in  the  event  of 
unemployment, sickness, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control. (UDHR, Article 25)
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Finally, Article 28 states that ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’, 
and Article 30 states, ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for 
any  State,  group  or  person  any  right  to  engage  in  any  activity  … aimed  at  the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein’. 
The argument seems to be not that there should be these two environmental 
human rights, rather, that these rights already exist, insofar as they are implicit  in 
existing human rights covenants, and that they should therefore be recognised and 
made explicit.  For Hancock,  the greatest  obstacle  to the full  realisation of human 
rights  (including the  two environmental  rights)  is  the  capitalist  system and,  more 
importantly,  the  dominance  of  (neo-classical)  economic  rationality  in  political 
thinking. In light of the pressures of economic globalisation and the dominance of 
economic  rationality  in  political  decision-making,  Hancock  (2003:17)  argues  that 
governments’  support  of  human  rights  reflects  a  desire  to  claim  and  maintain 
legitimacy  vis-à-vis  their  citizens  and  the  international  community,  rather  than  a 
genuine commitment to satisfying the needs and protecting the well-being of citizens 
(which,  in  Hancock’s  view,  ought  to  be  the  test  of  a  government’s  legitimacy). 
Hancock’s argument can be summarised as follows; if political decisions are made in 
economically rational terms, then environmental protection is sacrificed; if, however, 
ecological rationality prevails,  then the realisation of human rights will be seen to 
necessitate  strategies  of  environmental  protection  (Hancock  2003:17-33).  Such 
strategies  may  be  encapsulated  in  the  two  environmental  rights  that  Hancock 
specifies.
Hayward’s argument is somewhat different. His book ‘takes as its premise that 
human rights have a justification and legitimacy which precludes their being rejected’ 
(Hayward 2005a:35) and seeks to claim the same status for environmental rights by 
arguing  that  an  environmental  human  right  should  be  embedded  in  the  national 
constitution ‘of any modern democracy’ (Hayward 2005a:1).  Indeed, a number of 
constitutions  written  in  the  past  twenty  years  already  recognise  some  form  of 
environmental  right(s)  (Hayward  2005a:201)  –  and  consideration  of  these 
developments,  as  well  as  moral  argument,  leads  Hayward  to  propose  a  general 
environmental human right: namely the ‘right of every individual to an environment 
adequate for their health and well-being’ (Hayward 2005a:1). Hayward finds support 
for his proposed right in the draft principles of the UN Sub-committee on Human 
177
Rights and the Environment and adopts the chosen formulation from the influential 
Brundtland  report  (2005a:28-9).  Explaining the  relationship  between the  proposed 
environmental human right and the Brundtland idea of sustainable development, he 
goes on to note that rights to social justice and rights of future generations ‘would 
require  to be  stated  separately’  (Hayward  2005a:29).  This  differs  somewhat  from 
Hancock’s approach, which sees the realisation of social justice as being dependent 
upon the fulfilment of all human rights, which would in turn mandate the realisation 
of the two environmental human rights he proposes. In short, where Hancock posits 
an  inherent  inter-relatedness,  Hayward  allows for  the  separation  of  environmental 
rights and other forms of justice, in constitutional law at least. However, Hayward is 
clear that a constitutionally enshrined environmental human right is not, and should 
not  be,  a  panacea for  the environmental  movement.  Rather,  he sees  it  as  but  one 
strategy in a much broader struggle. 
Hayward’s proposed environmental human right is at once narrowly focussed 
and yet open to the charge that it mandates a multiplicity of rights that may prove too 
extensive to be workable. He devotes a couple of pages to speculating as to which 
specific procedural and substantive rights might be needed to realise a right of all to 
an  environment  adequate  for  health  and  well-being  (Hayward  2005a:29-31),  then 
steers himself away from committing to any of these more specific rights, noting that 
context would play a role in shaping interpretations, thus making it impossible to be 
prescriptive about what rights would be needed everywhere to protect the proposed 
environmental  human  right.  Hayward  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  ‘declaratory 
formulation’  is  in  keeping  with  the  style  of  established  human  rights  (Hayward 
2005a:31). Others, such as Eckersley (1996), have committed themselves to a detailed 
list of the procedural rights needed to underwrite a declaratory right of the kind that 
Hayward proposes. These include what are typically thought to be (environmental) 
citizens’ rights, such as rights to be informed of proposed developments in a particular 
local area, rights to information about environmental impact assessments, and so on. 
It should be noted, however, that Eckersley’s notion of inclusive sovereignty would 
entitle  those outside  of  the  citizenry  traditionally  conceived to these citizen types 
rights (see chapter 6). However, if established, Hayward’s constitutional right to an 
environment adequate for human health and well-being would set a standard whereby 
it would be incumbent upon all governments that adhere to human rights to establish 
and maintain for their citizens access to some version of these procedural rights. 
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Both Hancock and Hayward avoid discussion of philosophical problems with 
human rights. Hancock explains that:
Methodologically, this examination is predicated upon analysis of existing 
human rights texts rather than upon philosophical grounds because of the 
ontologically  contested nature of philosophical claims to human rights. 
(Hancock 2003:11)
Hayward, in a footnote to a 2001 article, brackets much of the historical criticism of 
the abstraction, class bias and cultural imperialism of existing human rights, as ‘moot 
points’, but goes on to say that ‘the content and weight of certain specific rights’, is a 
matter  that  requires  further  discussion  (Hayward  2001:132-3).  In  his  2005  book, 
which does indeed include further discussion of these issues, he sees the challenge as 
being, on the one hand, to prove that the notion of environmental human rights does 
not  ‘overextend’  human  rights  discourse,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  ‘defend  the 
apparent reduction of environmental concern to a concern with human interests in it’ 
(Hayward 2005a:25). Both Hancock and Hayward therefore take the status of human 
rights  as  given.  Although  Hancock  wants  to  see  the  rationality  that  informs  the 
interpretation  of  human  rights  overturned,  neither  theorist  is  troubled  by  ‘the 
ontologically contested nature of philosophical claims to human rights’. This attitude 
is not uncommon amongst green scholars who have discussed the possibility of there 
being environmental human rights. One possible explanation for this is the prevalence 
of the idea that there is ‘an overlapping consensus’ around the idea of human rights, 
such that  support  for human rights  is  ‘near  universal’  as Donnelly (1999b;  2003) 
claims. As was discussed in chapter 4, there are those who doubt the integrity of the 
claimed consensus, and one of the points I explore in what follows is whether or not 
that is a serious problem for the idea of environmental human rights. Before turning to 
this  question,  however,  I  first  consider  what  advantages and resources the human 
rights framework has to offer the project of realising environmental sustainability. In 
a  less  than  perfect  world,  it  may  be  that  the  potential  benefits  of  discussing 
environmental  sustainability  in  terms  of  human  rights  sufficiently  offset  any 
philosophical misgivings.
7.2.1 The merits of environmental human rights 
There  are  a  number  of  clear  strategic  advantages  in  presenting  claims  for 
environmental  justice  in the  language of  human rights.  Firstly,  there  can be  little 
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doubt that human rights discourse has come to be the authoritative language in which 
moral claims are presented in the context of both democratic polities and international 
political forums. Reflecting this dominance, the legal codification of human rights has 
developed  and  multiplied  since  the  1948  UDHR.  Adopting  rights  language  lends 
legitimacy and intelligibility to complex claims that, as Avner de-Shalit (2001:117-9) 
observes, are often poorly understood by the general public. Institutionalising these 
rights  in  international  conventions  and/or  national  constitutions  increases  the 
opportunities for the legal protection of the environment. As Eckersley (1996) notes, 
the  rights  discourse has  its  origins in liberal  politics,  a  point  also made by Chris 
Brown (1997). For some, this renders it implacably opposed to environmental ends, 
given, for example, the tendency in liberal politics to value the individual abstracted 
from his (social and ecological) environment.85 Yet one attraction of the rights-based 
approach is that it may afford the opportunity to reshape the terms of human rights. 
Engaging  an  influential  discourse  presents  opportunities  to  challenge  the 
understandings  of  the terms in which debate  is  conducted.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that 
Hancock’s  concern  to  ground  human  rights  in  ecological  rationality  might  be 
understood.  Pointing  to  the  advent  of  the  idea  of  social  and  economic  rights, 
Stammers (1999) argues that the scope of ‘liberal rights’ (by which he means political 
and civil rights) was extended by nineteenth-century social movements adopting the 
language of rights to further their aims. He sees a central place for social movements 
in driving social change (Stammers 1999:986).
Drawing on Stammers’ work, Eckersley (1996:219-20) observes the success 
of the socialist inspired ‘immanent critique’ of liberal rights and asks whether the 
green movement could achieve something similar. Thus the notions of autonomy and 
justice  that  Eckersley finds central  to  the  mainstream conception of  human rights 
should be understood in broader terms than is currently the case. Vandana Shiva has 
pointed  to  the  indivisibility  of  so-called  ‘first’  (civil  and  political)  and  ‘second’ 
(social, economic and cultural) generation rights, arguing that ‘Freedom from hunger 
is no less a human right than freedom of speech. Without the former, the latter does 
not exist’ (Shiva 1999:88). What is needed to ensure the fulfilment of human rights is 
more than their legal protection, it is also the capacity to realise them. The task of the 
human rights advocate is therefore to identify institutions or structures that inhibit or 
85 Eckersley (1996) berates the liberal tendency to abstract the individual from his social context. In 
chapter 5 I argued that this criticism is perhaps over-stated, but endorsed Eckersley’s  view that the 
ecological context of human life is typically overlooked.
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undermine  the  realisation  of  human rights  as  well  as  those  that  directly  threaten 
human rights. If a sustainable environment were understood to be as much a material 
precondition for the exercise of civil and political rights as food and water are thus 
argued to be, then, contrary to Beckerman’s position, such rights may be thought to be 
‘indivisible’ from environmental rights also, and norms or institutions that threatened 
or  undermined  sustainability  would  also  be  the  target  of  human  rights  claims. 
Environmental human rights thus understood might well be consistent with Thomas 
Pogge’s institutional model of human rights – indeed, Hayward’s understanding of 
human rights is explicitly derived from Pogge’s model, whereby, in contrast to the 
contemporary human rights regime, the underfulfilment of human rights is taken as 
the relevant standard (see chapter 4).86
A second respect in which environmental human right(s) may be attractive is 
apparent in the logic of human rights. As J.G. Merrills explains in a discussion of the 
conceptual difficulties that arise in linking the environment and human rights, ‘rights 
are a way of marking out a protected area within which the rights-holders are free to 
pursue their goals’ (Merrills 1996:27). The point of claiming environmental human 
right(s) is therefore to promote an adequate environment (Hayward), or the right to 
ownership of environmental resources and an environment free from toxic pollution 
(Hancock), as being beyond the sphere of political compromise. Thus debates about 
whether  governments should prioritise the environment over  development,  or  vice 
versa, are easily settled where further development is not essential to the fulfilment of 
other human rights. In this context, the advantage of a rights-based approach is that, 
following Dworkin, ‘it serves to ‘trump’ competing claims for utility maximisation’ 
(Eckersley 1996:216; Dworkin 1984).
Hayward expands upon this line of argument by suggesting that embedding 
environmental rights in national constitutions serves a broader purpose than simply 
providing  for  the  protection  of  the  environment  by  legal  action.  One  effect  of 
environmental  human  rights  would  be  the  mandating  of  the  procedural  rights 
discussed above. Hayward (2005a:125-127) claims that the legal recognition of such 
rights would have a positive impact on the democratic credentials of environmental 
86 That  said,  Hayward  has  some reservations  about  Pogge’s  argument,  specifically  relating  to  the 
latter’s  claim that  human rights  can  be  effective  as  moral  rights  only.  Hayward  contends,  on  the 
contrary, that one of the objects of those claiming moral rights is to have those rights legally recognised 
and  protected.  Without  such  legal  recognition,  Hayward  argues,  the  moral  right  is  weakend  (see 
Hayward  2005:38-41).  Hence  Hayward’s  position  is  in  some  ways  closer  to  the  contemporary 
international human rights regime, in that he is arguing for constitutionally enshrined legal rights. 
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decision-making procedures, would help facilitate environmental justice, and would 
foster  an ethic  of  custodianship,  all  key aspects  of  a  sustainable  society.  Another 
positive effect would be to introduce environmental ethics to a wider and younger 
audience  wherever  citizenship  training  is  part  of  the  national  curriculum,  and  to 
contribute to the environmental education of the general public. Finally, ‘Such effects 
would serve to consolidate the essential aims of environmental protection as being a 
matter of public interest rather than partisan cause’ (Hayward 2005a:126). 
Finally,  environmental  human  rights  could  be  interpreted  along  the  lines 
suggested in Pogge’s institutional model (discussed above in chapter 4). Individuals 
would  then  have  a  negative  duty  not  to  support  human  rights-disrespecting 
institutions,  as  well  as  governments  being  responsible  for  the  legal  protection  of 
human  rights.  The  individual  duty  could  be  readily  assimilated  as  a  practice  of 
environmental citizenship, at  the same time as providing citizens with a means of 
conceptualising  the  link  between  actions  and  environmental  impacts.  If  de-Shalit 
(2000:178)  is  correct  in  suggesting  that  one  of  the  primary  obstacles  to  active 
environmental citizenship is a lack of knowledge and understanding of environmental 
issues,  then  environmental  human rights  so  understood  could  prove  an  important 
educative tool. 
In summary there are (at least) four areas within which advances may be made 
by adopting a rights-based approach to environmental issues. Most straightforwardly, 
opportunities for legal action to protect the environment are increased. Second, and 
perhaps more significantly, the idea of environmental protection and its importance is 
arguably  strengthened,  made  more  credible,  more  easily  understandable,  and  is 
authoritatively  embedded  in  the  legal  and  political  fabric  if  some  form  of 
environmental  human  rights  is  recognised.  Thirdly  and  relatedly,  claiming 
environmental human rights may create opportunities to reshape the understandings of 
key elements of political vocabulary. Finally, environmental human rights understood 
on an institutional model may provide a conceptual tool that would help explicate the 
link between actions and environmental impacts to putative environmental citizens.
7.2.2 Problems with environmental human rights?
On the other hand, there are also a number of reasons for caution with regard 
to the attractiveness of the idea of environmental human rights. One respect in which 
the  logic  of  human  rights  is  potentially  problematic  for  environmentalists  is  its 
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anthropocentrism. As discussed in chapter 3, Michael Perry (1998) holds that to claim 
a human right is to say that there is something morally significant about being human. 
Human rights discourse recognises that individual humans have a right to what they 
need, or a right to pursue their own interests, in a way that individual snails, or giant 
pandas,  or  (more  complicatedly)  forest  ecosystems  do  not.  Catherine  Redgwell 
identifies  ‘a  conceptual  shift  from  conservation  to  ‘ecological  consciousness’’ 
(Redgwell  1996:73)  in  the  last  thirty  years  or  so  of  international  conventions 
concerning  the  protection  of  the  environment  generally  and  threatened  species  in 
particular.  For  Redgwell,  the  advent  of  environmental  human  rights  would  bring 
benefits  to  the  protection  of  other  species,  as  it  would  protect  human  and  other 
species’ habitats simultaneously. She therefore argues that the increasing dominance 
in  political  and  legal  thought  of  ‘weak  anthropocentrism’,  which  values  nature 
instrumentally as the inalienable context of human life, and thus recognises the inter-
connectedness of human life and that of other species, goes some way to ‘breaching 
the dam of anthropocentrism’ (Redgwell 1996:87). 
Nevertheless, the fact that individuals of other species are not valued in the 
same way as individual humans are in the human rights paradigm does undoubtedly 
elevate  humans  over  other  species,  and  this  will  be  unappealing  to  ecocentrists. 
Moreover,  Hayward  acknowledges  that,  where  environmental  human  rights  are 
accepted and there is a conflict between ‘human interests’ and ‘non-human interests’, 
then ‘the human interest will prevail’ (Hayward 2005a:34). With this in mind, Klaus 
Bosselmann proposes an ‘ecological limitation’ to environmental human rights. Such 
a limitation ‘refers to the fact that individual freedom is determined not only by a 
social context – the social dimension of human rights – but also by an ecological 
context’ (Bosselmann 2001:119).
Even  so,  the  ecological  context  that  can  support  human  life  need  not 
necessarily be as biodiverse nor be less polluted than it is today. As observed above, 
Wissenburg has suggested that a global Manhattan could be ‘sustainable’ in the sense 
of being adequate to support human life, if people are prepared to accept it. There is, 
therefore,  reason  for  concern  about  the  quality  of  environmental  sustainability  a 
rights-based approach could offer.  Hayward would acknowledge that  even though 
they act as ‘trumps’, rights are not absolute; rights trump utility, not other rights. The 
right of any individual to freedom of speech, for example, is limited by the right of all 
to  security,  thus  the  freedom  to  incite  violence  is  circumscribed.  An  ecological 
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limitation  to  human  freedoms  would  seem  to  be  implicit  in  the  notion  of 
environmental  human rights proposed by Hayward and certainly Hancock, but the 
precise  point  at  which  human  interests  would  ‘trump’  the  imperatives  of 
environmental protection cannot be determined  a priori. The fact also remains that 
environmental human rights do not promote the intrinsic value of the biosphere, an 
important goal for many greens. What they do promote is the fundamental value of a 
human interest  in  the  environment,  but  that  may  yield  a  rather  weaker  vision  of 
sustainability than many greens would hope for. On the other hand, an enlightened 
citizenry of environmental  stewards could interpret environmental  human rights in 
terms of a strong notion of sustainability. As argued in chapter 5, anthropocentrism is 
not necessarily correlated with weak sustainability.
It is unlikely that any one argument would satisfy all greens. The aim here is 
to evaluate the extent to which environmental human rights might be thought to be a 
useful  tool  in  relation  to  environmental  sustainability.  If  the  question  is  whether, 
strategically  –  that  is,  with the  aim of  effecting widespread political  change in  a 
democratic manner (if not always in a democratic context) – environmental human 
rights are useful, then the charge of anthropocentrism is not necessarily something 
that should discourage advocates of a rights-based approach. De-Shalit advises that 
the ecocentric approach is often unpersuasive to the public at large, who may be more 
concerned  with  economic  security  than  long-term  environmental  sustainability. 
Hayward points out that the accusation of anthropocentrism does not recognise the 
subtlety  of  either  the  anthropocentric  or  the  non-anthropocentric  position:  The 
anthropocentric position, if ‘weak’ (as above) recognises the inter-connectedness of 
human and non-human life in a way that ‘strong’ anthropocentrism does not, and, 
further,  the goal  of preserving the ecosystem as a whole is  indirectly indicated in 
promoting environmental human rights, even if the motivation is human-centred. On 
the other hand, it is argued that,
[a] human rights approach provides a link to interests and motivation, and 
thus to actual practices, in a way that more abstract notions of a ‘right of 
environment’ or of ‘nature’s intrinsic value’ do not. (Hayward 2005a:35)
Environmental human rights can thus to some extent be defended against the 
charges of inherent liberalism and anthropocentrism. But an important element of a 
weak anthropocentric theory, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6, was concern for the 
welfare of future generations. Environmental sustainability protected by reference to 
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the right  to live in an environment adequate for  the health and well-being of the 
present generation is consistent with seriously degrading the environment that future 
generations will inherit. Hancock’s formulation of environmental rights, promulgating 
the  right  to  live  in  an  environment  free  from  toxic  pollution,  and  the  right  to 
ownership  of  natural  resources,  is  arguably  more  robust,  but  would  nevertheless 
conceivably  allow  for  the  overuse  of  resources  that  are  owned  by  the  present 
generation,  thus  bequeathing  an  impoverished  range  of  resources  to  the  next 
generation. The question therefore arises as to whether future generations can be said 
to have rights, specifically, rights which the present generation has a duty to recognise 
and not infringe, and it is a question that has been much debated in environmental 
ethics. 
Ruth  Macklin  (1981:151-152)  argues  that  there  is  no  currently  identifiable 
subject that can be said to be the future generation-rights holder, a line also taken by 
Beckerman (2000:18). In reply to this Ernest Partridge (1990) offers the example of a 
campsite, which is said to prove that future generations can have certain types  of 
rights. The campsite example runs as follows: if I stay at a campsite I am generally 
recognised as having a duty to leave the campsite in as good a state as I found it for 
the next potential  user. This holds true whether the next person comes along next 
week or many years after I am dead. Partridge is confident that this proves that future 
generations can have what he calls ‘designative rights’, which are rights correlated to 
duties that are owed to a collective of people who can be described but not identified. 
But there are two problems with this argument. Firstly, it yields a potentially very 
weak  version  of  sustainability,  since  the  duty  bearer  is  obligated  to  leave  the 
environment, or the campsite, only in as good a state as it was found. Secondly, it is 
not clear why it is that future people have rights here. They cannot be said to have 
rights in a contractual or a reciprocal  sense,  since there is  no clear contractual or 
reciprocal relationship. Thus it seems plausible that the duty I have to clear up the 
campsite is closer to the stewardship duties discussed in the previous chapter, which 
do not depend on corresponding rights, but are instead tied to a model of citizenship. 
De-Shalit (1995:114-116) considers the possibility that future generations might have 
rights in virtue of having interests. But this raises the problem that, for a future person 
to have any interest at all, he would have to exist, so he would have an interest in 
existing. Thus if a future person has rights in virtue of his interests, then he has a right 
to exist. This, as de-Shalit notes, is unacceptable, both in terms of the procreative 
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duties it might be said to place on current humans, and in terms of the impact on 
population numbers. These debates indicate that the case for future generations having 
rights does not seem a sufficiently robust basis on which to argue for environmental 
sustainability. 
This casts a further doubt on the direct usefulness of the idea of environmental 
human rights, particularly if they are conceived in the avowedly legalistic terms that 
Hayward proposes. In the previous chapter I argued that Andrew Dobson’s idea of 
post-cosmopolitan citizenship was problematic in that it recognised duties of justice in 
relation to environmental harms that may have been perpetrated by people already 
dead. Environmental human rights might be thought to give rise to the same sort of 
problems. Suppose I am born in a small island state in 2120, and that, when I am two 
years old, life on the island becomes untenable because of rising sea levels. I may 
have the right to live in an environment adequate for my health and well-being, but 
the people who have violated my right are not my contemporaries, they are the people 
and governments of previous generations. Quite obviously, I cannot seek legal redress 
against the dead.87 
However,  I  can act  as  an environmental  steward and seek to  maintain  the 
environment for future generations, and environmental human rights might well help 
me in discharging my environmental citizenship duties. For example, if the right to 
live in an environment adequate for my health and well-being entails, as Eckersley 
suggests,  rights  to  be  informed  of  proposed  developments,  or  rights  to  access 
environmental impact assessments, then as an environmental citizen I might find these 
rights crucial. Furthermore, such rights would have an impact on some cases within 
the present generation. Not all environmental problems are gradual and incremental. 
The siting of a toxic dump, for instance, can immediately impact on the health and 
well-being of local people, and would be directly captured by either Hayward’s or 
Hancock’s  formulation  of  human  rights.  Similarly,  those  who  have  been  made 
environmental refugees in virtue of conservation policies that equated environmental 
protection  with  wilderness  preservation  might  well  argue  that  the  right  to  an 
87 A related point to be noted here is Derek Parfitt’s well-known ‘non-identity problem’. Parfitt (1984) 
argues that I cannot rationally wish that different decisions had been made before I was born, since it is 
the precise pattern of decisions that were made that led to me being born as the person that I am. Parfitt 
therefore argues that future individuals cannot be said to have been harmed by policies that bring about 
their existence. I suggest that this point makes little practical difference when making decisions about 
environmental policies, since, we can act as environmental stewards independently of the rights or 
claims of future generations (see chapter 6). 
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environment adequate for health and well-being, or the right to ownership of natural 
resources, would mean that they ought not to have been removed from their lands. So, 
although environmental human rights encounter some problems in relation to future 
generations, this does not render the idea of environmental human rights redundant.
What all this suggests is that the idea of environmental human rights is indeed 
plausible, and also has the potential to be useful to environmental citizens. But there 
remain  the  problems  with  the  contemporary  international  human  rights  regime 
identified in chapter 4 and discussed briefly in the first section of this chapter. Thus I 
suggest that environmental human rights merit the endorsement of greens if and only 
if they are conceptualised differently to those rights recognised in the contemporary 
international human rights regime. The standard by which to judge the (in)security of 
environmental human rights is that proposed by Pogge, that is, not whether the rights 
have  been  directly  violated  but  whether  or  not  they  are  underfulfilled.  This  is 
appropriate because it better captures the chronic and systematic nature of some of the 
problems  associated  with  economic  globalisation.  There  is  also  merit  in  Pogge’s 
proposal that individuals be responsible for human rights in that they have a negative 
duty  to  refrain  from supporting  human  rights-disrespecting  institutions.  As  noted 
above, this could be understood in terms of a duty as an environmental citizen. In 
chapter 4 I argued that Pogge fails to insulate himself from the libertarian critique he 
seeks to avoid, because the only plausible way of fulfilling this negative duty in a 
globalised world is to become a hermit, which, in itself is problematic since it is not 
consistent with many people’s conception of a good life. It is also reasonable to argue 
that this negative duty falls foul of some of the doubts I raised in the previous chapter 
about  environmental  citizenship  in  that  it  envisages  a  more  onerous  model  of 
citizenship than many liberals might be comfortable with and this in turn leaves, at the 
very  least,  unanswered  questions  about  the  division  of  labour.  But  it  does  not 
necessarily  entail  the  identification  with  community  inherent  in  republican  and 
communitarian notions of citizenship discussed in chapter 6. It is closer to the post-
cosmopolitan view of recognising the inevitability of social interaction and human 
interconnectedness, and, with that, the possibility of injustice. 
Doubts about the consensus on human rights, and arguments about conflicting 
values, present further problems for the idea of environmental human rights. Non-
Western critics of human rights have also at times rejected the implicit universalism 
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they see in the idea of sustainable development (again see chapter 4). Indeed, it is 
clear from O’Neill’s and Martinez-Alier’s work that there are reasons to be sceptical 
of  environmental  standards  that  are  applied  without  the  informed  consent  of  the 
people affected. Human rights are undeniably universalist,  and the terms in which 
human rights are defended by political theorists sometimes do little to assuage the 
concerns  of  those who fear  that  human rights  proponents  are  opposed  to cultural 
difference.  But,  as argued in chapter 4,  it  does  not  follow that  cultural  relativism 
offers an appropriate guide to action. 
Implicit in my argument in the thesis has been the claim that human rights 
work as a package deal, and that environmental sustainability, being crucial to human 
security, ought to be recognised as such. The view of human rights as a package is 
exemplified in Shiva’s point (above), which is that civil and political rights and social 
and  economic  rights  are  interdependent,  presumably  with  environmental  rights  as 
well. On this basis, it matters very much to the environmentalist if human rights to 
freedom  from  discrimination  are  not  respected.  It  might  be,  for  instance,  that  a 
particular ethnic group is discriminated against in that the land that they live on is 
polluted by toxic waste  and the authority  does not prevent or correct  this.  In this 
instance,  freedom of  speech,  to  be  able  to  speak  out  about  the  injustice,  is  also 
important. Thus it is easy to see the strength of the package deal approach. But there 
are corresponding weaknesses. The adoption of the human rights framework enjoins 
environmentalists to argue for a package, some elements of which are not universally 
respected,  as  seen  in  chapter  4.  It  may  be  that  environmental  issues  are  more 
amenable  to  having  universal  appeal  as  a  human rights  issue  than  freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds of gender, or freedom of religion may have. In this 
case, environmentalists might feel that their case would be enhanced if they argued 
that  the right  to  an environment  adequate for  human well-being (or  whatever  the 
chosen formulation) is a more important human right than these other rights with less 
universal appeal. But if it is permissible to cherry-pick which rights are recognised, 
then the whole package begins to unravel. My aim in section 7.1 was to discredit the 
idea that we can have environmental sustainability or human rights, but not both. On 
the contrary, neither is secure without the other. 
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7.3 Conclusion
One  of  the  aims  of  this  thesis  is  to  evaluate  whether  the  human  rights 
framework is an appropriate one in terms of which to respond to the environmental 
challenges associated with globalisation. This might be thought a misguided project in 
view  of  the  assertions  of  scholars  who  have  endorsed  the  view  that  either 
environmental sustainability, or human rights, should have priority. The justification 
for  such  views  is  either  that  the  freedoms  associated  with  human  rights  will 
undermine environmental sustainability, or that a world in which human rights are 
respected will be of greater value to future generations than a world in which certain 
ecological resources are preserved. Both these positions are flawed. Human rights and 
environmental  sustainability  are  interdependent,  particularly  in  the  context  of 
globalisation  as  it  is  currently  pursued,  where  economic  activity  typically  entails 
environmental degradation, which in turn undermines human security. The discussion 
in the previous chapter demonstrated that individual rights are necessary in order to 
guard against the potential for environmental politics to become oppressive. In this 
chapter  it  was  shown  that  a  powerful  consensus  around  a  particular  model  of 
environmental sustainability can also generate circumstances in which fundamental 
rights  are  ignored  and  abused,  for  example  where  environmental  protection  was 
understood in terms of wilderness preservation and used to justify the exclusion of 
people from their lands. Thus respect for human rights can be an important corrective 
to  the  more  problematic  aspects  of  the  universalism  disclosed  in  environmental 
values. 
But  it  was  also  noted  in  this  chapter  that,  although  human  rights  and 
environmental  sustainability  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  neither  are  they 
straightforwardly  nor  immediately  compatible.  Thus  the  latter  part  of  the  chapter 
considered the plausibility  and appeal of  the idea of  environmental  human rights. 
Taking the status of human rights as given, and adding environmental rights, is an 
imprudent strategy in view of the problems exposed in the contemporary human rights 
regime. Therefore, insofar as environmentalists wish to institutionalise a right to some 
standard  of  environmental  protection  that  will  have  the  force  of  trumping  other 
concerns,  then  it  is  incumbent  upon  green  theorists  to  follow  up  on  Eckersley’s 
proposed project of an ‘immanent critique’ of human rights. This might lead to an 
endorsement  of  something  akin  to  Pogge’s  institutional  model  of  human  rights, 
which, though not without its problems, is attuned to the criticisms of state-centrism 
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and is directed at the underfulfilment  of human rights.  The idea of environmental 
human rights has much to recommend it, if, and only if, human rights are not taken as 
they  are,  but  are  instead  reinterpreted  so  as  to  address  the  problem  of  the 
underfulfilment of human rights, and so as to recognise the ecological as well as the 
social embeddedness of human life. 
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Chapter 8: Human rights, environmental sustainability, 
and the inevitability of moral choice
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the dynamic between human rights 
and environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation. It is evident from the 
analyses presented in chapter 2 that economic globalisation as it is currently pursued 
is environmentally unsustainable, and that environmental degradation is a significant 
and growing source of human insecurity. Environmental sustainability is the relevant 
test since a sustainable environment is a precondition for all human activity. Humans 
are ecologically embedded beings. There are a range of positions on the standard or 
quality  of  environmental  sustainability  required,  and  I  do  not  pretend  that  my 
argument will satisfy all of them. I have, however, followed Bryan Norton in arguing 
that sustainability is best interpreted in terms of ecosystem integrity as the best means 
of bequeathing a range of options and opportunities to future generations. However, 
commitment to such a standard depends on a presumed concern for the fate of future 
generations  over  the  long  term.  Nevertheless,  a  more  minimal  standard  of 
environmental sustainability is also being undermined in the short term. That being 
the case, environmental sustainability is clearly a challenge for human rights. 
In the thesis, I have sought to assess whether the contemporary human rights 
regime  provides  an  adequate  and  appropriate  framework  for  responding  to  that 
challenge,  and  I  have  argued  that  it  does  not,  as  human  rights  are  currently 
interpreted. There are several reasons for this, not least of which is the problem that 
neither the contemporary human rights regime, nor any of the theoretical justifications 
or  expositions  of  human  rights  studied  here  explicitly  recognise  the  ecological 
embeddedness  of  human  activity.  However,  demonstrating  that  humans  are 
ecologically  embedded beings is  relatively straightforward,  whereas demonstrating 
why individuals should act to protect the human rights of others, or to preserve the 
environment for the sake of future generations, proved much more difficult. In this 
concluding  chapter,  I  consider  some  of  the  difficulties  of  universalism,  the 
justification  of  obligations  regarding  human  rights  and  future  generations,  the 
inevitability of moral choice, and the extent to which the human rights framework can 
be  said  to  be  an  appropriate  one  for  addressing  the  challenge  of  environmental 
sustainability. 
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8.1 Universal standards and the inevitability of moral choice
The  contemporary  human  rights  regime  is,  on  Jack  Donnelly’s  argument, 
supported by an overlapping consensus, analogous to that proposed by John Rawls as 
a means of devising domestic principles of justice. But there are also complaints that 
the apparent overlapping consensus on human rights is to some degree coerced, and 
that compliance with human rights standards is in fact ‘a question of political might 
and  realpolitik’  (Hussein  2001:77).  Donnelly’s  proposal  that  human  rights  be 
understood as a standard of civilisation arguably accepts the legitimacy of coercing 
compliance with purportedly universal values, indeed, of using coercive measures to 
universalise a particular set of values. Thomas Pogge’s institutional model of human 
rights, though innovative in focusing on the underfulfilment of human rights rather 
than  the  legal  protection  of  them,  also  implicitly  accepts  the  legitimacy  coercing 
compliance with a universal standard, and his commitment to human rights appears to 
be  premised  on  the  belief  that  people  would  naturally  prefer  human  rights  to 
alternative standards, such as a world organised according to the principles and values 
espoused in the Qur‘ān. 
The  question of  coercion  is  particularly  important  with  respect  to  Pogge’s 
theory because of his focus on the coerced imposition of an unjust institutional order 
on people as the crucial factor in determining the underfulfilment of human rights. In 
contrasting human rights with the Qur‘ān, Pogge signals his support for the apparently 
coerced  global  enforcement  of  human rights  standards,  but  not  of  Islamic law or 
morality. It would seem, then, that coercion is acceptable if the ‘right’ standards are 
being enfocred. But in a pluralistic world, this is a deeply problematic line to take, and 
indeed, one that has been taken before and used to justify a great deal of oppression 
and injustice  in  colonial  enterprises.  In  chapter  7,  I  also  highlighted examples  of 
enivronmental values, externally defined, being used to justify the violation of rights. 
In view of these past mistakes, as well as the difficulties of present pluralism, it might 
reasonably be argued that coercing compliance with human rights standards is not 
acceptable. 
But such an argument would commit one to the view that where human rights 
are violated by a person who does not recognise human rights, in a society that does 
not recognise human rights, then there is nothing to be done about it. However, as 
Andrew Nathan points out,  a neutral line over human rights is not possible, since 
trying to remain neutral in the face of oppression is in effect allowing the oppression 
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to  continue. Thus moral  choice is  inevitable.  Moral  choice is  also inevitable with 
regard to environmental sustainability. To delay decision or profess agnosticism as to 
the present generation’s obligations to future generations is to side with those who 
argue that the future will take care of itself, and therefore legitimise bequeathing to 
posterity  diminished  biodiversity,  over-stretched  life  support  systems,  exponential 
population growth, and toxic wastes that will last many thousands of years.
Richard  Rorty’s  solution to  this  problem is  simply  to  say that  it  does  not 
matter that there are no independent terms available in which to argue the case, liberal 
values  just  are  better  (than  the  Qur‘ān,  or  anything  else  yet  to  be  discovered  or 
argued),  but  commitment  to  human  rights  should  be  ironic,  in  the  sense  of 
acknowledging that it might turn out after all that this commitment is misguided. Until 
that is proven, however, human rights are our best bet. Michael Freeman and others 
complain that this leaves human rights as a moral standard considerably weaker than 
many would wish,  but  I  do not  see a  convincing argument  that  yields  a  stronger 
defence of human rights whilst sensitive to the problem of pluralism. Rowan Cruft’s 
idea of individualistically  justified human rights  is  perhaps a  candidate,  but  Cruft 
himself  acknowledges  the  epistemological  difficulties  of  such  approach.  The 
democratising  trend  in  Pogge’s  institutional  approach,  which  makes  individuals 
responsible for human rights insofar as they are enjoined either not to support human 
rights-disrespecting institutions, or where this is unavoidable, to take compensatory 
measures,  perhaps  allows  for  individual  judgment  about  the  individual  rights  of 
others, but I argued in chapter 4 that an institutional model of human rights alone is 
not sufficient; legal protection, as well as collective action to undermine oppressive 
institutions, is required if disempowered groups are to be protected. 
Turning to the inevitability of moral choice about environmental sustainability 
and  the  fate  of  future  generations,  there  are  plausible  grounds  for  arguing  that 
commitment to environmental sustainability need not be so ironic. There is now a 
well-documented  scientific  consensus  on  human  responsibility  for  environmental 
problems  such  as  global  warming  and  climate  change.  It  is  also  clear  that,  as 
ecologically embedded beings, it is in the interests of all humans that the environment 
be  sustained  at  least  to  the  minimum  standard  necessary  to  support  life. 
Environmental  sustainability  may  therefore  have  the  potential  to  be  a  fairly 
uncontroversial universal value. While some greens have been thought to be ‘anti-
science’  in  view  of  their  hostility  to  increasingly  dangerous  technological 
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development,  others  such as  Ulrich Beck have emphasised  the  value of  a  critical 
engagement with scientific  debate.  Scientists  can advise of the potential  risks and 
gains consequent upon any particular development, but citizens must then reflect on 
this information to make judgments about what degree of risk they are willing to 
accept in return for what level of technological development. In short, citizens must 
make  choices  about  what  they value,  and how much risk  or  what  costs  they are 
willing to accept in order realise their goals. Thus the way in which environmental 
sustainability  is  interpreted  makes  a  significant  difference  to  the  extent  to  which 
environmental degradation is avoided, and the costs incurred in terms of changes to 
patterns of living. In chapter 5 I argued that neither free market environmentalism nor 
ecological  modernisation  were  able  adequately  to  accommodate  both 
intragenerational justice and intergenerational justice, whereas ecological economics, 
though problematic in other ways, offered the possibility of a more robust model of 
environmental  sustainability,  but  required significant  changes in global patterns of 
production  and  consumption.  Reflection  on  environmental  decisions  implies  a 
judgment about the extent to which citizens today are willing to export costs to distant 
peoples,  be  they  contemporaries  in  other,  often  poorer,  countries,  or  future 
generations. As argued above, this moral choice is inevitable. It is clear, then, that 
environmental sustainability shares some illuminating features with human rights.
8.2 Concern for distant people and environmental human rights
There is also a parallel discernible in the problem of justifying support for 
human rights and environmental sustainability. Both depend on concern for distant 
people,  but  it  is  not  always  clear  what  is  presumed  to  be  the  motivation  or  the 
justification for individuals to care about distant people. Meanwhile, it is evident, both 
in the environmental externalities attendant upon economic globalisation, and in the 
chronic underfulfilment of human rights, that distant people are generally valued less 
than spatial  and temporal  contemporaries.  A number  of  possible  justifications  for 
human  rights  and  environmental  sustainability  were  considered  in  this  thesis. 
Justifications for human rights that are grounded in rationally derived philosophical 
foundations, such as Alan Gewirth’s, imply a model of the human being as a rational 
agent,  an  assumption  shared  in  certain  aspects  by  neoliberal  economics,  but  this 
individualistic  and  rationalistic  notion  is  not  universally  assented  to.  Gewirth’s 
dialectically  necessary method is  unable  to provide an answer  to Michael  Perry’s 
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question of what it is that makes human beings such special creatures that they are 
uniquely worthy of a particular standard of moral consideration. Perry suggests that 
the only coherent answer to this question is God. Freeman concluded that a secular 
justification for human rights is ultimately unhelpful,  but the plurality of religious 
doctrines,  in  addition  to  the  existence  of  atheists  and  agnostics,  suggests  that  an 
exclusively religious foundation for human rights will not suffice either. 
Moving away from this search for foundational truths, Donnelly proposes a 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus on human rights. This is to some extent an empirical 
claim,  but  it  is  also  flawed  as  a  justification  of  universal  human  rights,  since 
consensus is morally neutral – it indicates nothing as to the desirability of the subject 
of the consensus. It is also not a particularly strong basis on which to build support for 
human rights, since consensus now is no guarantee of consensus in the future. A third 
justificatory strategy was found in Rorty’s proposal that human rights be thought of as 
the desirable product of a sentimental  education. Here, the justification for human 
rights  is  based on the assumption not only that  individuals care about the fate of 
strangers, but also that they should. Rorty rejects rationalist appeals to universal truths 
and claims that there are no ‘morally relevant transcultural facts’ (Rorty 1993:116), 
but his defence of human rights in fact commits him to the assumption that suffering, 
and humans’ unique capacity for sympathy, are morally relevant transcultural facts. 
Thus there is evidence of a tentative theory of human nature in his argument. 
A more  troubling point  conceded by Rorty himself  is  that  many will  find 
sentiment too weak a foundation for human rights, particularly since, as he argues, 
sympathy has a better chance of moving individuals to act in defence of human rights 
when the individuals in question enjoy relative security. Yet it is human security that 
increasing  environmental  degradation threatens  to  undermine.  Freeman doubts  the 
strength of Rorty’s  sentimental  basis for human rights,  but he ultimately in effect 
takes  a  Rortyan  line when he  argues that  individuals  face ‘a  nonrational  decision 
either to accept or reject solidarity with humanity’ (Freeman 1994:514).  The most 
persuasive justification for human rights rests  on the intuition that  people do care 
about  their  fellow human beings,  and Rorty therefore proposes  that  a  sentimental 
education be cultivated as the best means to bolster support for human rights, as an 
expression of this ‘care’. Though weaker than appeals to rational foundations claim to 
be, this is consistent with both secular and religious beliefs, insofar as it does not 
address the question of why humans are special, but simply assumes that they are. 
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On  the  other  hand,  appeals  to  rational  self-interest  can  be  said  to  justify 
environmental sustainability in terms of the ‘restraint principle’ proposed by Marcel 
Wissenburg. Here, it is in a first generation’s rational interest to invest in protecting 
the environment as a means to secure the trust of succeeding generations that will 
overlap with the first generation, and, on the basis of these bonds of trust, subsequent 
generations will feel obliged to care for the first generation in their old age. But some 
environmental problems, such as climate change, build up incrementally over long 
periods  of  time,  thus  it  would be  possible  for  the  first  generation to  degrade the 
environment in ways that will not impact on overlapping generations, but will impact 
several  generations  hence.  Conversely,  a  first  generation  might  wish  to  invest 
significantly in environmental protection to try to reverse environmental damage, thus 
incurring substantial costs and making changes to patterns of living that would impact 
negatively  on  the  relative  welfare  of  overlapping  generations,  but,  if  continued, 
benefit distant generations. Thus it is possible that first generation would impose on 
contiguously  or  immediately  overlapping generations  substantial  costs  without  the 
promise of benefits within their lifetimes. In this scenario it is only rational for the 
first generation to act as described if it is assumed that overlapping generations will 
care sufficiently about more distant future generations to accept the burden. But this 
moves the argument beyond self-interest. Rational self-interest can only underwrite a 
weak model of environmental sustainability. Green theorists who have promoted the 
idea  of  environmental  stewardship,  such  as  Terence  Ball  and  Robin  Attfield,  do 
generally seem to assume that most people have a sentimental concern for the fate of 
future generations. As with human rights, it might be thought that sentiment is too 
weak a basis on which to ground arguments for environmental sustainability, but the 
upshot of my analysis  is that such arguments are more persuasive than appeals to 
reason. 
However,  I  do  not  suggest  that  sentiment  alone  is  a  sufficient  basis  for 
justifying either human rights or environmental sustainability. What is also needed is 
knowledge of the potential and actual impacts of actions, which in turn is dependent 
upon an understanding of humans as both socially and ecologically embedded beings, 
and in particular  an awareness of individuals’ inevitable interconnectedness in the 
context  of  globalisation.  Possible  routes  to  generating  such  knowledge  include 
Andrew Dobson’s notion of post-cosmopolitan citizenship discussed in chapter 6, but 
I  argued  that  the  historical  approach  implied  there  is  ultimately  unhelpful  to  the 
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forward looking task of realising environmental sustainability. On the other hand, a 
reinvigorated  notion  of  ‘environmental  human  rights’,  taking  account  of  the 
ecological  embeddedness of human rights and adopting from Pogge’s institutional 
model the focus on the underfulfilment of human rights and on negative duties not to 
support  human  rights-disrespecting  institutions,  is  in  many  respects  a  promising 
proposal. Yet, it is misguided to propose simply adding environmental claims to the 
existing list of human rights, in the hope of capitalising on the pre-existing consensus 
on human rights, or taking the status of human rights as given, as has been suggested 
in the literature on both human rights and environmental politics. Moreover, if the 
assumed sentimental concern for the fate of future generations proves in fact to be 
mistaken, then, even if generally respected and fulfilled, environmental human rights 
are likely to secure a weaker model of sustainability than that which I have endorsed. 
Human rights  do  not,  then,  provide a  sufficient  framework for  responding  to  the 
challenges  posed  by  environmental  sustainability.  Nevertheless,  a  renewed 
understanding of human rights may well prove instrumental in furthering the goal of 
environmental sustainability.
This thesis had as its key aim an assessment of the interaction between human 
rights and environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation, with specific 
reference to the question of the extent to which the challenges of the environmental 
problems associated with economic globalisation could be met within the terms of the 
human rights framework. My investigation has demonstrated the contested character 
of  much  of  the  terrain  and  exposed  the  inadequacies  of  many  of  the  arguments 
employed  therein.  It  also  supports  the  conclusion  that  sentiment,  informed by  an 
understanding  of  humans  as  socially  and  ecologically  embedded  beings,  though 
perhaps a weaker foundation for either human rights or environmental sustainability 
than  many  would  wish  for,  nonetheless  provides  a  motivation  for  (and  the  best 
available justification of) caring about others, which is key to both human rights and 
environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation.
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